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Resumen extendido
Introducción. El tema de estudio se ha enfocado hacia lo que se conoce como
Plataformas y Mercados Bilaterales. Estos son mercados con dos o más grupos de
agentes que necesitan interactuar para conseguir un beneficio que, en cada grupo,
depende del número de personas que hay en el otro grupo. El punto de partida
de la teoría de los mercados bilaterales es que miembros del grupo A no internal-
izan el impacto que su participación tiene sobre los miembros del grupo B. En este
contexto, la plataforma es una firma (o institución) que posibilita o facilita la in-
teracción entre los grupos e internaliza las externalidades que pudieran surgir entre
ellos a través de los precios. Son ejemplos de plataformas las tarjetas de crédito,
los centros comerciales, los portales web de subastas, las consolas de videojuegos,
los sistemas operativos, los canales de televisión y los periódicos. Si bien algunos
de estos mercados existen desde hace mucho tiempo, solo recientemente la liter-
atura económica los ha reconocido como “diferentes”. En particular, las primeras
publicaciones académicas no tienen una antigüedad superior a los cinco años.
En relación a estos mercados, la tesis que aquí se presenta se compone de cuatro
capítulos. El primero incluye un resumen crítico y recopilación de la literatura
en mercados bilaterales. El segundo capítulo analiza los efectos de demanda que
surgen al permitir que el lado vendedor (con mayor o menor poder de mercado)
fije un precio por su producto al lado comprador. El estudio permite realizar
una comparación entre los mercados de sistemas operativos para ordenadores y las
consolas de video juegos, mercados que representan ejemplos típicos de plataformas
tecnológicas. El tercer capítulo introduce un modelo de dos firmas asimétricas
para analizar los incentivos de las plataformas tecnológicas para hacer compatibles
sus respectivas aplicaciones. Se observa también el efecto que esta compatibilidad
podría tener en los incentivos de las firmas a innovar, en el bienestar de los usuarios
y en el bienestar total de la economía. El cuarto y último capítulo introduce
consideraciones de calidad entre los agentes en mercados donde la literatura sólo
ha tenido en cuenta los efectos de red existentes entre ellos.
Capítulo primero: Una revisión introductoria a las plataformas bilat-
erales. El objetivo de este capítulo es presentar a los lectores no familiarizados con
la literatura en mercados bilaterales los modelos canónicos presentes en Armstrong
(2006) y Rochet-Tirole (2003 y 2006). Se realiza también un análisis crítico de los
supuestos en estos modelos y una revisión de los mercados que han sido estudiados
con este marco teórico. Finalmente, se pretende además ubicar las contribuciones
de esta tesis en el mapa de la literatura existente.
Capítulo segundo: Estrategias de precios en plataformas de software.
Un supuesto importante presente en los modelos canónicos de mercados bilaterales,
y mantenido en la mayoría de los artículos en la literatura, es que los miembros de
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un grupo son indiferentes en relación al número de miembros del propio grupo. Este
supuesto excluye la posibilidad de competencia entre los agentes que participan en
la plataforma (ausencia de efecto rivalidad) e implica que vendedores y compradores
actúan como monopolistas.
El modelo que se presenta en este capítulo permite la competencia en el lado
de los vendedores y considera además los precios que el lado vendedor aplica a los
compradores a diferencia de los modelos canónicos donde los únicos precios que
existen son los que la plataforma fija a cada lado del mercado.
Se asume la presencia de una plataforma tecnológica (un sistema operativo o
consola de video juegos) que fija un precio a los desarrolladores de aplicaciones para
la plataforma y otro a los usuarios. Cuando los desarrolladores establecen el precio
que cobrarán a los usuarios por las aplicaciones, surgen dos escenarios alternativos
de estudio, que siguiendo la terminología empleada por Lerner y Tirole (2004),
se denominan "margen de demanda" y "margen de competencia". La diferencia
fundamental entre uno y otro margen radica en que en el primero los desarrolladores
fijan precios teniendo en cuenta el efecto que estos ejercen sobre la demanda total del
sistema (plataforma más aplicaciones) mientras que en el segundo fijan sus precios
en función de la valoración marginal por las aplicaciones de los usuarios. El margen
que en equilibrio estará activo viene determinado por el grado de sustitución entre
las aplicaciones y el número de vendedores. En la medida en que las aplicaciones
sean sustitutas cercanas es más probable que el margen de competencia esté activo.
Lo mismo ocurre si el número de vendedores es muy alto. Por el contrario, si las
aplicaciones no son muy sustitutas y/o el número de vendedores es muy bajo el
margen de demanda tenderá a estar activo.
El capítulo está relacionado a los artículos de Nocke, Peitz y Stahl (2007) y
Hagiu (2006a y 2006b), en el sentido de que el modelo permite capturar los efectos
de demanda que surgen cuando los vendedores/desarrolladores fijan precios. Sin
embargo, en los trabajos citados el margen de competencia está siempre activo, por
lo que la contribución general de este capítulo es identificar los nuevos resultados
que se generan en un contexto en el que el margen de demanda es el que está activo.
El estudio de los dos márgenes permite comparar la eficiencia de una plataforma
abierta o de "open source" (que no fija precios) versus una plataforma cerrada en
ambos escenarios. También se analiza la eficiencia de la integración vertical entre
la plataforma y el lado de los vendedores.
El modelo también permite analizar y explicar algunas características de los
mercados de sistemas operativos de ordenadores y consolas de video juegos. En
particular, ciertos hechos estilizados observados llevan a pensar que los desarrol-
ladores de aplicaciones para sistemas operativos están restringidos por el margen de
demanda, mientras que los desarrolladores de videojuegos lo están por el margen
de competencia (por ejemplo, las aplicaciones de sistemas operativos son menos
sustitutas entre sí que lo que parecen ser los video juegos; por otra parte, los con-
sumidores de video consolas confiesan poseer y comprar importantes cantidades
de video juegos y lo hacen de manera regular, lo que no es el caso en lo que a
aplicaciones de sistemas operativos se refiere).
En línea con estas interpretaciones, los resultados que arroja el modelo sugieren
que los gobiernos deberían promover el "open source" en el mercado de sistemas
operativos, pero no necesariamente en el de las consolas de videojuegos. El mod-
elo también explica la tendencia observada en las firmas que operan plataformas
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tecnológicas a estar integradas con las que se conoce como las "killer applications"
(las aplicaciones más demandadas o de mayor peso para los usuarios).
Capítulo tercero: Compatibilidad e innovación en mercados con una
firma dominante. Este capítulo pretende explicar los incentivos que tienen las
firmas que producen plataformas tecnológicas para hacer compatibles sus productos.
También se intenta analizar el efecto que la compatibilidad puede tener en los
incentivos de las firmas para continuar innovando y particularmente, el efecto que
la compatibilidad puede ejercer en el bienestar de los consumidores y en el bienestar
total de la economía.
Los problemas que los temas de compatibilidad despiertan han sido largamente
analizados en la literatura económica y de organización industrial, véase por ejemplo
Economides (1989), Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Matutes
and Regibeau (1988, 1989, 1992).
Uno de los aportes de este capítulo es introducir dos conceptos diferentes de
compatibilidad. En particular, se analiza lo que se denomina "compatibilidad en
las aplicaciones", que implica que las aplicaciones puedan ser utilizadas en difer-
entes plataformas. Por otra parte, se reconoce la "compatibilidad entre redes", que
implica que usuarios de diferentes plataformas puedan "conectarse" o intercambiar
información, por ejemplo, mantener correspondencia por e-mail. En este último
tipo de compatibilidad la presencia de efectos directos de red entre los usuarios es
fundamental. El modelo muestra que los resultados relativos a los incentivos de las
firmas y el efecto sobre el bienestar de promover un tipo de compatibilidad o la
otra pueden ser diferentes.
Se plantea un modelo de mercado con dos firmas de plataformas tecnológicas
donde cada una tiene asociada una aplicación completamente compatible, en el sen-
tido de que puede ser usada perfectamente con la plataforma. Al mismo tiempo,
esta aplicación no es compatible, o lo es en un grado menor, con la otra plataforma.
Las firmas son asimétricas en el valor que los usuarios otorgan a la aplicación com-
pletamente compatible. Esto determina entonces que existe una firma dominante
y una débil en el mercado.
Se intenta estudiar entonces cómo cada tipo de plataforma reacciona ante de
la posibilidad de aumentar el grado de compatibilidad de sus aplicaciones y como
afectan estas decisiones a sus beneficios y al bienestar de los usuarios.
En primer lugar, se observa que la firma dominante nunca está interesada en
promover la compatibilidad en las aplicaciones. Este resultado se explica por el
hecho de que la compatibilidad principalmente lleva a una disminución del poder
de mercado de la dominante al reducir su ventaja de diferenciación de su producto.
Por su parte, la firma débil siempre demandará esta compatibilidad. Sin embargo,
en relación a la compatibilidad entre redes, se muestra que ambas firmas encuentran
beneficioso promoverla.
Se remarca también que la compatibilidad no es siempre beneficiosa para los
consumidores. Además, en muchas circunstancias el interés de la firma dominante
en relación a la compatibilidad está en línea con el de los usuarios y opuesto al de
la firma débil, que por su parte siempre demandará compatibilidad. En este caso,
imponer un mayor grado de compatibilidad dañaría el bienestar total y el de los
consumidores.
Asimismo, se muestra que el efecto de la compatibilidad en el bienestar depende
esencialmente del nivel de complementariedad/sustitución de las aplicaciones. En
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particular, la compatibilidad impacta negativamente en el bienestar y los consum-
idores si las aplicaciones son sustitutas cercanas.
El nivel de las asimetrías en las aplicaciones y/o en el valor de la plataforma
puede influir también en el efecto de la compatibilidad en aplicaciones sobre el bien-
estar y los consumidores. En particular tiende a ser negativo cuando las asimetrías
son importantes. Se muestra también que la presencia de fuertes efectos directos de
red refuerza la potencial incidencia negativa de un creciente grado de compatibili-
dad en aplicaciones. Además, los resultados exhiben que un cambio marginal en la
compatibilidad entre-redes tiene siempre un efecto negativo para los consumidores
y pueden también ser negativo para el bienestar si las asimetrías son muy fuertes.
Finalmente, se demuestra que cuando los sistemas son independientes o comple-
mentarios la compatibilidad en aplicaciones debería ser promovida por cualquier
sector de la sociedad.
En relación a los efectos sobre los incentivos a innovar, los incentivos marginales
a invertir en el valor de la plataforma son crecientes en el grado de compatibilidad
para la plataforma débil, y también lo son los relativos a los incentivos a invertir en
la aplicación siempre y cuando las asimetrías sean importantes. Por el contrario,
para la firma dominante los incentivos marginales a invertir en la plataforma como
así también en el valor de la aplicación son decrecientes en el grado de compatibil-
idad. Por su parte, los cambios en el nivel de compatibilidad entre-redes afectan
positivamente los incentivos marginales a invertir de la plataforma débil pero neg-
ativamente los correspondientes a la plataforma dominante.
En pocas palabras, el capítulo destaca dos aspectos sobresalientes de la relación
entre compatibilidad y bienestar. Primero, los bienes sustitutos son "malos" para
la compatibilidad. Si los productos son sustitutos, la compatibilidad tiende a ser
negativa para el bienestar. Segundo, las potenciales consecuencias negativas de
la compatibilidad son más probables cuando las asimetrías son fuertes. Estos son
nuevos resultados en el tema, como así también el estudio que se hace de la compat-
ibilidad desde la perspectiva de la complementariedad/sustitución entre los bienes
a los que se les impondría la compatibilidad.
El análisis reúne varias implicaciones que permiten evaluar decisiones de política
del "mundo real". En particular, los resultados son un llamado de atención para
algunos puntos relacionados con el caso entre la Comisión Europea y Microsoft.1
En esta investigación se muestra que a la hora de decidir sobre la necesidad
de forzar la compatibilidad, la existencia de una firma dominante no es argumento
suficiente para sostener que es más deseable la compatibilidad. Además, los efectos
de red, generalmente presentes en este tipo de industrias, pueden ser también una
razón para no forzar la compatibilidad en aplicaciones. En relación a los incentivos a
innovar, cuando la Comisión tomó la decisión de forzar la compatibilidad argumentó
que el remedio sería bueno para la innovación. En esta investigación se muestra que
la compatibilidad genera un efecto "free-rider" que lleva a que la compatibilidad
desincentive la innovación tanto de la firma dominante como de la débil.
Capítulo cuarto: Plataformas bilaterales con diferenciación en cali-
dad. La literatura en mercados bilaterales se ha concentrado preferentemente en
los efectos de red existentes entre los agentes, ignorando que en ciertos mercados
1En marzo 2004 la Comisión ordenó a Microsoft a abrir a los competidores códigos confiden-
ciales que permitirían la compatibilidad entre los productos de los últimos y los de Microsoft. La
decisión fue confirmada en septiembre 2007 por la Corte Europea de Primera Instancia.
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la calidad o el tipo de los agentes que participan en la plataforma puede afectar
también la utilidad del resto de los usuarios. Por ejemplo, en los centros comerciales
o "shopping malls" se observa que algunas marcas (lado de los vendedores) están
presentes en todos ellos mientras que otras no. Al mismo tiempo, los compradores
visitan un centro comercial en función de las marcas que esperan encontrar. Tam-
bién suele observarse que marcas caras eligen estar agrupadas a pesar de que esto
refuerza la competencia entre ellas. Un ejemplo de este fenómeno son los Village
Outlets (Fidenza Village en Milan, Bicester Village en Londres, Las Rozas Village
en Madrid, etc.) que reúnen sólo marcas muy caras como Loewe, Versace o Dior.
En este capítulo se presenta un modelo simple de plataformas que compiten
en precios con dos nuevas características. Primero, las plataformas al fijar precios
deciden endógenamente la calidad del servicio que ofrecen. Segundo, cada grupo
exhibe preferencias no sólo sobre el número de agentes en el otro lado del mercado,
sino también sobre su tipo o calidad. Además, los vendedores podrían también
interesarse en el tipo de agentes presentes en su mismo lado.
El modelo propuesto considera agentes heterogéneos y en particular, vendedores
de dos tipos: el tipo alto que recibe beneficios esencialmente de la presencia de com-
pradores de "alta calidad" mientras que los vendedores de tipo bajo se benefician
de la masa (cantidad) de participación de los compradores. El modelo se extiende
luego al caso donde los vendedores de tipo alto también atienden a la calidad de los
otros vendedores Esta característica que se denomina "efecto reputación" implica
que los vendedores de tipo alto prefieren no compartir plataforma con los de tipo
bajo.
El interés del capítulo es examinar el conjunto de condiciones bajo las cuales,
más allá de la presencia de los efectos de red, en el mercado coexistirá más de una
plataforma.
Un resultado central del estudio es que aunque las plataformas son ex-ante
simétricas, en equilibrio pueden surgir dos plataformas asimétricas en calidad y/o
beneficios. Para obtener este resultado es esencial la presencia del efecto reputación.
Los resultados muestran además que los compradores maximizan su bienestar con
un resultado de mercado en el cual están presentes dos plataformas con diferente
calidad.

Abstract
In the first chapter we present a critical survey of the literature on platforms
and two-sided markets. First, we introduce two general models, called the “Arm-
strong’s model” and the “Rochet-Tirole’s model”, to understand the main issues
that arise in the literature. Second, we analyze some of the main assumptions of
the above models. Finally, we review some articles related to specific markets and
to competition policy issues.
In the second chapter we study software platforms for which the total amount
that users spend depends on the two-sided pricing strategy of the platform firm,
and on the pricing strategy of application developers. When setting prices, de-
velopers may be constrained by one of two margins: the demand margin and the
competition margin. By analyzing how these margins affect pricing strategies we
find some conditions which explain features of the market of operating systems and
its differences with the one corresponding to the video consoles. The problem that
arises when the platform does not set prices (as an open platform) is considered.
We show that policy makers should promote open source in operating systems plat-
forms but not necessarily in video consoles. We also analyze the incentives for a
platform to integrate with applications as a function of the extent of substitutabil-
ity among them and provide a possible explanation for the observed fact of vertical
disintegration in these industries.
Third chapter analyzes the effect of firm dominance on the incentives to become
compatible and how compatibility decisions affect investment incentives. We will
consider compatibility in two dimensions: compatibility of the complementary good
and inter-network compatibility. We show that if products are substitutes, com-
patibility tends to be welfare decreasing with the potential negative consequences
of increasing compatibility being more likely when asymmetries are strong. We
also find that in many instances the dominant firm’s interests regarding compati-
bility are in line with those of users, and are opposite to those of the weak firm,
which will always demand more compatibility to be enforced. Finally we show that
compatibility may harm innovation, particularly for the dominant firm.
In the fourth chapter we construct a simple model of platform price competition
with two main novel features. First, platforms endogenously decide the quality of
their ‘access service’ and second, each group exhibits preferences not only about
the number of agents in the other side of the market, but also about their type or
quality. Additionally, sellers may also care about the type of agents in their own
side. Our interest is to examine the set of conditions under which, in spite of the
presence of network effects, more than one platform coexist in the market. We
show that although there are two ex-ante identical platforms, in equilibrium they
could be asymmetric in quality and profits. In particular, buyers prefer a market
outcome in which two different quality platforms are present.
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Chapter 1. An Introductory Survey to Two-Sided
Platforms
1. Introduction
Think of a market where two groups of agents, B and S, need to interact among
them to get a surplus that, in each group, depends on the number of agents in the
other group. The starting point to the theory of two-sided markets is that members
of group i do not internalize the welfare impact of his participation on members
of group j. In this context, a platform is a firm (or institution) that enables or
facilitates the interaction between the two sides and internalizes the externalities
through prices.
In section 2, we present two general models of monopoly platforms that encom-
pass several special cases. In the first one, that we call the “Armstrong’s model”,
we assume that the platform incurs a fixed cost of serving a participant of group
i. Each customer has to pay a fixed charge to participate in the platform and her
demand depends on the charge and the number of participants in the other group.
In the second model, the “Rochet-Tirole’s model”, the surplus of customers i
arises when a transaction takes place and depends on the number of member in
side j. Participants pay a per transaction price and the platform affords a variable
per transaction cost. In this case, the demand of a member just depends on the
per transaction charge.
In the framework of their model, Rochet and Tirole (2006) set two features that
characterizes two-sided markets, namely the presence of indirect network externali-
ties and the impact of price structure on transaction volume. Furthermore, they set
a definition of two-sidedness: “Consider a platform charging per-interaction charges
aBand aS to the buyer and seller sides. The market for interactions between the
two sides is one-sided if the volume V of transactions realized on the platform de-
pends only on the aggregate price level a = aB + aS . If by contrast V varies with
aBwhile a is kept constant, the market is said to be two-sided”. It says that in a
two-sided market the price structure is non neutral. They also state that it implies
the failure of the Coase Theorem: in a Coasian world the gains from trade between
two participants depend on the price level but not its structure. In particular, the
failure of the Coase Theorem is a necessary condition for non neutrality of prices
although not sufficient.
A key problem of the platform is “getting both types of customers on board” in
order to have a product to offer. Indeed, the good or service is consumed jointly by
members of both sides and a wrong pricing structure could imply the non existence
of the product at all. The importance that the optimal pricing structure has is the
main difference with industries based on one-sided markets.
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We will see in the Armstrong’s model that the profit maximizing prices are
adjusted, relative to the cost, by the externality effect. In the Rochet-Tirole’s
model the total price charged to users on both sides has a relationship with the
marginal cost incurred by the platform per transaction. However, the particular
price charged to one side does not have generally any relationship either to that
marginal cost or to costs specific to that side and prices can be set below costs
as a consequence of a competitive practise. Furthermore, we can find new strong
implications relative to antitrust policy once we take into account the two-sided
nature of these markets.
In section 3 we present a non-exhaustive list of papers that work with particular
markets and in section 4 we present some papers dealing with specific issues in
competition policy.
2. The canonical models
This section presents the two canonical models of two-sided markets one intro-
duced by Armstrong (2006) and another one by Rochet and Tirole (2003). Both
models share some common characteristics: 1) There is a monopoly platform; 2)
There are two sides of the market or two groups that interact denoted by B and S,
with a continuum of members on each side; 3) A member of group i cares about
the number of members of the other group j who go to the platform but does not
care about the number of members of group i; 4) The platform sets a price on each
side of the market. The main difference between them relies on the fact that in
Armstrong platform charges are levied as a lump-sum fee, whereas in Rochet and
Tirole agents pay a per-transaction fee to the platform.
We will first explain both models and will present the main results that they
yield. We will then discuss some of their modeling assumptions, in particular those
regarding platform competition and sellers competition within a platform.
2.1 The Armstrong’s model. In a monopoly platform buyers and sellers
interact. An end-user of side i, i ∈ {B,S} , has to pay a fixed platform charge Ai
to participate in the platform. If N j denotes the number of side-j end-users who
decide to join the platform, then the net utility of an end-user on side i is given by
U i = βiN j −Ai,
where the parameter βi measures how a group i participant cares about the number
of participants in the other side.
Assume that the number of participants of each side is determined by N i =
φi(U i), for some increasing function φi, and that the platform incurs in a fixed cost
Ci for serving a group i participant. Then, platform’s profit equals
π = (AB − CB)NB + (AS − CS)NS ,
which can be expressed in terms of the offered utilities (by setting implicit prices
Ai = βiN j − U i) as
π = (βBNS − UB − CB)NB + (βSNB − US − CS)NS .
The profit maximizing prices become
Ai = Ci − βjN j + N
i
∂Ni
∂Ui
= Ci − βjN j + 1
σi
,
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or, alternatively, using the “Lerner” formula
(1)
Ai −
¡
Ci − βjN j
¢
Ai
=
1
ηi(Ai/N j)
,
where ηi(Ai/N j) = ∂N
i
∂Ui
Ai
Ni is the price elasticity of demand for group i, for a given
level of participation by the group j.
In a two sided-market the profit maximizing prices are adjusted, relative to
the cost, by the externality effect βjN j and the price structure is determined by
the relative externalities on each side, βi and βj . The side with the larger β is
more likely to receive larger charges than the side with lower indirect network
externalities. Furthermore, for “getting both sides on board”, the platform may
optimally set a zero or even negative price on the side that generates the largest
externality.
The socially optimal prices are
Ai = Ci − βjN j .
The optimal price for group i equals the fixed cost of serving this group adjusted
downward by the external benefit that an extra group-i agent brings to the agents
of the other group on the platform. In particular, optimal prices will be below cost
as long as βB and βS are positive.2
2.2 The Rochet and Tirole’ model. Consider a model where the surplus is
created by “transactions” between pairs of end-users (think of a credit card market
or of matchmaker services). Assume that there are no fixed costs but that there is a
variable cost c which is incurred when a transaction takes place and is therefore not
attributable to a single side alone. Each member on side i enjoys a per transaction
benefit bi and has to pay a per-transaction price ai. End-users are heterogeneous
over the transaction benefit and transactions between end-users involve no payment.
The net utility of a member on side i is defined by
U i = (bi − ai)N j ,
where the network externalities are reflected by the fact that the surplus of a cus-
tomer with bi depends on the number of customers j, N j . However, the demand
function
N i = P (U i ≥ 0) = N i(ai) i ∈ {B,S},
is independent of that number. Platform members use the platform if and only if
bi ≥ ai, thus the participation decision is determined by the per transaction surplus
and does not depend on the number of agents who will join the platform on the
other side.
Let the volume of transactions be NBNS , a multiplicative demand that cap-
tures the interaction between the two market sides.3 The platform chooses aB and
2The prices that maximizes the total welfare subject to the zero profits constraint for the
platform are
Ai = Ci − βjNj + (λ− 1)
λ
N i
∂Ni
∂Ui
, i ∈ {B,S}.
3See Evans (2003a) p. 341 for a discussion of this assumption.
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aS to maximize total profit
π = (aB + aS − c)NBNS ,
and the optimal price structure is characterized by
aB + aS − c = 1
σB
=
1
σS
,
where σi = ∂N
i
∂ai
1
Ni is a semi-elasticity.
In particular, prices can be characterized by formulae that are reminiscent of
Lerner’s formula:
aB + aS − c
aB
=
1
ηB
,
aB + aS − c
aS
=
1
ηS
where ηi = ∂N
i
∂ai
ai
Ni . Moreover, the total price a = a
B + aS chosen by the private
monopoly is given by the classical Lerner formula
a− c
a
=
1
η
,
where η = ηB + ηS , and the price structure is given by the ratio of elasticities
aB
ηB
=
aS
ηS
.
The condition to set the total price a = aB + aS in two-sided markets is
analogous to the Lerner condition for monopoly pricing in one-sided markets. The
key point is that, in equilibrium, the ratio of the prices charged by the platform
is proportional to the ratio of the elasticities of demand on the two sides. It is
important to notice that the price structure does not depend on c. Thus, the
particular price charged to one side may not have any relationship either with its
marginal cost or with any cost specific to that side. Furthermore, prices can be set
below costs as a consequence of a competitive practice.4
2.3 The integrated model. Rochet and Tirole (2006) develop a model that
integrates the two models presented above.5 Each member on side i enjoys a benefit
per transaction bi and a fixed membership benefit βi (positive or negative). On
each side i, end-users are heterogeneous over both benefits. Members on side i
pay to the platform Ai for membership and a usage fee ai. The platform’s costs
include a fixed cost Ci per member on side i and a marginal cost c per transaction
between two members of different sides. Transactions between end-users involve no
payment.
The net utility of an end-user on side i is
U i = (bi − ai)N j + βi −Ai.
4The prices that maximize social welfare subject to the constraint aB + aS = c satisfy
aB
ηB
[
V B
NB
] =
aS
ηS
[
V S
NS
],
where V i is the net surplus of side i from an average transaction.
5Authors consider a “Pure-membership model” the Armstrong model and a “Pure-usage
model” the Rochet and Tirole model.
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The number of members of side i is thus
N i = Pr(U i ≥ 0),
which generates “quasi-demand functions” defined by
(2) N i = N i(Ai, ai,N j) i ∈ {B,S}.
Platform’s profit are equal to
(3) π = (AB − CB)NB + (AS − CS)NS + (aB + aS − c)NBNS .
Under regularity conditions, system (2) has a unique solution characterizing
memberships NB and NS as functions of (Ai, ai). In particular,
NB = nB(AB, aB, AS , aS) and NS = nS(AB, aB, AS , aS).
If we define the price that the platform sets as
pi = ai +
Ai − Ci
N j
,
then equation (3) can be transformed into
Π = (pB + pS − c)nB(pB, pS)nS(pB, pS).
The optimal price structure is hence determined by
(4)
1
pB + pS − c =
∂nB
∂pB
1
nB
+
∂nS
∂pB
1
nS
=
∂nB
∂pS
1
nB
+
∂nS
∂pS
1
nS
.
Note that it takes into account the direct effect of the price of side i on the quasi-
demand of side i and the indirect effect of this price on the quasi-demand of side
j.6
2.4 Modeling assumptions.
2.4.1 Platform competition. The two canonical models assume that there is
just one platform.7 In this subsection we present some extensions of the canonical
models that allow for platform competition.
Whenever there is more than one platform it is necessary to define if agents
on each side patronize only one platform (single-home) or more than one platform
(multi-home). In particular, we have to set if this feature is exogenously imposed
or if it is an equilibrium result. There are three cases to consider: (i) both sides
single-home, (ii) one side single-homes while the other multi-homes, and (iii) both
sides multi-home.
In what follows we first present the main results derived under platform com-
petition under the proviso that each agent can only join a single platform. We will
then allow for multihoming and endogenous patronizing.
6In terms of elasticities expression (4) can be rewriten as
pB + pS − c
pB
=
1
ηB + ηSB
and
pB + pS − c
pS
=
1
ηS + ηBS
·
where ηiand ηij are the price elasticity of demand and the cross elasticity of demand, respectively.
7This is a restrictive assumption given that empirically it is difficult to find a real-life market
organized around a single platform.
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Exogenous two-sided single-homing. Armstrong (2006) extends its “pure-membership
pricing” model to study competition between two platforms. He assumes that plat-
forms are horizontally differentiated and that, for exogenous reasons, each partici-
pant chooses to only participate in one platform. The number of members of group
i who goes to platform 1 is given by
N i1 =
1
2
+
U i1 − U i2
2ti
where ti is the differentiation parameter on side i, with ti > βi.
Symmetric equilibrium prices are given by
AB = CB + tB − β
S
tS
(βB +AS − CS), (5)
AS = CS + tS − β
B
tB
(βS +AB − CB).
In a Hotelling model without network effects, the equilibrium price for group
i would be Ai = Ci + ti. However, in a two-sided market the price is adjusted
downwards by the factor β
j
tj (β
i+Aj−Cj). The term (βi+Aj−Cj) represents the
benefit to a platform of having an additional customer of group j and β
j
tj measures
the additional j customers attracted by an extra group i customer. Solving the
simultaneous equations in (5), the resulting expressions for equilibrium prices are
AB = CB + tB − βS , (6)
AS = CS + tS − βB.
The platform will charge more to the group that is less competitive and that yields
smaller benefits to the other group. Thus, a price in (6) can be negative for the side
of the market which has lower fixed and transport costs and/or which generates a
larger external benefit to the other side. These prices can be expressed as
(7)
Ai −
¡
Ci − 2βjN j
¢
Ai
=
1
ηi
, i ∈ {B,S}
where ηi = pi/ti is the platform’s own-price elasticity of demand. Note that, when
a duopoly platform increases the price inducing an agent from a group to leave, this
agent goes to the rival platform, making it harder to attract agents from the other
group. This is the reason behind the term 2βjN j in formula (7) when compared
with the monopoly expression in (1) for which the corresponding term is only βjN j .
Multi-homing and endogenous patronizing. The presence of multihoming on at least
one market side influences the degree of competition. The competitive pressure
will be stronger wherever a platform can get rid of its competitors, which occurs
more easily where singlehoming prevails. A “competitive bottleneck” situation will
emerge whenever one side, say group B, continues to deal with a single platform
whereas the other side wishes to deal with both. The outcome is then that the
platform ignores the interests of the multihoming group while strongly attends
those of the singlehoming group.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) propose an imperfect-competition Bertrand game
between two matchmakers in the presence of indirect network externalities. They
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analyze both the case of exogenous two-sided single-homing and the case of multi-
homing. They show that the relevant pricing strategies are of a “divide-and-
conquer” nature, subsidizing the participation of one side (divide) and recover-
ing the loss on the other side (conquer). It implies a highly contestable market
structure when single-homing is imposed. In contrast, when users wish to engage
in multi-homing, it is more difficult to “conquer”, and platforms can avoid fierce
competition.
Armstrong and Wright (2007) discuss the conditions under which agents sin-
glehome or multihome under the assumption of non-negative prices. In the context
of a standard Hotelling model of price competition between two platforms, agents
make a subscription decision (a pure-membership model). They prove that a unique
equilibrium may emerge in which all users single-home, the two platforms offer the
same pair of prices, and half of the agents from each group join each platform. In
particular,
if CB + tB ≥ βS and CS + tS ≥ βB equilibrium prices are like (6);
if CB + tB < βS equilibrium prices are
AB = 0
AS = CS + tS − β
B(βS − CB)
tB
;
if CS + tS < βB equilibrium prices are
AB = CB + tB − β
S(βB − CS)
tS
AS = 0.
The prices of the first case have been analyzed in the previous subsection.
Consider the second case (the third one is analogous). When the asymmetry in the
size of the network effect between the two groups is sufficiently large, i.e., when
CB + tB < βS and CS + tS ≥ βB, platforms would pay buyers to join, given the
resulting increase in demand from sellers. Under the assumption of non-negative
prices, this results in platforms offering buyers a zero price, which is a usual strategy
in two-sided markets. Furthermore, platforms will compete very aggressively for
sellers in order to attract more buyers, and hence, due to the positive indirect
network effects, to attract more sellers.
Under product differentiation on one side, for instance tS = 0 and tB > βB ,
sellers view the competing platforms as homogenous (ignoring the number of buyers
on the platforms), while buyers prefer using a particular platform over the other.
In this case, buyers will tend to singlehome, what is an incentive for sellers to
multihome in order to maximize network benefits. If there are no network effects
for one side, i.e., βi for some i, the equilibrium is unique and symmetric, group i
singlehomes and group j multihomes.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide an extension of their “pure-usage pricing”
model in which there are two competing platforms, 1 and 2. The buyer’s gross
surplus is denoted by bBi when the transaction takes place on platform i. In con-
trast, the sellers gross surplus is bS no matter the platform they join. It is further
assumed that (bB1 , b
B
2 , b
S) are private information and are drawn from continuous
distributions. The charges set by platform i are aBi to the buyer side and a
S
i to
the seller side. Under a symmetric distribution of (bB1 , bB2 ) there is a symmetric
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equilibrium (aB1 = aB2 = aB and aS1 = aS2 = aS with ) where the sellers multihome,
and such that
(8) aB + aS − c = a
B
ηB0
=
aS
(ηS/σ)
,
where ηB0 = −
pB∂dBi /∂p
B
i
dB is the “own-brand elasticity of demand for buyers”, d
B
i is
the proportion of buyers that trade in platform i, and σi measures the “loyalty” of
consumers of platform i with dB1 = dB2 = dB and σ1 = σ2 = σ in the symmetric
equilibrium pricing of equation (8).8 Note that (8) resembles the analogous formula
in the monopoly case. On the buyer side, ηB0 plays now the role of η
B with ηB0 > η
B .
On the seller side ηS is adjusted by σ, and coincides with the result in the monopoly
case when all buyers singlehome so that σ = 1. In contrast, if buyers multihome
(σ → 0) the charge to sellers tends to decrease as they have now more options.
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) model the competition between two platforms
within a vertical differentiation framework where quality in one platform is endoge-
nously determined by the size of the network in this platform. In other words, the
platform with the larger number of members on side i, is seen by members on side
j as a good of higher quality than the other platform. Assuming heterogeneous
agents, authors show that when multhoming is allowed there is a unique equilib-
rium exhibiting positive profits for both firms. Monopoly prices are set on the side
that multihomes and products are given for free on the side that singlehomes. This
equilibrium, which is the unique equilibrium outcome, has similar features to the
equilibrium in Armstrong (2006) when he assumes single-homing on one side and
multihoming in the other.
Viecens (2008a) constructs a simple model where platforms endogenously decide
the quality of their ‘access service’, the buyers singlehome and sellers are allowed
to multihome. The sellers are of two types, high and low, and the quality of a
platform depends on the number of high type sellers relative to the total number of
sellers in the platform. It is shown that ex-ante symmetric platforms may become
asymmetric in equilibrium. Moreover, depending on parameter values, different
type of sellers may follow different strategies, i.e., an equilibrium where high type
sellers multihome but low type sellers join only one platform may arise.
2.4.2 End user’s market: no rivalry effects vs. competition. An important
assumption introduced in the canonical models, and kept in many follow-up papers,
is that a member of group i does not care about the number of members of her
own group. This assumption excludes competition between subjects within the
same platform (no rivalry effects) and implies that retailers and consumers act as
monopolists.
Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007) discuss platform ownership in a model where
competition between sellers exists. They consider a continuum of sellers and denote
a seller’s (gross) variable profit by
Π(ms) = z(ms)π(ms),
where ms is the measure of entering sellers (it is also the number of goods bought
from the sellers since consumers buy one good from each of them). The term
π(ms) is the seller’s variable profit per unit mass of buyers and z(ms) is the mass
of buyers visiting the market place, which is increasing in ms. They assume π(ms)
8The σ is equal to 1 if platform i buyers stop trading when sellers leave that platform.
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will decrease with ms by two reasons: first, there is a market share effect : for given
prices, if the amount of sellers increases buyers buy less from each seller, and second,
there is a price effect : as the amount of sellers increases, prices fall as competition
increases. Regarding the impact of ms on variable profits, it will depend on the
interplay between two contrasting effects: on one hand, a positive indirect network
effect that makes sellers’ profit to increase as the number of firms on its own side
increases by the impact of z(ms) on profits, and, on the other hand, a negative
competition effect which makes firm’s profit to decrease as the number of firms on
its own side increases via π(ms). They show that the platform ownership structure
and the total welfare will depend on the strength of these two aforementioned
effects. In particular, if the positive indirect network effect is the strongest, then
equilibrium platform size under monopoly ownership is larger than under dispersed
ownership and a monopoly is the socially preferred ownership structure. In contrast,
if the competition effect is the strongest then monopoly ownership induces a smaller
platform than an open ownership structure.9 In particular, under closed ownership
and weak indirect network effect allowing sellers to integrate downwards onto the
platform may be socially beneficial.
Hagiu (2006) explicitly considers the price that sellers set for the good that they
sell to consumers. He assumes that sellers act competitively, thus,for a given gross
consumers’ surplus V (ms) , sellers set a price equal to the marginal contribution
of a new variety to the surplus, in a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., p = V 0 (ms). The
author shows that one platform yields a higher social welfare than two platforms.
It mainly occurs because the monopoly platform offers more product diversity to
its users than any of the two competing platforms given that it is able to internalize
a larger share of user benefits.
Viecens (2007) works with a model similar to that in Hagiu (2006b) and con-
siders the case where sellers have some market power. It follows that they can set a
price pˆ that maximizes their profits, provided that pˆ < V 0 (ms) .10 This scenario al-
lows to consider the reduction in the demand for the platform when contemplating
a price increase in the product of the sellers, an effect that has been largely ignored
by the literature. Furthermore, we show that π(ms) is not necessarily decreasing.
The model also permits to analyze the incentives for a platform to integrate with
the seller side as a function of the extent of substitutability among their goods.
2.4.3 Overview. The table below summarizes the main modelling assumptions
adopted in the literature discussed so far.
Platform competition End user’s market
Armstrong (2006) Monopoly and Hotelling No rivalry effects
Armstrong and Wright (2007) Hotelling No rivalry effects
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) Duopoly No rivalry effects
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) Vertical differentiation No rivalry effects
Hagiu (2006) Monopoly and Hotelling Competition
Nocke, et al. (2007) Monopoly Competition
Rochet and Tirole (2003) Monopoly and duopoly No rivalry effects
9The authors define a closed platform or club, as one in which access can be restricted by the
incumbent intermediaries. An open platform in their setting is not one which sets zero charges
but one with unrestricted access.
10If pˆ > V 0 (ms) holds, sellers are forced to set p = V 0 (ms) .
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2.5 An alternative model. Economides and Katsamakas (2006) propose a
very different model to the one presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2 in which firms do
also follow a two sided strategy. Their setting consists of one platform firm selling
platform A0 and an independent firm selling good B1, which is complementary to
the platform. The platform firm sells the platform to end-users at price p0. The
independent application provider sells the application to end-users at price p1 and
also pays a per unit access fee s to the platform firm (where s can be negative).
They assume a linear demand structure such that the demand function of the
platform A0 is given by
q0 = a0 − b0p0 − dp1,
and the demand of the application B1 is set at
q1 = a1 − b1p1 − dp.
They find that following a two-sided strategy yields an additional value for the plat-
form ( as compared to the one-sided strategy, i.e., when s = 0 is given). Note that
this value vanishes when the platform and the application are perfect complements,
i.e., when d = b0 = b1 = b and a0 = a1 = a. They also find that the platform sets a
negative s in equilibrium (subsidizes the independent application provider) as long
as the ratio a0/a1 is large.
3. Literature on particular markets
In this section we present a non-exhaustive summary of some of the markets
that have been analyzed by using the framework of two-sided markets.
3.1 Card Payment Systems. A platform that has been widely studied is
the card payment system where on the one hand card holders (buyers) and on
the other hand merchant affiliated to the platform (sellers) are both served by
service providers, issuing and acquiring banks, that set their prices for issuing and
acquiring.
Wright (2003) presents a monopoly platform model with two different types
of merchant pricing, monopoly pricing and Bertrand.11 For some of the analysis
consumers make a separate subscription decision (facing a membership fee) and
then a usage decision (earning rebates).
Let the gross benefit of each purchase to a consumer be v per good and the
gross cost to each merchant be d whith v > d > 0. Using a card for a transaction
generates a benefit of bB to cardholders and a benefit of bS to merchants, where
bB is continuously distributed on the interval [bB, b¯B], according to the distribution
function H(bB). All merchants have the same value of bS . A transaction done using
cards costs the issuer cI and the acquirer cA. The fee set by symmetric issuers for
issuing is denoted by f , the interchange fee that the acquirers pay to the issuers
is a and the fee that merchants pay is m. Acquirers are assumed to be perfectly
competitive setting the equilibrium merchant fee m = cA + a. Further, the timing
of decisions is as follows: 1. Payment system rules are set. In particular, a rule is
set whereby merchants are either allowed to set a surcharge for card payment, or
not. Also, the centralized interchange fee a is set. 2. Issuing and acquiring banks
set their prices for issuing and acquiring respectively (f and m). 3. Consumers and
11Ses also Rochet and Tirole (2002). Guthrie and Wright (2007) extend the model in order
to discuss two competing payment schemes.
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merchants decide whether to join the payment network. 4. Merchants set prices
for goods (pcard and pcash). 5. Consumers decide which merchant to purchase from
and what payment method to use.
Two cases are analyzed: “merchant surcharging”, where merchants can set a
surcharge on goods purchased with cards, and the “no-surcharge rule” case.
Merchant surcharging. When surcharging is allowed, Wright (2003) finds a
unique equilibrium where monopolistic merchants engage in excessive surcharging.
The marginal cardholder, defined by bBm, satisfies the equation
(9) bBm = f(b
S − cA) + 1−H(b
B
m)
h(bBm)
,
where pcash = v and pcard is set to maximize the merchant’s profits which are given
by
π = H(bBm)(v − d) + (1−H(bBm))(pcard − d+ bS −m).
Inspection of equation 9 shows that the marginal cardholder can be defined without
reference to the interchange fee (neutrality of intercharge fees).
Under Bertrand competition the prices are pcash = d and pcard = d +m − bS
and the marginal cardholder is defined by bBm = f(bS − cA).
No-Surcharge rule. When a no-surcharge rule is in place, monopolistic mer-
chants set a uniform price p = v, the card association sets an interchange fee
a∗ = bS − cA and consumers will get and use cards if and only if bB ≥ f(bS − cA).
Under Bertrand competition results will depend on the relation ship between
mercahnt benefit bS and merchants fee m. In particular, if bS ≤ m then merchants
will either accept only cash sales at a price pcash = d or will acept both card sales
and cash sales at a common price p∗ = d + m − bS . If bS > m, in a competi-
tive equilibrium merchants will discount for card purchases, setting pcash = d and
pcard = d+m− bS , with at least one firm accepting cards at these prices. In either
case, the marginar cardholder is defined by bBm = f(b
S−cA). Note that if merchants
are forced to price the same for both card and cash, then customers will also induce
merchants to “separate” into those that accept cards and those that do not.
The author finds that both monopolistic pricing and perfect competition con-
strain the ability of card schemes to use interchange fees and the no-surcharge rule
in anticompetitive ways. Merchants with market power will not accept cards un-
less merchant fees are at or below the cost savings which card acceptance provides
them. On the other hand, competitive merchants will not be able to sustain any
cross-subsidy between cash and card customers under the no-surcharge rule. The
paper highlights the positive role of the no-surcharge rule in preventing excessive
merchant surcharging. In either case, the no-surcharge rule and privately set in-
terchange fees cannot reduce welfare, and in the case of monopolistic merchants, it
will be welfare enhancing.
3.2 Technology/Software markets. Evans et.al (2006) present an explo-
ration of the two-sided economics of software platforms. They offer detailed studies
of the personal computer, video game console, personal digital assistant, smart mo-
bile phone, and digital media software platform industries, focusing on the business
decisions made by industry players. The authors argue that in order to understand
the successes of software platforms, it is necessary to understand their role as a
technological ground where application developers and end users meet (i.e., their
role as a platform).
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Hagiu (2006) and Economides and Katsamakas (2006) focus on markets or-
ganized around a software platform allowing users to access the large number of
applications supplied by independent developers, who must gain access to the plat-
form. Both papers compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform
(such as Windows) with those based on an open source platform (such as Linux),
and analyze industry implications in terms of social welfare. Hagiu (2006) identi-
fies a economic welfare trade-off between two-sided open platforms and two-sided
proprietary platforms. The latters create two-sided dead weight losses through mo-
nopoly pricing but at the same time, when setting prices they partially internalize
the two-sided positive indirect network effects and the direct competitive effects on
the producers side. In contrast, open platforms internalize neither of these effects.
Because of this, the author finds that proprietary platforms can be socially more
desirable than open ones. Economides and Katsamakas (2006) find that the variety
of applications is larger when the platform is open source.
Viecens (2007) provides an explanation for some features of the market of op-
erating systems and for its differences with the video consoles market. Her results
suggest that policy makers should promote open source in operating systems but
not necessarily in platforms as video consoles. She also provides a possible expla-
nation for the observed vertical disintegration in these industries (an empirical fact
reported in Evans, et. al. (2006)).
Clements and Ohashi (2005) have estimated network effects in the home video
game industry and the effectiveness of console price and software variety as two
alternative ways of stimulating hardware demand.
3.3 Media industries. A media firm (the platform) works between two mar-
kets: the media market in which it sells magazines, newspapers, TV channels,
web-sites, etc. to a population of viewers, listeners and readers and the advertising
market in which it sells spaces to advertisers. The acceptance of media consumers
towards advertising is not clear, some of them dislike ads while others like them.12
Newspapers. Gabszewicz et.al. (2001) show in a very simple model of two
editorials that newspapers may moderate their political message in order to get
a large number of readers ranging from the extreme left to the extreme right in
political opinions. Readers are indifferent about the level of advertising implying
that the network effects go in just one direction.
TV. In Anderson and Coate (2005) two media platforms compete in a frame-
work where the content of tv programming is given. They analyze the conditions
under which there exist over- or underprovision of advertising. In the work of Peitz
and Valletti (2004) the platforms set the content and the level of advertising in a TV
market under pay and free-to-air schemes. Authors compare the welfare properties
of both systems.
Yellow pages. Rysman (2004) estimates two demand curves simultaneously in
order to measure the network effects between consumers of directories and advertis-
ers in yellow pages. He considers the inverse demand for advertising as a function
of the amount of advertising and the number of uses per consumer. Consumer de-
mand for usage is a function of the amount of advertising. He finds that the effect
12Authors consider advertisement as a nuisance and so it generates a negative externality. It
could be argued that advertisments in magazines and newspapers are not as much of a nuisace as
they are in TV, radio or web-pages ( a point made in Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006)). See also
Reisinger (2004) for a study of negative externalities in two-sided markets.
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of advertising on usage and the effect of usage on advertising are both positive and
significant, showing that network effects exist. The effect of the amount of adver-
tising on the price of advertising is negative and significant. He also examines the
welfare trade-off between competition and a monopoly structure and finds that,
despite the positive network effects, a competitive market structure is preferable.
3.4 Call termination on mobile telephone networks. Call termination
refers to the service whereby a network completes a call made to one of its sub-
scribers by a caller on another network. There are two types of call termination on
mobile telephone networks: termination of calls made from other mobile networks
(mobile to mobile, MTM), and termination of calls made by callers on the fixed-line
telephone network (fixed to mobile, FTM).
Armstrong and Wright (2007b) argue that call termination on mobile telephone
networks is a leading example of a competitive bottleneck.13 Because of this, in
the case of FTM termination the existing literature predicted termination charges
being set at the monopoly level. In the case of MTM call termination, the study of
two-way interconnection has led the literature to focus on whether mobile networks
can use a negotiated termination charge to relax competition for subscribers and
on showing that the predicted termination charge is below the efficient level (see
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998)).
Armstrong and Wright (2007b) combine a model of FTM calls with a model
of MTM calls what allows them to consider the impact of wholesale arbitrage and
demand-side substitution. They show that whenever a large number of mobile
networks exist, the market failure associated with MTM termination is negligible,
in contrast to the situation with FTM termination.
3.5 Overview. Next table summarizes the industry specific literature on two-
sided markets.
Card Payment Systems
Guthrie and Wright(2007)
Rochet and Tirole (2002)
Wright (2003)
Technology/Software markets
Clements and Ohashi(2005)
Economides and Katsamakas(2006)
Evans et.al (2006)
Hagiu (2006)
Viecens (2007)
Media industries
Anderson and Coate (2005)
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006)
Gabszewicz et.al. (2001)
Peitz and Valletti (2004)
Rysman (2004)
Mobile telephone networks Armstrong and Wright (2007b)
13When a competitive bottleneck takes place firms compete to attract the set of consumers
that wishes to deal with just one firm. The other set of consumers wishes to interact with the first
group so that firm can charge the second group higher prices for access to its captive customers.
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4. Literature on competition policy issues
Evans (2003b) remarks that the antitrust policy in these industries should con-
sider the particular economic principles that characterize them. A lack of under-
standing of the typical nature of two-sided markets, especially about the interde-
pendence of agents’ decisions, may lead to erroneous conclusions. In particular, he
notes that prices will not follow marginal costs on each side of the market, since price
levels, price structures, and investment strategies must optimize output taking into
account the indirect network effects available on both sides.14 Economides (2007)
discusses how antitrust law and regulatory rules should be applied to industries
where network effects are present. He finds that significant differences may ap-
pear between the effects of application of antitrust law in network and non-network
industries.
In a static one-sided context more competition always increases social wel-
fare because the deadweight losses due to pricing by firms with market power are
reduced. In a two-sided context however, an economic efficiency tradeoff arises be-
tween internalizing two-sided indirect network effects and creating two-sided dead-
weight loss. Thus, the desirability of competition between two-sided platforms may
be compromised.
Choi (2006) analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition
and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-
homing. He finds that tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed,
even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing.
Amelio and Jullien (2007) show that a multi-product monopoly platform uses bun-
dles to raise participation on both sides, which benefit consumers, whereas tying
may not be optimal for a contested platform in a duopoly context. The impact
on consumers surplus and total welfare depends on the extent of asymmetry in
externalities between the two sides.
Armstrong and Wright (2007) explore the role of exclusive dealing and show
that exclusive contracts will be used by platforms to prevent multihoming, allowing
one of them to attract one side exclusively and capture the network benefits gener-
ated to the other side. If we compare to multi-homing, such contracts are inefficient
since many buyers are forced to visit a platform they do not like, and the remaining
buyers no longer enjoy any network benefits. Doganoglu and Wright (2007) analyze
the ability of an incumbent to use exclusive deals or introductory offers to dominate
a market under the threat of entry when network effects are present. They find
that when consumers can only join one firm, the incumbent will make discrimina-
tory offers that are anticompetitive and inefficient. In contrast, if consumers are
allowed to multihome, they find offers that only require consumers to commit to
purchase from the incumbent are not anticompetitive. Corts and Lederman (2007)
estimate a model of hardware demand and software supply to investigate the scope
of indirect network effects in the home video game industry. They argue that the
increasing presence of non-exclusive software gives rise to indirect network effects
that exist between users of competing and incompatible hardware platforms.
Viecens (2008b) considers a model with two asymmetric platforms, each of them
with an associated application produced by competitive third party developers. She
analyzes the effect of making compatible the applications between the platforms.
14See also Rochet, J.C. and Tirole J. (2007).
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Under incompatibility the situation is like an ex-ante single-homing or exclusivity
of the developers, where compatibility leads to partial (or full) multihoming or
non-exclusivity. Users are assumed that single-home, a reasonable assumption for
industries organized as software platforms. The weak platform always promotes
compatibility. In contrast, the dominant platform never does when the market
is covered. If the market can be expanded, the higher value that compatibility
yields (a larger network, ver según Economides) may compensate the reducing
differentiation effect due to compatibility (that generates a loss of market power of
the dominant one, it experiments a reduction of its dominant position) and then
the dominant platform may also promote compatibility.
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Chapter 2. Pricing Strategies in Software
Platforms
1. Introduction
Many modern industries work around software platforms. Typical examples are
operating systems for computers, personal digital assistants, smart mobile phones
or video-game consoles. The usual feature is that they connect or attend different
types of customers that benefit from the interaction among them, characterizing
what is known in the literature as two (multi)-sided platforms. On the one side,
developers write the applications or software that improve the value of the platform
for the users. On the other side, users derive utility from consuming the system
(the platform and the applications). Because of this, users are concerned about the
system price, i.e., the total amount spent in the platform and the software. The
system price will hence depend on the two-sided pricing strategy of the platform firm
which in turn affects the market of complementary applications, and on the pricing
strategy in the developers’ market. This paper offers a model of a monopolist
two-sided platform that allows us to analyze the pricing strategies it will adopt,
the level of entry it will induce in the applications’ market and the welfare it will
generate. Furthermore, by considering that it can become either an open platform
or a proprietary one, we will study the implications of having one or the other.
Finally, issues related to the vertical structure of the platform and to the role of
outside options will also be analyzed.
Two well known and widely used software platforms are video consoles and
computer operating systems. In both, users care for the total charge of the system
(platform and applications). Nevertheless they have followed quite different pricing
strategies. Operating system platforms charge high prices to the users and subsidize
developers. However, video console firms charge low prices to users and make profits
on the developers’ side.15 We provide here a possible explanation for the difference
based on the margin at which developers compete. When setting prices, developers
may be constrained by one of two margins, the demand margin and the competition
margin. As long as the demand margin binds, prices of developers affect the overall
demand of the system and they set the price that maximizes their profits, a price
that is lower than their marginal contribution to the users utility. In contrast, if
competition margin binds, developers can not affect overall demand of the system
and they are forced to set a price equal to their contribution to the users surplus.16
What margin is binding depends on the number of applications in the market and
on the level of substitutability among them. In particular, the competition margin
15This issue is largely analyzed by Hagiu (2006b).
16Lerner and Tirole (2004) introduce the two margins to analyze pricing strategies in patent
pools.
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is more likely to bind as long as users prefer a system with many applications and
these are near substitutes. In the market of video console gamers state that price
is very important in deciding what game to buy. Some of them report having a
huge number of games and, for instance, among the ten top rated PlayStation 2
games, 3 of them belong to the adventure genre and 3 to the role-playing genre.17
These facts allow us to presume that developers writing for the video console are
constrained by the competition margin. However, users of operating systems need
a lower number of applications that indeed are far substitutes, like a text processor,
a spreadsheet or a browser, so that we suspect the developers in this market are
constrained by the demand margin. By analyzing how these margins affect the
pricing strategies and the profits of the platform, we find some conditions that
may help to explain features of the market of operating systems and its differences
with that corresponding to the video consoles, and shed some light on the different
pricing routes they have followed. We observe that the platform price for users is
higher when demand margin binds than when competition margin binds, and this
is consistent with the observed fact that operating systems charge high prices to
users, whereas video console firms charge low prices to them.
When considering the problem that arises if the platform does not set prices
(as an open platform), our model allows us to contribute to the current enthu-
siastic discussion on whether governments should promote (as some of them do)
open source platforms. Nowadays, 50% of European public administrations declare
that they use some open source software and the figure is 35% for the USA. In
addition, some large companies are also using open source programs.18 The litera-
ture is not conclusive about recommendations. Hagiu (2006b) shows that there is
a trade-off between the extent to which proprietary platforms internalize indirect
network effects through profit-maximizing pricing and the two-sided deadweight
loss they create. He shows that a proprietary platform may generate a higher level
of product variety and welfare than an open platform. In contrast, Economides
and Katsamakas (2006a) find that the variety of applications and social welfare is
always larger when the platform is open source. We here show that outcomes may
depend on the margin that binds. We find some results that suggest that policy
makers should promote open source platforms where demand margin binds (as op-
erating systems) but not necessarily in platforms where competition margin binds
(as video consoles). In particular, we prove that if demand margin binds, a pro-
prietary platform and an open platform will provide the same level of applications,
so that the latter will generate more welfare for users. However, if competition
margin binds a proprietary platform may generate a larger number of applications
and higher welfare to users than an open platform.
In a book about empirical business and economics aspects of software based
platforms, Evans, et. al. (2006) document that almost all the successful firms in
these industries started being one-sided, producing applications at home, and later
17See Game Daily: June 22, 2004 at http://www.gamedaily.com, Video Game Culture:
Leisure and Play Preferences of B.C. Teens - Summary of Findings at http://www.media-
awareness.ca, and www.gamespot.com, September 2006.
18In a sample of 600 large companies in USA, 35% use one or more "free" software and 39%
of 300 European large firms do so. Forrester Consulting, in El Mundo Digital 22/11/2006. In
Spain, for instance, some "Comunidades Autónomas" are supporting open source. In 2007, the
public administration of Extremadura will start to work with Linux. Andalucía and the Basque
Country are also heading in the same direction (El País Digital, 16/11/2006).
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they disintegrated becoming in firms producing only the platform and supported
by independent developers.19 We here try to provide a possible explanation for this
observed fact based again on the margin that binds for developers. We analyze the
incentives of a platform to integrate with applications (becoming one-sided) as a
function of the extent of substitutability among them. We derive some conditions
about the relationship between the welfare effects of a merger and the degree of
substitution of the applications. We also offer an explanation for partial integration
and we show that in the long run the platform will be partially integrated with the
killer applications for which demand margin will bind and will allow free entry for
developers of other applications.20
Finally, we study the effects on incumbent platform strategies for facing the
threat of an outside option that offers a surplus for developers or users. Examples
of outside options for users of the video game consoles are those games that can
be played in the computer or online in the internet.21 Writing these games is
the outside option that developers have to the video console. Outside options for a
proprietary operating system are the open platforms such as Linux. It is developing
quickly in terms of number, variety and quality of applications and availability of
support and other complementary services. In this sense, Linux is now an outside
option to Windows and nowadays it is considered a serious threat to the latter.22
Thus, we can interpret the analyses as an option that competes or threatens the
incumbent platform. Questions we try to answer with this analyses are, for instance,
given Windows being the incumbent firm, is it the grow importance of Linux in
the users’ benefit? What about developers of software?. If Linux becomes more
important so that the value of writing applications for it increases, is this profitable
for them? We find that it would not be in the interest of the users to promote the
outside options (i.e., online games or computer games) to the video game console
since, whenever competition margin binds, a higher outside option value for the
users may lead to a decrease in their surplus. However, an increase in the value for
developers of writing for an open platform such as Linux or Google has a positive
impact in the users’ surplus. This is the case because if demand margin binds,
an increase in the outside option of the developers will always increase the users
surplus.23
Since the model includes the pricing decision of developers, it captures the
demand effects that arise from the price set by the developers. In this respect the
paper is closely connected to Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2007) and Hagiu (2006a,
2006b). In particular, Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007) discuss platform ownership in
a model where competition between sellers exists. They consider a continuum of
19Several facts that we cite along the article are documented by Evans, et. al. (2006).
20For instance, Microsoft produces operating system Windows and Office package. Nintendo
wrote Mario Brothers, its killer game.
21Gamers report an average of 6,65 of hours spent per week on online-games and the home PC
use of time explains 25% of children’s and adult’s games. http://www.cybersurvey.com/reports
22See www.cnn.com, World Business, "Reclusive Linux founder opens up", 19/05/2006, and
"Microsoft vs. Open Source: Who Will Win?- HBS Working Knowledge, June 2005.
23In November 2006 Microsoft and Novell have signed a deal so that Linux programs can
operate with Windows. Rivals will collaborate on technical development and marketing programs
(The New York Times, 3/11/2006). A priori it seems the deal would benefit users and developers,
but it warrants further analyses.
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sellers and denote a seller’s (gross) variable profit by
Π(ms) = z(ms)π(ms),
where ms is the measure of entering sellers. The term π(ms) is the seller’s variable
profit per unit mass of buyers and z(ms) is the mass of buyers visiting the market
place, which is increasing in ms. They assume that π(ms) will decrease with ms by
two reasons. First, there is a market share effect: for given prices, if the amount of
sellers increases buyers buy less from each seller; and second, there is a price effect:
as the amount of sellers increases, prices fall as competition increases. Regarding
the impact of ms on variable profits, it will depend on the interplay between two
contrasting effects: on one hand, a positive indirect network effect that makes
sellers’ profit to increase as the number of firms on its own side increases by the
impact of z(ms) on profits, and, on the other hand, a negative competition effect
which makes firm’s profit to decrease as the number of firms on its own side increases
via π(ms). Our explicit model allow us to study in depth the driving forces of these
effects. And, in particular, we show that when the demand margin binds π(ms)
may not necessarily decrease as more sellers enter.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the model of a monopoly
platform in section 2, and in section 3 we analyze the developers problem. In section
4 we solve the problem of a profit platform and compare its performance to that
of an open platform in section 5. In section 6 we analyze incentives for integration
and partial integration of the platform with applications. In section 7 we introduce
outside options to the monopoly platform for developers and users. Finally, section
8 concludes.
2. A monopoly platform model
We assume that there is a monopoly platform and preferences of users are
defined over the platform, its applications and an outside good. Unless stated
otherwise applications are assumed symmetric. There is a measure one of users with
a preference for software variety and whose tastes for the platform are uniformly
distributed along the unit interval. The utility of a user located at distance t from
the platform is
U = V (M) + x− kt,
where M is the number of software varieties or applications, x is the numeraire
good and k measures the degree of platform differentiation,and V (M) is assumed
concave and increasing inM.24 Unless stated otherwise, applications are considered
symmetric and such that there is a certain degree of substitutability among them.
Every user who purchases the platform consumes at most one unit of each
application and maximizes her utility by choosing applications and consumption of
the outside good subject to the constraint
ΣMj=1pj + x+ P
U = y,
where pj is the price of a unit of application variety j, PU is the charge that platform
sets to the users and y is their income. A user’s decision can be decomposed into
24Similar utility functions are used by Church and Gandal, (1992, 1993, 2000) and Church
et.al. (2003).
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two decision problems. First, the user sets her optimal basket of applications among
the total number in the market,
(10) G
¡
M,ΣMj=1pj , P
U¢ = max
M≤N
{V (M)− ¡ΣMj=1pj¢}− PU ,
where N is the number of applications in the market.25 Then, the user buys the
platform if and only if
G
¡
M,ΣMj=1pj , P
U¢− kt ≥ 0.
The users demand for the system (size of the network) is hence determined by
td =
G
¡
M,ΣMj=1pj , P
U
¢
k
 [0, 1] .
Note that demand depends on the price that platform sets for the users, but
also on the number and prices of applications.
On the other side there are N¯ potential developers of applications, each of
them providing a single different application. Profits of developer of application i
are given by
πi = pitd − F − PD,
where F is a fixed cost of production, and PD is the price that platform charges
developers to allow them to write platform compatible applications.
Costs of the platform are assumed zero, so that platform profits are given by,
Π = PU td + PDN.
In this set-up we study the pricing strategies of the platform and developers.
To do so we consider a game whose timing is as follows: in the first stage, the
platform sets the charge to developers and these decide upon entry. In the second
stage, the platform sets the price to the buyers. In the third stage, developers
compete and set the prices for their applications to the buyers, then finally buyers
decide if they buy the platform and the number of applications. Timing above
takes into account that developers of applications join platforms before buyers do,
a common feature in the software and video-game markets. Since the development
of application is a costly activity, platform firms often deal with developers before
selling their product in order to ensure that enough applications will be available
to be used with the platform.26 An alternative timing is the one in Hagiu (2006b)
in which users decide about the developers products once they have purchased the
platform. This alternative timing can be embedded in our model as it is equivalent
to assume that developers can not affect the overall demand of the system when
setting prices, i.e., the competition margin does always bind.
3. Application prices, users payments and system effects
When a user considers buying the platform, her decision will depend upon the
prices set by developers. No user will purchase a video console without buying some
video games, nor an operating system without buying the application software.
Because of this we first study how developers set prices which will be a key point
in our analysis. We then solve the second stage of the game at which the platform
25With this formulation we are implicitly assuming that products are sorted by increasing
price.
26See Hagiu (2006a) for more details about the reasonability of this timing.
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sets the price for users, taking N as given. Before that let us define two elasticities
that will be used throughout the paper.
Ignoring the integer problem we define the elasticity of V (N) , a measure of
the degree of substitutability of applications for the users,27 as follows,
ev (N) =
V 0 (N)N
V (N)
.
Since V (N) is increasing and concave, it lies in the interval (0, 1) . For a given N,
we consider that applications to be near substitutes if ev (N) is sufficiently low.28
Similarly, let us define the elasticity of V 0 (N),
εv (N) =
V 00 (N)N
V 0 (N)
.
Given that V (N) is concave, it follows that εv (N) is negative. The relationship
between these two elasticities is the content of next lemma
Lemma 1 ev (N) is increasing in N as long as
(11) ev (N) < 1 + εv (N) ,
and is decreasing if the other inequality holds.29
3.1 Equilibrium application prices. The problem faced by developers is
similar to the problem faced by a licensor in a patent pool. In the context of
patents, the licensor problem has been studied by Lerner and Tirole (2004). In
their model, the surplus derived from using N patents is also a function V (N),
strictly increasing in N. They show that, when setting a licensing fee, an individual
licensor may be constrained by either of two margins that they call the competition
margin and the demand margin. In our context, developers are constrained in a
similar way. If the developer can not increase her price without, because of this,
being excluded from the set of applications selected by the users, (in user’s problem
(10)) then the competition margin binds. In contrast, demand margin is said to
bind for developer i, if she can individually raise her price without being excluded
but leading to a reduction in the overall demand for the system (effect on td). In
particular, if the demand margin binds, a developer chooses a price pi = bp such
that
(12) bp = argmax
pi
{piV (N)− P
U − (N − 1) bp− pi
k
}.
Consequently,
bp = V (N)− PU
(N + 1)
.
27It has also been interpreted as a measure of "degree of preference for variety" (see Kühn
and Vives (1999) and Hagiu (2005)).
28Our interpretation here is similar to the one in Lerner and Tirole (2004): given N patents
and two surplus functions V1 (·) and V2 (·), such that V1 (N) = V2 (N) , applications are more
substitutable for surplus function V1 (·) than for V2 (·) if V 01 (·) < V 02 (·) .
29For instance, functions V (N) = log(1 + N) and V (N) = (1− exp (−N)) have ev (N)
decreasing for all N > 0 and it is easy to show that they satisfy the reverse of (11) in all the
relevant range of N. Function V (N) = Nβ , with β < 1, presents constant elasticities, ev (N) = β
and εv (N) = β − 1, then ev (N) = 1 + εv (N) .
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In contrast, if the competition margin binds, the price that a developer sets is its
marginal contribution to the users utility, i.e.,ep = V (N)− V (N − 1) .
Note that ep depends on V (N) but neither on the demand of the system td nor on
PU .30 Besides, ep is always positive, whereas bp is not necessarily so, as it will depend
on the value of PU .
Next lemma follows immediately from propositions 1 and 4 in Lerner and Tirole
(2004).
Lemma 2 There exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium such that, if ep < bp,
developers are constrained by the competition margin and charge equilibrium priceep, whereas if ep > bp, developers are constrained by the demand margin and charge
equilibrium price bp.
As long as demand margin binds, developers set the price that maximizes their
profits and this price is lower than their marginal contribution to the users’ utility.
In contrast, if the competition margin binds, the price that maximizes profits, as
defined in (12) , is higher than the marginal contribution to users surplus and then
developers are forced to set a price equal to this contribution.
The consideration of both scenarios allows us to include in the analysis situa-
tions where the developers set the price that maximizes their profits and consider
the reduction in the overall demand for the system when contemplating an appli-
cation price increase (i.e. when demand margin is binding). Other papers in the
literature, such as Hagiu (2006b) and Church et. al. (2003), implicitly restrict
their analyses to an scenario where the competition margin is always binding. In
particular, Hagiu (2006b) assumes that developers set prices for applications once
users have bought the platform. Similarly, Church et. al. (2003) derive the equilib-
rium prices set by developers under the proviso that platform sales are invariant to
application pricing.31 Our contribution here will not only be to study the case in
which the demand margin binds, but also the comparisons that will follow. Clearly,
some of our results when the competition margin is the one that binds are similar
to those found in these previous papers.
3.2 What is the binding margin? We now try to establish what the con-
ditions are that determine the margin that will bind, by using lemma 3.1, and the
equilibrium values of prices bp and ep.
Lemma 3 Developers are constrained by the competition margin if the platform
sets a price to the buyers such that
(13) PU < V (N)− ep (N + 1) .
If the opposite inequality holds, developers are constrained by the demand margin.
30If we ignore the integer problem, ?p = V 0 (N) . Then, εv (N) also represents the applications
price elasticity to N when competition margin binds.
31In Church et. al. (2003), V (N) = Nβ . For this utility function they show that the Nash
equilibrium in developers’ prices is given by p (N) = V 0 (N) when N > 1 and β ≤ 1
2
, so that, in
our terminology, the competition margin binds.
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A closer look at (13) allows us to determine the binding margin as a function
of the primitives in the model.
Proposition 1 If
(14) ev (N) <
∙
1− 1√
N + 1
¸
,
the competition margin will bind. If the opposite inequality holds, the demand mar-
gin will bind.
Proof : See Appendix A.
The proposition above shows that the degree of substitution among applica-
tions and the number of developers determine the margin that binds. As long as
applications are near substitutes the competition margin is more likely to bind.
The same occurs when N is large, as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 1 If ev (N) is non-increasing there exists N∗ such that if N < N∗
the demand margin binds and if N > N∗ the competition margin binds. However,
if ev (N) is strictly increasing, N∗ may fail to exist, so that the demand margin
always binds.32
Proof See Appendix A.
From proposition 1 we deduce that those developers that write applications
which are not near substitutes or are indeed complements will tend to compete in
the demand margin. Similarly, those systems composed by a very high number
of applications are more likely to have developers competing in the competition
margin.
Using the results above, if one looks at the observed facts in the video game
industry discussed in the introduction,
1) 76% of gamers state that price is very/somewhat important in deciding what
game to buy,
2) From a survey of over 1,000 game consumers it is known that around 19.10% of
them purchase 1 or 2 games per month, 26.50% purchase 1 every two month and
6.90% 3 or more per month,33
3) Some players report having more than 50 games,
4) Among the ten top rated PlayStation 2 games, 3 of them belong to the adventure
genre and 3 to the role-playing genre. Among the ten top rated Xbox 360 games,
2 of them belong to the Ice Hockey genre.
Facts 1 and 4 suggest that there exists a near substitution between the games.
Facts 2 and 3 show that consumers usually own a system of console and video
games composed of many applications.
If we compare these facts with those observed for systems of operating systems
and applications (i.e. Windows) we find that it is not easy to find a consumer using
a huge number of applications.34 Moreover, applications are far substitutes (and
32This is the case for instance for V (N) = N +
√
N for which demand margin always binds.
Note that if N∗ exists, it is defined by N∗ =
?
1
1−ev(N∗)
?2
− 1.
33Zelos Group Survey: What Do Gamers Want? Everything. Electronic Gaming Business,
Nov 19, 2003. http://www.findarticles.com
34Evans et.al. (2006) point out that, as opposed to the case of video consoles, "there’s prob-
ably not much correlation between the number of applications that someone uses on a computer
and the value that person places on that computer".
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sometimes complements). A user may need a text processor and a spreadsheet and
also a browser. Then, we presume that developers writing for an operating system
are constrained by the demand margin whereas those writing for the video console
are constrained by the competition margin.
3.3 Users prices and system effects. In the second stage of the game, the
platform sets the price for users, taking N as given. When the demand margin
binds, the platform will set a price to the users as35
(15) bPU = V (N)
2
.
It then follows that the price set by developers will be bp = V (N)2(N+1) .
Meanwhile, if the competition margin binds, the optimal price that platform
chooses for the users is
(16) ePU = V (N)− epN
2
.
Equations (15) and (16) put in evidence the existence of "system effects" in
the industry. These effects arise when the value of one component depends on
complementary components in the system.36 The presence of system effects is
reflected in the price that the platform sets to users which increases with the number
of applications. In addition, when competition margin binds ep affects ePU because
of the complementarity between the applications and the platform. In particular,
for a given N, when the price of the applications increases, the benefit that the
platform makes per user decreases.37
When the competition margin binds, the relative charges paid by users can be
expressed as a function of ev (N),ePUePU + epN = 1− ev (N)1 + ev (N) .
Lemma 4 As long as applications are more substitutes, applications will be
relatively less expensive, and the platform can charge users more.
When substitution is strong on the developers’ side, prices in this market are
very low and the platform takes advantage of this situation setting a higher price
for the platform. Lemma 4 implies that it is profitable for the firm selling the
console to accept games that compete among them or are near substitutes, which
is consistent with the observed practice in the video game industry as stated in fact
4.
The relative charge paid by users for the platform when demand margin binds
is given by
bPUbPU + bpN = N + 12N + 1 .
35See proof of proposition 1.
36See Evans and Schmalensee (2001). System effects are a clear feature of software platforms
where the user buys a system (platform and applications) and cares for the total charge of the
system.
37Note also that for the same N, ?PU > ?PU , it is consistent with the observed fact that
operating systems charge high prices to users whereas video console firms charge low prices to
them.
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Note that when demand margin binds, relative charges depend only on N whereas
it depends on both, N and V (N), when competition margin binds. The next
proposition presents how relative charges vary with N.
Proposition 2 If demand margin binds, the relative payment made by users
to the platform is decreasing in N. However, if the competition margin binds, the
relative payment is increasing in N whenever ev (N) is decreasing in N .
As N increases, users tend to spend more on the bulk of applications when
demand margin is binding. The same occurs, whenever the competition margin
binds provided that ev (N) is increasing in N. However, N+12N+1 >
1
2 , meaning that
more than one half of the money that users spend in the system goes to the platform
when demand margin binds. Meanwhile, it may occur that 1−ev(N)1+ev(N) <
1
2 if ev (N) >
1
3 .
When setting the price to users, the platform should optimally preserve this
ratio, if not, a competitor with a better pricing strategy may easily overcome the
incumbent’s advantages.38
Let the users demand elasticity with respect to the price by the platform be
Ep = ∂t
D
∂PU
PU
tD = −1 and the elasticity of demand with respect to the number
of applications be Es = ∂t
D
∂N
N
tD = −
v?εv
1−v . The ratio −
Es
Ep
measures the effect of
platform price equivalent to a 1% increase in N.39 In the users’ interest, a 1%
increase in the number of applications is equivalent to a v?εv1−v% price cut.
40 This
ratio is increasing in v and eεv. That is to say that an increase in N is more valued
as long as it conveys a reduction in developers applications prices and applications
are near complements.
4. Developers entry and welfare: profit platform versus open platform
In the first stage a proprietary platform sets a price to the developers that
then decide upon entering the market. If the platform is open, this price is zero.41
One could think that the platform, through the choice of prices for developers,
determines the number of applications. However, this assertion may not always be
true. In particular, if developers’ gross profits (i.e., p (N) td (N)) are increasing in
the number of applications, then the platform can not affect entry which will equal
N¯ . This is the case when the positive indirect network effect more than compensates
the direct negative effect of competition. An additional developer exerts a positive
effect on other developer’s profits, explained by the fact that more participation
by one side (i.e., developers) induces more participation by the other side (i.e.,
38For instance, in the market for video players, VHS overcame Beta after six years of higher
installed base by Beta. The strategy of the winner was a widespread licensing of VHS and a
low- priced VHS player, compared with a high-priced Beta player and restricted licensing (See
Economides 2006).
39Note that if V (N) = Nβ the ratio is −EsEp = 1.
40Clements and Ohashi (2005) have computed this ratio for the USA video game industry.
They find that a 1% increase in game titles is equivalent (in average) to a 2.3% price cut of the
console price.
41An open platform will charge zero to both users and developers. Nevertheless, we will
assume that developers set positive prices to users for their applications. Applications for open
platforms like Linux are often free for consumers. However, there are also several applications that
are not free that are offered for Linux operating system (Economides and Katsamakas (2005a)).
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users), which benefits customers and makes them more willing to participate.42
Consequently, whenever developers’ gross profits are increasing at N¯ , the platform
would charge a price PD
¡
N¯
¢
= p
¡
N¯
¢
td
¡
N¯
¢
− F and its profits will be
Π = PU
¡
N¯
¢
td
¡
N¯
¢
+
¡
p
¡
N¯
¢
td
¡
N¯
¢
− F
¢
N¯ .
In contrast, if developers’ gross profits are decreasing at N¯, because the positive
effect on the demand is compensated by the negative effect on the price, then
there is a one-to-one relation between N and PD, so that the platform rather than
maximizing profits over PD can do so directly over N. The platform will hence
optimally choose N to maximize its profits given by
(17) Π = PU (N) td (N) +
¡
p (N) td (N)− F
¢
N.
From the expression above it is clear that an increase in N affects the profits of
the platform in two ways, through the profits made on users (first term in (17))
and through the profits made on the developers (second term in (17)). How these
effects depend on the degree of substitution between the applications that develop-
ers offer is quite clear when looking at the profits made on the developers’ side. If
substitution is strong, their profits, gross of PD, are lower, then the surplus that
the platform may extract from them is also lower (or even negative if it is optimal
for the platform to subsidize the developers, i.e., PD < 0). Regarding the profits
made on the users’ side, recall that both P˜U and PˆU are increasing in N. In ad-
dition, the positive effect of entry on P˜Uand t˜d = P˜
U
k is higher when substitution
between developers is higher (whenever ∂?p∂N = V
00 (N) is high). When N increasesep decreases, and this additional effect is taken into account by the platform when
allowing access to the developers, becoming an additional incentive to promote
entry. The optimal level of entry will depend on the margin that binds.
If demand margin binds, the platform will optimally choose Nˆ such that it
solves
(18)
V (N)V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− (V (N))2 NN+1
2k (N + 1)2
= F,
whereas if competition margin binds, it will choose N˜ such that
(19)
V
³
N˜
´
V 0
³
N˜
´
−
³
V 0
³
N˜
´´2
N˜ [1 + εv]
2k
= F.
The discussion above is the content of next lemma.
Lemma 5 Let πDM (N) (πCM (N)) stand for the developers’ gross profits when
demand (competition) margin binds, and let N∗ be such that if N < N∗ the demand
margin binds and if N > N∗ the competition margin binds. Assume πCM (N∗) >
πDM (N) for all N.43 The patterns of equilibrium entry in a proprietary platform
will depend on the binding margin and the size of N¯ . In particular:
42Farrell and Klemperer (2004) state that an indirect network effect arises whenever the
indirect benefit outweighs any direct loss from more participation by one’s own side. Thus,
following this definition, there is an indirect network effect among developers as long as profits
are increasing in N.
43This is not a restrictive assumption, all the surplus functions that we are considering here
satisfy it.
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i) If πCM (N∗) > πDM (N) for all N and N¯ > N∗, in any stable equilibrium
of developers’ entry the competition margin will always bind and the level of entry
will be
N =
(
N¯ if π0CM
¡
N¯
¢
> 0
min
³
N˜, N¯
´
if π0CM
¡
N¯
¢
< 0,
where N˜ solves (19).
ii) If N¯ < N∗, the level of entry will be
N =
(
N¯ if π0DM
¡
N¯
¢
> 0
min
³
Nˆ, N¯
´
if π0DM
¡
N¯
¢
< 0,
where Nˆ solves (18).
Proof: See Appendix A.
When the platform is open there are no platform prices to affect agents decisions
(recall that now PU = PD = 0), so that developers will enter until their profits are
zero, i.e.,
p (N) td (N)− F = 0.
Lemma 6 Let πDMo (N) (πCMo (N)) stand for the developers’ gross profits
when demand (competition) margin binds in an open platform and let No∗ be the
N that determines the binding margin. Then,
i) π0DMo
³
Nˆ
´
= π0DMo
³
Nˆ
´
= 0
ii) Nˆ = No∗ < N∗
iii) πDMo
³
Nˆ
´
= πCMo
³
Nˆ
´
Proof: See Appendix A.
Point i) implies that the maximum in gross profits when demand margin binds
occurs at the same N in both types of platforms. Point ii) implies that if demand
margin binds, gross developers profits are increasing. Whereas, if competition mar-
gin binds, profits may be increasing or not. Note that a comparison of outcomes
under open and proprietary platforms is not direct for the range of N 
³
Nˆ ,N∗
´
as competition margin will bind under an open platform whereas the demand mar-
gin binds under a proprietary platform. Finally, point iii) shows that developers’
profits are continuous at the point where the change from a margin to the other
occurs.
If gross profits are increasing at N¯ , then N¯ developers will entry. If not, the
number of developers is determined by
(20)
V
³
N˜o
´
V 0
³
N˜o
´
−
h
V 0
³
N˜o
´i2
N˜o
k
= F.
The next proposition compares the levels of entry that occur in each case and
the effect on users’ welfare.
Proposition 3
i) If demand margin binds, a proprietary platform and an open platform will
provide the same level of N, so that the latter will generate more welfare for users.
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ii) If competition margin binds a proprietary platform may generate a larger
number of applications and higher welfare to users than an open platform.
Proof See Appendix A.
For comparison purposes, consider now the problem solved by a benevolent
social planner. She would choose the optimal number of applications, NFB, to
maximize social welfare given by
W ∗ =
Z t
0
V (N) dz −
Z t
0
kzdz − FN,
where tFB =
V (NFB)
k .
The first order necessary condition yields the first best allocation,
(21)
V
¡
NFB
¢
V 0
¡
NFB
¢
k
= F.
Condition (21) that determines the first best level of N equalizes the marginal
benefit with the marginal cost of an additional application. The former is the
marginal utility enjoyed by users (V 0
¡
NFB
¢
times the size of the market tFB),
whereas the latter is the fixed cost of producing one more application. Then if
N¯ < NFB social planner chooses N¯ and chooses NFB otherwise.
As long as N¯ < Nˆ entry is N¯ and equals NFB. The same occurs when
competition margin binds and N¯ < N˜. Then, when the effect of N on platform
profits is strong (and this is more likely when ev is high) the platform will tend to
generate the same level of entry as the social planner.
Proposition 4 Assume N¯ > max
³
NFB, Nˆ , N˜
´
. If demand margin binds, a
proprietary platform chooses a level of N smaller than the first best. However, if
competition margin binds the comparison is not conclusive.
Proof : See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 and 4 yield some insights into policies regarding the emergence
of open source platforms competing with platforms such as Windows (Linux is the
classic one, but there are also some others like Google which offer programs for free).
In contrast, we do not observe the emergence of open platforms in the market of
video consoles. The propositions above suggest that policy makers should promote
open source in platforms like operating systems but not necessarily in those like
video consoles.
5. Integration and the margin
Assume now that the platform firm can also develop its applications at zero
marginal cost and at a fixed cost F per application. Then, if the platform is
integrated, meaning that one firm produces the platform and the N applications,
its system price will be
P I =
V (N)
2
and profits will be
ΠI =
µ
V (N)
2
¶2
1
k
− FN.
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We have shown that when integration is absent and demand margin binds, the
resulting system price is V (N)2
³
1 + NN+1
´
which is larger than P I . The rational
behind the result is clear: under separation there is a double marginalization as
neither the platform nor the developers take into account the reduction of sales of
the others when raising the price so that an inefficiently large price arises.
However, if integration is absent and competition margin binds, the resulting
system price is V (N)+V (´N)N2 which gets close to P
I as V (´N) gets close to zero,
which is the case when applications are very substitutes.
Proposition 5 Inefficiencies of disintegration tend to disappear as long as
competition margin binds and applications are near substitutes.
Consider total profits of the firm. If demand margin binds, these are
ΠDMB =
µ
V (N)
2
¶2
1
k
µ
2N + 1
N2 + 2N + 1
¶
− FN < ΠI ,
so that the platform will always prefer being integrated in order to get developers
to aware of the impact of their pricing strategies on the other developers and on
the platform profits. Note that under separation even if the platform can control
N through PD, it can not control the price developers set.
If competition margin binds, profits are
ΠCMB =
µ
V (N)− epN
2
¶2
1
k
+ epµV (N)− epN
2
¶
N
1
k
− FN.
Again, as long as ep = V (´N) tends to zero (because the extent of substitutability
among applications is great or N is very high), profits tend to ΠI .44
The results above are consistent with the observed phenomena that initially
platforms are vertically integrated and later disintegrate. Recall from corollary
1 that there exists N∗ which determines the margin that is going to be binding.
When the industry is less developed (initial steps of the industry with N low) the
platform strictly prefers being integrated. As the industry evolves and the number
of developers available in the market increases, the competition margin is likely to
bind, prices of applications will be V (´N), decreasing in N , and at this stage of
the industry, the platform will be more willing to disintegrate.45 As the market
of developers matures and becomes more competitive, the firm can concentrate
on producing only the platform. Note that other alternative explanations are of-
fered in the literature for the phenomena of vertical disintegration that not can be
explained within this model. For instance, Stigler notes that firms need to arise ver-
tically integrated since technology is not familiar in the market. When the industry
grows, production process are well known and scale of the market allows special-
ization, such that disintegrating is profitable. 46 Another different explanation for
no integration is given by Gawer and Henderson (2005), when discussing Intel’s
strategy. They suggest that managers were aware of how important the generation
44In particular, the necessary condition is that V (´N)N be decreasing, i.e., εv (N) > 1.
45PDA’s were born as "smart agendas" offering a limited number of applications. Then,
they evolved to become "small computers". Something similar has occurred in the mobile phone
industry. In addition to the traditional communication service, today they allow for hundreds of
applications. See "What is a Window Mobile" in www.microsoft.com.
46George Stigler, "The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market", Journal of
Political Economy 59 (June 1951), quoted by Evans, et. al.(2006).
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of complements was to the success of Intel’s business; however, although it is in
the interest of the platform to enter complementary markets, the platform knows
that this could discourage entry by new firms.47 A more trivial explanation comes
from the fact that the platform does not always possess the requisite capabilities
to produce some of the complementary goods.48
5.1 Partial integration. A widely observed fact in software industries is that
some computer software are clearly more useful or more commonly used than others,
Office software and Messenger are illustrative examples. At the same time, some
video games are the most popular (killer games) in the market, so that applications’
contributions to total surplus may be different. To incorporate this feature into our
model, in what follows we allow applications to be heterogeneous.
Assume that each application i has a contribution Ni ∈ [0, N ] , with the nor-
malization
NX
i=1
Ni = N.
Note that Ni = 1 will bring back the homogeneity we have considered so far. Let
us further assume that ∂Ni∂i > 0 and let us define V (·) by V
³PN
i=1 xiNi
´
, where
xi = 1 if user buys application i and xi = 0 otherwise. The next lemma is inspired
in proposition 6 in Lerner and Tirole (2004).
Lemma 7 Assume that gross surplus of users by applications is V
³PN
i=1 xiNi
´
,
where xi = 1 if users buy application i and xi = 0 otherwise, with ∂Ni∂i > 0. Then,
there is a mass 0 ≤ n ≤ N of developers that are constrained by the competition
margin and charge a price epi = V 0i , their marginal contribution to the total surplus.
The rest of the developers are constrained by the demand margin and all of them set
the same price bp = V (N)−PU−? n0 ?pidiN−n+1 . Finally, the platform sets PU = V (N)−? n0 ?pidi2 .
When the platform decides PU , it defines the value n, i.e., the mass of devel-
opers that will be constrained by the competition margin. For every i ∈ [0, n] it
must hold that epi = V 0i < bp and that V 0i is increasing in i. If n = 0, we have that
every developer is constrained by the demand margin. Analogously, if n = N every
developer is constrained by the competition margin.
Proposition 6 In the long run the platform will be partially integrated with
the killer applications for which demand margin will bind, and will allow free entry
for developers of other applications.
This proposition may help us to explain why platforms are often partially in-
tegrated, most of them with the core application. Microsoft produces operating
systems and some of the applications (i.e. Office package). Nintendo wrote Mario
Brothers, the killer game of one of its consoles. In the US the proportion of games
47Dave Johnson, a director of Intel, explained: "The market segment gets hurt if third
parties think: "Intel, the big guys, are there, so I do not want to be there..."... it is not what we
want, because we are trying to encourage people to do these complementary things". Gawer and
Henderson (2005), pp. 18.
48Claude Leglise, director of the Developer Relation Group, responded: "Intel has no cor-
porate competence in entertainment software. We do not know how to do video games, so forget
it". Gawer and Henderson (2005), pp. 13.
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developed in house is about 10% for GambeCube and 8% for PlayStation and Xbox.
6. Platform competition: the role of outside options
Up to now we have assumed that a monopolist platform (either proprietary or
open) provides a good with no competition at all. Nevertheless in many industries,
either open and proprietary platforms coexist, or there are several for-profit plat-
forms competing to attract both users and developers. We now extend our basic
framework by assuming that a proprietary and an open platform operate in the
same industry.49 Our aim here is to analyze how a firm that offers a proprietary
solution will respond to changes in the value of an outside option that provides a
positive surplus or profit to their clients (i.e., to users and developers). We analyze
how the monopoly reacts in terms of prices and we abstract from other strategies
such as investment.50
A user who purchases the open platform gets a net surplus v = V (Z) − h,
where V (Z) measures the utility users derive given the applications written for the
open platform and h is an exogenous cost (interpreted as a transportation cost or
a cost of learning to use this outside good). Consequently, users will purchase the
proprietary platform as long as
V (N )− kt ≥ v > 0.51
In what follows we provide some comparative statics analyses to changes in v in
order to study its impact on users welfare. We start assuming that the competition
margin binds. Then, we move to an scenario where the demand binds. We restrict
the analyses to values of N for which developers’ profits are decreasing so that the
proprietary platform can affect entry.
Consider the impact of a change in v on developers’ profits and on the number
of applications. The condition that arises when the platform at the first stage
maximizes with respect to N is
(22)
V (N)V 0 (N)− (V 0 (N))2N [1 + εv]
2k
− V
0 (N) v
2k
= F.
and from the comparison with equation (19) it follows that the monopolist will
reduce entry due to the term V
0(N)v
2k . This term is decreasing in N and smaller as
long as applications are very substitutes.
It means that developers of video consoles may not have incentives to increase
the value of v (i.e., writing applications for computers or online games) because
the monopolist may react reducing the level of entry and thus the incentives for
them. However, this response will not be important whenever the games are near
substitutes.
By taking into account its impact on entry, the next proposition provides results
on the impact of outside options on users surplus.
49Since the open platform is considered non-profit, we will assume that it behaves myopically
and hence does not play a best response against the pricing strategies by the proprietary platform.
In contrast, the proprietary platform will take into account the presence of the open platform when
deciding upon its pricing strategies.
50Economides and Katsamakas (2006b) study investment incentives of platforms and devel-
opers in a proprietary system and in an open source one.
51Note that v is used to proxy for the extent of product market competition.
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Proposition 7Whenever the competition margin binds, a higher outside option
value for the users may lead to a decrease in their surplus. In contrast, if the
demand margin binds, the impact on users’ surplus of a higher outside option value
will generally be positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Regarding the other side of the market, we now assume that developers can
obtain a profit of w when writing applications for the open platform. Note that
nothing changes if developers are allowed to write for both platforms (i.e., to mul-
tihome). In that case developers get a higher total profit but the strategies of
the proprietary platform do not change. Results are different if we assume that
developers are forced to choose one of the platforms (i.e., to singlehome) due, for
instance, to contractual arrangements. Thus, developers will enter the market of
the proprietary platform as long as
πi = pitd − F − PD ≥ w.
The effect of an increase in w is analogous to an increase in the fixed cost, so it
clearly leads to a reduction in the level of N.
Proposition 8 If the competition margin binds, an increase in the outside
option of the developers will always reduce the users’ surplus. However, if the
demand margin binds, an increase in the outside option of the developers will always
increase the users’ surplus.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We have shown that reinforcing competition pressure for developers when com-
petition margin binds leads to a reduction in the users welfare. Results are quite
different when demand margin binds. Promoting the benefits that writing for Linux
has for the developers (sometimes interpreted as a "reputation effect"52) would be
in favour of the users.
Let us provide an illustrative example. Consider V (N) = Nβ where β = 0.45
and a fixed cost F = 0.14. A value β = 0.45 determines that competition margin
is binding as long as N > 2.3 and we restrict the analyses to this range of N. For
a value v = 0.1, the surplus of the users is 0.71 whereas for an increase ∆v = 0.05,
the new users surplus is 0.59. It represents in terms of elasticities that a 1% increase
in the users outside option implies a 19% decrease in the users surplus.53
To compare the effects of w and v, consider now β = 0.25 (so that competition
margin binds as long as N > 0.8) and a fixed cost F = 0.075. Given the initial
values w = v = 0.1, we find that a change in v (i.e., ∆v = 0.05) exerts a direct
impact on PU equal to ∂P
U
∂v = −
1
2 , whereas there is no direct impact when w
changes (i.e., ∆w = 0.05). However, when we compute the total effect, considering
the indirect one by the effect on N, we find that ∂ ?P
U
∂v
v
?PU = −0.01 and
∂ ?PU
∂w
w
?PU =
−0.03, meaning that, under these parameters, the monopolist decides to reduce the
price more for users when there is an outside option for the developers than when
there is one for the users themselves.
52Economides and Katsamakas (2005.b). Other motivations are explained in "Microsoft vs.
Open Source: Who Will Win?- HBS Working Knowledge, June 2005.
53The exercise has been computed assuming k = 1.
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7. Conclusions
We have solved a model that provides some results for a better understanding
of the two-sided pricing strategies of a platform that sells a good whose value
depends on the applications sold in a market of developers. We note that when
setting prices the developers are constrained by two margins: the demand margin
and the competition margin. What margin is binding depends on the number of
applications in the market and on the level of substitutability among them.
We find that if the demand margin binds, policy makers should promote open
source platforms. However this is not necessarily the case when competition margin
binds.
We consider the case where applications are asymmetric in the users’ surplus
and we find that in the long run the platform will remain integrated with the ap-
plications for which demand margin binds and will leave for third-party developers
the production of applications for which competition margin binds.
Finally, we find that it would not be in the interest of the users to promote the
value of outside options for the platform when competition margin binds. However,
an increase in the value of the outside option for developers would have a positive
impact on the users surplus if demand margin binds.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
To show the result we compute the profits that each situation generates for the
platform, then we compare them and deduce the optimal strategy for the plat-
form. If the platform sets a price that satisfies PU < V (N)− ep (N + 1) , then the
competition margin will bind for the developers and platform profits will be
eΠPU = PU ∙V (N)− epN − PU
k
¸
.
The price that maximizes profits, given the constraint, is
PU =
V (N)− epN
2
if ep < V (N)
N + 2
, and
PU = V (N)− ep (N + 1) if ep > V (N)
N + 2
.
If the platform sets a price such that PU > V (N) − ep (N + 1) , so that demand
margin will bind for the developers, platform profits will be
bΠPU = PU ∙V (N)− PU
k (N + 1)
¸
.
The price that maximizes profits, given the constraint, is
PU =
V (N)
2
if ep > V (N)
2 (N + 1)
, and
PU = V (N)− ep (N + 1) if ep < V (N)
2 (N + 1)
.
Comparing above the profits we observe that if ep < V (N)2(N+1) the price that generates
highest profits for the platform is ePU = V (N)−?pN2 . If ep > V (N)N+2 , the platform will
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optimally choose bPU = V (N)2 . Finally, whenever the relevant interval is V (N)2(N+1) <ep < V (N)N+2 , if ep < V (N)N h1− 1√N+1i the platform will set ePU = V (N)−?pN2 and
will set bPU = V (N)2 otherwise. It follows that the competition margin will bind ifep < V (N)N h1− 1√N+1i , and this occurs whenever ev (N) < h1− 1√N+1i, as claimed.
Proof of corollary 1
Note that the function
h
1− 1√
N+1
i
is increasing in N , equals zero at N = 0, and
goes to one as N goes to infinity. Since ev (N)  (0, 1) , if ev (N) is a non increasing
function, it will necessarily cross
h
1− 1√
N+1
i
. However, if ev (N) is an increasing
function, a crossing point may not exist.
Proof of lemma 5
When the demand margin binds, developers will enter until profits are zero so that
it is satisfied µ
V (N)
2 (N + 1)
¶2
1
k
− F − PD = 0.
If competition margin binds, the developers zero profit condition will be
V 0 (N)
µ
V (N)− V 0 (N)N
2k
¶
− F − PD = 0.
Consequently, let πDM (N) =
³
V (N)
2(N+1)
´2
1
k and π
CM (N) = V 0 (N)
³
V (N)−V 0(N)N
2k
´
.
i) In a stable equilibrium, profits are zero and decreasing. Consider now an
equilibrium such that πDM = F + PD (so that demand margin binds). Since
πDM < πCM (N∗) , when N¯ is sufficiently large a coalition of developers will enter
to obtain (at least) profits πCM (N∗) , and the result follows.
Then,
1) if π0CM
¡
N¯
¢
> 0 gross developers profits are strictly increasing so that entry
is N¯ .
2) if π0CM
¡
N¯
¢
< 0 gross developers profits are strictly decreasing so that the
platform will choose N = min
³
N˜ , N¯
´
, and the result follows.
ii) We must distinguish two cases. 1) If π0DM
¡
N¯
¢
> 0 gross developers profits
are increasing and entry is N¯ .
2) If π0DM
¡
N¯
¢
< 0 gross developers profits are decreasing so that the platform
will choose N = min
³
Nˆ , N¯
´
, and the result follows.
Figure 1 below, although does not encompass all the possible cases, may help
to clarify each of the previous points.
Proof of lemma 6
Note that πDMo (N) =
³
V (N)
(N+1)
´2
1
k and π
CMo (N) = V 0 (N)
³
V (N)−V 0(N)N
k
´
.
Result i) follows trivially. Note that the concavity of V ensures that Nˆ always
exists. ii) Note that Nˆ solves V 0
³
Nˆ
´
=
V (Nˆ)
Nˆ+1
. The equality Nˆ = No∗ fol-
lows from the fact that in an open platform competition margin binds as long
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N  Ň Ñ
πCM(N)
πDM(N)
N*
Figure 1. The entry problem
as V 0 (N) < V (N)(N+1) . To prove that Nˆ < N
∗ recall from corollary 1 that N∗ sat-
isfies V 0 (N∗) = V (N
∗)
N∗
µ
1− 1√
(N∗+1)
¶
. Since V 0 (N) is decreasing and V (N)(N+1) >
V (N)
N
µ
1− 1√
(N+1)
¶
for all N, it follows that Nˆ < N∗. Part iii) follows from
straightforward computations.
Proof of Proposition 3
i) The first statement follows from point i) in lemma 6 (profits of developers
are increasing under both regimes for the same range of N) then in both cases entry
will equal N. If demand margin binds, with a proprietary platform the system price
is PU + pN = V (N)2 +
V (N)
2(N+1)N, that is higher than
V (N)
N+1 N, the system price with
an open platform, so that the second statement follows.
ii) From the comparison between (19) and (20), it follows that as long as ev >
1
1−εv (i.e.V
0 (N)− V 00 (N)N > V (N)N ), a profit platform yields a higher N than the
open platform. The second statement is proven by the fact that when competition
margin binds, the users’ surplus (net of kt) is increasing in N. The condition ev >
1
1−εv imposes that εv < −1 since ev < 1. An example for which a proprietary
platform yields a higher N than an open platform is given by
V (N) =
½
(1− exp (−0.05N)) if N ≤ 7
(0.8− exp (−0.1N)) if N > 7,
with F = 0.0045.54 The proprietary platform chooses N ' 25 whereas the open
chooses N ' 24. The competition margin binds for all N > 13.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first statement follows from the comparison between (18) and (21) . The
second statement follows from the comparison between (19) and (21) and the fact
that as long as −ev (1 + εv) > 1 (i.e.−V 00 (N)N > V (N)N + V 0 (N)) the proprietary
platform may generate excess of entry. As in the previous proof, the condition
54The equilibrium occurs at N > 7 so that V (N) = (0.8− exp (−0.1N)) . Note that V (N) =
(1− exp (−0.05N)) if N ≤ 7 ensusres that V (0) = 0.
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−ev (1 + εv) > 1 requires εv < −1 and it is more stringent than the condition
in the proof of proposition 3. It does not contradict the condition to be in the
competition margin ev < 1− 1√N+1 , nor the condition for a maximum in the social
planner problem, ev <| εv |, nor the fact that V (N) is concave.
Proof proposition 7
Given a user t, if competition margin binds, her surplus gross of kt is equal to
V (N)− pN − PU . We observe that this surplus will be increasing (decreasing) in
v as long as
£
1− V 00 (N)N ∂N∂v
¤ ≶ 0, and the first statement follows. To prove the
second statement note that if demand margin binds, users’ prices are: bp = V (N)−v2(N+1)
and bPU = V (N)−v2 . The platform optimally chooses the N that maximizes profits
1
k (N + 1)
µ
V (N)− v
2
¶2
+
Ãµ
V (N)− v
2 (N + 1)
¶2
1
k
− F
!
N.
Note that expression (18) can also be written as
V (N)
2k (N + 1)2
∙
V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− V (N) N
N + 1
¸
= F,
and when the outside option appears it transforms in
V (N)
2k (N + 1)2
∙
V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− V (N) N
N + 1
¸
−
v
2k (N + 1)2
∙
V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− (2V (N)− v) N
N + 1
¸
= F.
So, the effect on N of v will depend on the second term. If this is positive, the
monopolist will reduce N whereas if this is negative the impact on N will be positive.
Both situations may occur; however since platform profits are lower for each N, the
most likely case is that the monopolist will reduce N.
Now, note that whenever demand margin binds and there is an outside option
v, the users surplus, gross of the cost kt, equals
V (N)− bpN − bPU = V (N)− [V (N)− v]N
2 (N + 1)
− [V (N)− v]
2
The first derivative of this surplus with respect to v is going to be positive as long
as ∂N∂v
h
V 0(N)
N+1 −
V (N)
(N+1)2 +
v
(N+1)2
i
+ 2N+1N+1 > 0. The second term of the left hand
side of the inequality is always positive. However, the term in brackets is negative
as long as V <
h
1− vV (N)
i
N
N+1 , and this is the case along the relevant range of
N (when gross developers profits are decreasing). The first term will be positive if
∂N
∂v < 0 (the most likely case) and negative otherwise, so that the result follows.
Proof proposition 8
If the competition margin binds the effect of an increase in w on users surplus
is equal to −V
000(N)N ∂N∂W
2 < 0 and the first statement follows. To prove the second
statement, note that the surplus is decreasing in N if ev < NN+1 and this occurs
for the relevant range of N. Given that ∂N∂w < 0, the second statement follows.
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Chapter 3. Compatibility and Innovation with
Firm Dominance
1 Introduction
"Customers have mandated that the companies, long arch-rivals, must ensure
that their infrastructure work together well. But beyond that, they will continue to
compete tooth and nail" (Ron Hovsepian, Novell’s president, BrainShare 2007).55
"We’re evolving to a point where there are a couple of platforms. You can’t
standardize everything ... They (customers) pushed on us a lot about interoperabil-
ity, but also about continuing innovation" (Craig Mundie, Microsoft’s chief research
and strategy officer, BrainShare 2007).56
Several dominant firms are being scrutinized by the European Commission in
cases where interoperability/compatibility issues have been one of the main argu-
ments in the authorities’ concerns. For instance, Sun Mycrosystems charged that
Microsoft was refusing to share information that would allow interoperability be-
tween its servers and the equipment produced by the software giant. In March
2004 the Commission ordered Microsoft to disclose confidential computer code to
competitors and in September 2007, Europe’s Second-Highest Court reaffirmed the
decision. In January 2008, the European Commission began two new antitrust in-
vestigations into Microsoft focussed on the compatibility of its Office package with
other companies’ software. Similarly, in March 2007 the European Commissioner
for Consumers complained about the fact that iPod (Apple’s device) was the only
portable device that will play iTunes.57 Given the importance of these antitrust
cases and of these industries in modern economies, compatibility/ interoperability
appears as a relevant issue for competition policy and regulation.
Discussions about compatibility and market power are certainly nothing new.
However, the recent evolution of technological industries has brought forth a new set
of issues, in particular the implications of market dominance in terms of strategic
decisions on compatibility/interoperability and the impact of the latter on innova-
tion incentives. After the EU resolution on the Microsoft case, some voices believe
that the Commission will now go after other technology firms with large market
shares, which will force companies to give up intellectual property and will curb
55See http://www.crn.com/software/198100037
56Ibidem.
57Norway has threatened to take action against Apple if it does not open up its digital
rights management (DRM) system to other companies. France proposed a law requiring digital
music retailers to make all downloaded songs compatible with various MP3 players. Other music
download sites use a variety of DRM technologies that are incompatible with the iPod. (see
Reuters, April 3, 2007 and http://www.crmbuyer.com/story/ipod/56255.html).
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the incentives to innovate.58 Among these voices, Thomas O. Barnett, the assis-
tant attorney general for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division has declared
that "rather than helping consumers, it may have the unfortunate consequence of
harming consumers by chilling innovation and discouraging competition".59
The impact of firms’ decisions on compatibility issues and/or on innovation
goes beyond antitrust analysis. On one hand, the extent to which a firm will be
compatible with other firms is one of its key strategic decisions. Note that vertical
arrangements lead to a situation of incompatibility. In contrast, it may be in the
firms’ interest to promote compatibility, as the agreement signed by Microsoft and
Novell to enhance interoperability between Linux and Windows illustrates.60 On
the other hand, consumers will clearly be affected by firms decisions. A console firm
that impedes its video-game developers to provide their products to its competitors
is de facto refusing compatibility, and it is hence affecting to consumers of the multi-
billion video game industry.61
In this paper we will analyze firms’ attitudes towards compatibility and how
compatibility decisions affect incentives on investments in producing a product im-
provement. In particular, we study how different levels of firm dominance, measured
by a premium in consumer valuations, influence these incentives. Thus, the ques-
tions we address include (a) is there a relationship between market dominance and
compatibility incentives?, (b) does compatibility enhance or discourage innovation?,
(c) is a policy of mandatory compatibility socially desirable?.
To address these issues we propose a model of platform competition. We assume
that users buy a platform and its compatible applications. We allow for applications
to be substitutes, complements or independent. We consider compatibility in two
dimensions. First, compatibility of the complementary good, to which we will refer
as compatibility in applications. Typical examples are software that can be either
run or not with different hardware. Second, we consider inter-network compatibility.
In this case, direct network externalities are present in the sense that one user’s
value for a good is higher when another user buys the compatible good, as in the
case of personal computers that allow users to exchange e-mails. Literature has
largely ignored the difference between both types of compatibility, however our
model yields different results for each of them (see Section 1.2 for more details
about these two forms of compatibility and about related literature).
We find that the dominant firm will never promote compatibility in applica-
tions. In contrast, both firms find inter-network compatibility profitable.
Compatibility in applications is not always beneficial for consumers. Moreover,
we find that the dominant firm’s incentives to be compatible may coincide with
58See www.economist.com, September 20, 2007.
59The New York Times, September 18, 2007. See also Nicholas Economides in his "Com-
mentary of the EU Microsoft Antitrust Case" (September 2007, www.NETInst.org) where he
remarks: "By requiring full disclosure at a nominal price, the EU decision in effect reduces the
value of intellectual property for dominant firms. Additionally, in the particular case, full under-
standing of internal Windows functions is valuable to Sun beyond interoperability (...). That is,
the Commission’s vertical remedy gives an advantage to Sun in horizontal competition".
60The Novell and Microsoft Collaborate relates to both interoperability and innovation. Note
that the companies expressed the intention of creating a joint research facility to pursue new
software solutions for virtualization, management, and document format compatibility (for details,
see http://www.novel.com/linux/microsoft/faq.html).
61See Lee (2007) for an empirical analysis on the impact of vertical integration and exclusive
contracting in the US video game industry during the period 2000-2005.
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those of users while being against those of the weak firm. When this is the case,
imposing compatibility would harm both consumer surplus and total welfare. In
particular, compatibility in applications decreases both consumer surplus and wel-
fare if applications are close substitutes. Furthermore, the effect of compatibility on
welfare and on consumer surplus tends to be negative when firm dominance is im-
portant. We also find that the presence of strong direct network effects strengthen
the potential negative incidence of compatibility in applications. Regarding inter-
network compatibility, it is always consumers’ surplus reducing and has a negative
impact on total welfare as long as the market is very asymmetric.
We also show that any type of compatibility often reduces the incentives of
the firms to invest, particularly those of the dominant one. When compatibility
in applications is present a free-riding problem arises: an investment made by one
firm that adds value to the compatible good is shared by the other firm, thus
compatibility may induce lower incentives to invest. Additional reasons for the
lack of interest in compatibility (besides the free-riding problem) arise from the
substitutability between the applications.
The main antitrust implication of our results is to advise that decisions on
compatibility and/or on exclusivity must be tailored to each particular case as the
degree of substitutability, direct network effects, and firm dominance may alter the
desirability or not of enforcing compatibility.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of this Section presents the re-
lated literature and a discussion on compatibility and its possible modeling strate-
gies. Section 2 presents the basic framework. In Section 3 we show the results for
compatibility in applications and inter-network compatibility. Section 4 analyses
investment incentives related to compatibility. Section 5 studies the robustness of
the model proposed in Section 2. Section 6 concludes. Finally, proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
1.1 Related literature. This paper borrows modelling strategies from, and
contributes to, two strands of literature. First, to the literature on compatibility
in industries with network effects. The seminal papers of Katz and Shapiro (1985)
and Farrell and Saloner (1985) predict that incentives for incompatibility will differ
across firms and will be greater for firms with larger networks, since under compat-
ibility these firms will lose the competitive advantage that their networks confer.
Adopting the Katz and Shapiro-model, Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000) analyze the
competition between Internet backbone providers with asymmetric installed bases.
They show that a firm with a large installed base may have incentives to reduce
the degree of compatibility towards its smaller rivals. In the same vein, Malueg
and Schwartz (2006) analyze the conditions under which the firm with the largest
market share of installed-base customers will prefer incompatibility with smaller ri-
vals that are compatible among themselves. They find that the largest firm is more
likely to prefer incompatibility over compatibility if with the latter its market share
rises above fifty percent or if the potential to add consumers falls. Chen, Doraszel-
ski and Harrington (2007) consider product compatibility with market dominance
in a dynamic setting. They find that if firms have similar installed bases they make
their products compatible. But, if a firm gets a larger installed base then it may
make its product incompatible.
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Similar to these papers, we find that the dominant firm is against compatibility
related to applications. However, this firm would indeed promote inter-network
compatibility.
In the absence of consumption externalities, some papers have analyzed firms’
incentives to make components of different systems compatible, in what is known
as the mix-and-match literature.62 Economides (1989) finds that profits are higher
under compatibility, so that a fully compatible regime is the unique perfect equilib-
rium. However, symmetry of system demands is crucial for compatibility to occur.
Economides (2006) argues that it is socially efficient to move towards compat-
ibility. In the same vein, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that a move to complete
compatibility would raise consumers’ surplus. In contrast, these results do not al-
ways hold in our framework. In particular, we conclude that a move towards a
larger degree of compatibility in the applications may be harmful for users and
social welfare, particularly when asymmetries are strong. Moreover, in the case of
inter-network compatibility our model predicts that it should not be promoted by
consumers.
The second strand of the literature which this paper relates to, is devoted
to studying incentives to innovate when firms are asymmetric. Cabral and Polak
(2007) analyze the effect of firm dominance on the incentives for R&D. They find
that an increase in firm dominance increases the dominant firm’s incentives while
decreasing the other firm’s incentives for R&D. They also show that total research
effort decreases when firm dominance increases, and that firm dominance is good
for innovation only when property rights are strong.
Few papers combine the two aforementioned strands of the literature. Cabral
and Salant (2007), in a model of R&D competition and cooperative standards
setting, argue that standardization leads to a free riding problem and thus to a
decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. Our model also identifies the
free-riding problem and a decreasing marginal incentive for the dominant firm, but
an increasing one for the weak firm. Hannan and Borzekowski (2006) investigate
whether incompatibility across rival systems may influence firms’ incentives to in-
vest in product changes that are beneficial to the consumer in the case of bank
ATM networks. They consider the number of ATM locations as the measure of
product quality and the surcharge fees as an index of incompatibility. They find
that an increase in incompatibility for Iowa banks caused a substantial increase in
the number of ATM locations offered to customers. Besides, the effect is greater
for larger banks than for smaller ones. In a symmetric setting Choi (2003) analyzes
the effect of compatibility on R&D incentives. He finds that a firm that makes two
components incompatible increases its R&D level and outside firms reduce theirs
in a linear demand model with quadratic R&D cost functions.
1.2 On the modeling of compatibility in the literature. Standards spec-
ify properties that a product must have in order to work (physically or functionally)
with complementary products within a product or service system. Compatibility
refers to "the possibility of costlessly combining various links and nodes on the net-
work to produce demanded goods. Two complementary components A and B are
62The mix-and-match literature does not assume a priori network externalities; however, it is
clear that demand in mix-and-match models exhibits network externalities. The mix-and-match
approach was originated by Matutes and Regibeau (1988), and has been used in several papers
including Economides (1989), Economides and Salop (1992), Matutes and Regibeau (1989, 1992).
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compatible when they can be combined to produce a composite good or service"
(see Economides (2006)). Interoperability refers to "the ability of two or more sys-
tems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has
been exchanged" (as defined by the IEEE Standard Computing Dictionary (IEEE,
1990)). Both compatibility and interoperability are hence related to the possibility
of sharing standards.
The economic literature has modelled compatibility (or interoperability) in two
ways. First, as in the seminal paper of Katz and Shapiro (1985), compatibility
affects the consumers’ surplus of buying one unit of a good, making it depend on
the number of other agents who join the network associated with that product. If
xei denotes the number of customers that a consumer expects firm i to have and y
e
i
denotes the consumers’ prediction of the size of the network with which firm i is
associated, then brands are incompatible whenever yei = x
e
i . In contrast, if m firms
products are compatible then
yei =
mX
j=1
xej for i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000) adapted Katz and Shapiro (1985) to incorporate
installed-base customers where firms differ in their locked-in, installed bases of
customers.63 Without compatibility, the size of the network of each firm is its
installed base and the mass of new customers. With compatibility, the networks
include all new customers and the installed bases of all the firms. In all of these
papers network effects are direct since the main purpose of the consumers is to
contact other users.
There is a second set of papers that also studies compatibility issues in a mix-
and match framework (Economides (1989), Matutes and Regibeau, (1988, 1992),
Choi (2003)). They consider systems that are composed of two components (e.g.
hardware and software) produced by two firms A and B (Economides (1989) gen-
eralizes to n firms). If the components sold by the two firms are not compatible,
only two systems are available for consumers, systems A1A2 and B1B2. If the com-
ponents are compatible, consumers have the additional options of A1B2 and B1A2.
In these papers consumers derive utility from the system itself.
We will analyze here platforms that together with a set of applications compose
a system so that, in the context of the hardware-software paradigm, we relate
compatibility to the number of applications that can be used with the platform.64
Because of this, we say that there is compatibility in applications if the users have
the possibility to construct a wider variety of systems (e.g. A1A2B2 and B1B2A2).
In contrast, we talk about inter-network compatibility when consumers are
concerned with exchanging information and files with other consumers. Specifically,
consumers may exchange information with consumers of other platforms and not
only with consumers that bought the same platform. The modeling of compatibility
63Other papers that consider similar models include Malueg and Schwartz (2006) or Chen,
Doraszelski and Harrington (2007).
64Corts and Lederman (2007) consider the existence of both exclusive (non-compatible) and
non-exclusive (compatible) software in an empirical model of indirect network effects. They argue
that over the last 20 years - over succesive technological generations - software has become less
likely to be exclusive to a particular platform, and that this trend and its consequences have
largely been ignored.
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in Katz and Shapiro (1985) seems to us the appropriate model to address this type
of compatibility as direct network effects are more implicated.65
2. The model
We consider a market in which consumers derive utility from consuming a
platform and its compatible applications. There are two platforms l, l = A,B that
compete à la Hotelling and are located at the two extremes of the unit line. We
assume that they cover the market.
Each platform has a fully compatible application i, i = 1, 2. Application 1 is
fully compatible with platform A and its value isW1. This application is compatible
with platform B in a degree δ, so that its value for a user of platform B is δW1.66
Analogously, application 2 is fully compatible with platform B with valueW2 (δW2)
for users of platform B (A). Platforms have also a stand-alone value to consumers
so that the value of platform l is either VA or VB .
Applications are produced by third party developers. The consumers pay a
price for the platform and for each application that they buy from the develop-
ers. We consider that platform firms follow a two-sided strategy, setting a fee to
developers per unit of application sold to be used with the platforms. We allow
platforms to discriminate by type of application. Developers behave competitively,
consequently, the price they charge to consumers for their applications is their mar-
ginal cost given here by the per unit fee set by the platforms.67 Note that the model
resembles the traditional models of telephony (Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998)).
We assume that the market structure is asymmetric with a dominant and a weak
firm. There are two potential sources of asymmetry: an asymmetry in the stand-
alone value of the platform and/or an asymmetry in the value of the fully compatible
application. Note that under full compatibility the latter asymmetry disappears.68
We assume that W1 > W2 and initially, we also assume that VA = VB = V.
Applications side. A representative consumer of platform A maximizes the following
net utility from consuming the applications,
uA =W1qA1 + δW2qA2 −
1
2
b
¡
q2A1 + 2σqA1qA2 + q
2
A2
¢
− pA1qA1 − pA2qA2,
where qli is the quantity of application i consumed by a consumer of platform l, pli
is its price, and b > 1. Negative values of σ would make the model one of demand for
complementary applications. If σ = 0 the applications are independent in demand.
As σ approaches 1, the applications become closer substitutes.69 The representative
65In some sense our interpretation of the difference between "compatibility in applications"
and "inter-network compatibility" is similar to the one employed by Clements (2004) to dis-
tinguish between direct and indirect network effects. Similarly, Economides and White (1994),
differentiates between two-way networks and one-way network.
66Alternatively, we may interpret the application fully compatible for platform l as a set of
applications and δ as a measure of the subset of applications that can be used by a user of the
other platform.
67This assumption is not innocuous. We introduce it for simplicity to concentrate on the
consequences of changes in compatibility. However, we conjecture that, although quantitative
results will change if we introduce some market power on the sellers’ side (i.e., there is a double
marginalization in the price), they will not change qualitatively.
68The way we introduce asymmetries in the platforms is similar to Carter and Wright (2003).
69Examples of substitute applications are text processors written for different operating sys-
tems, or football games written for different video consoles. Complementary applications are
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consumer of platform B maximizes an analogous net utility uB. These utilities yield
demands
qA1 =
1
b (1− σ2) (W1 − σδW2 − pA1 + σpA2) ,
qB2 =
1
b (1− σ2) (W2 − σδW1 − pB2 + σpB1) ,
qA2 =
½
0 if δ = 0
1
b(1−σ2) (δW2 − σW1 − pA2 + σpA1) if δ > 0
,
qB1 =
½
0 if δ = 0
1
b(1−σ2) (δW1 − σW2 − pB1 + σpB2) if δ > 0
.
Note that although the market for the platforms is fixed and covered, the size
of the applications market is increasing in both δ and the value of the applications.
Users side. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit line with respect to
their preferences for the platforms. A consumer with a most preferred platform
type (or location) x derives utility from the use of the platform she buys and from
its compatible applications. In particular, the net utility derived by a consumer
who buys platform l located at the beginning of the unit line is given by
(23) Ul = wl (δ) + V − tx− sl.
The first and second term reflect the value of owning platform l. The term wl (δ)
is the indirect utility that the applications compatible with platform l generate.
Thus, wA (δ) is a function of W1 and δW2, where the level of δ is exogenously
determined, for instance, by a regulator. The third term is the disutility stemming
from not consuming the most preferred platform type (the transportation cost or
the degree of differentiation in the standard Hotelling model). Finally, sl is the
price charged by platform l. Note that in (23) users’ utility do not depend on the
number of platform users, i.e., there are no direct network effects.
If direct network effect exist then (23) becomes
(24) Ul = wl (δ) + V + ηθl − tx− sl,
where η measures the extent of the network effect. We will model consumers’ net
utility as in (24) to analyze inter-network compatibility where direct network effects
among users are present. These effects could be important in markets where users
want to exchange or share the applications (for instance users of Word can share
files, gamers of the same video console can exchange the games, etc ).
The problem of the platforms. Each platform has two sources of income, one from
the consumers and another from the developers of applications. Thus, under the
proviso that costs are null, platform profits are given by
Πl (δ) = (sl (δ) + πl (δ)) θl (δ) ,
where πl (δ) represents the profit that the platform gets, per consumer, from the
developers side.70
The timing of the game is the following: first, the platforms set prices to con-
sumers who then decide which platform to buy. Then, the platforms set fees to
a text processor and a spreadsheet, while independent applications are a role-play game and a
boxing game.
70Our model is quite similar to the model in Church and Gandal 1992a, 1992b and 2000. How-
ever, they only consider platforms that follow a one-sided strategy with profits Πl = sl (δ) θl (δ) .
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developers. Finally, the developers set competitive prices to the consumers for the
applications they sell. We compute the subgame perfect equilibria, which implies
that consumers form rational expectations to determine both the size of each net-
work and the prices that developers will set for the applications, while knowing the
prices set by the platforms.
3. Compatibility in applications
To study the impact of compatibility on platform competition we first analyze
the market for applications, then analyze the stage at which platforms set prices.
Since developers behave competitively, the prices that they set coincide with the
fees that platforms charged to them so that we can rewrite the problem faced by
platform l in the second stage as follows
(25) max
pl1,pl2
πl = pl1ql1 + pl2ql2.
Note that at this stage each platform’s market share is given so that each platform
sets prices for applications as if it were a monopolist. Lemma 1 summarizes some
properties of the indirect utilities and profits which arise from the applications.
Lemma 1
i) If applications are complementary or independent, then ∂wl(δ)∂δ > 0 and
∂πl(δ)
∂δ > 0 for all l.
ii) If applications are substitutes, there exist σ¯1 = δW1W2 and σ¯2 =
δW2
W1
< σ¯1
such that
if σ < σ¯2 then
∂wl(δ)
∂δ > 0,
∂πl(δ)
∂δ > 0 for all l,
if σ > σ¯1 then
∂wi(δ)
∂δ < 0,
∂πi(δ)
∂δ < 0 for all l,
if σ¯2 < σ < σ¯1 then
∂wA(δ)
∂δ < 0,
∂πA(δ)
∂δ < 0,
∂wB(δ)
∂δ > 0,
∂πB(δ)
∂δ > 0.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Results in Lemma 1 resemble the standard results in the literature on mul-
tiproduct monopolist (see Tirole (1987)). The price and the demanded quantity
of the non-fully compatible applications are increasing in δ for each platform and
for any value of σ. However, how the quantity of the fully compatible applications
reacts to changes in δ depends on the sign of σ (the price is neutral). As expected,
this quantity increases with δ if applications are complementary, it decreases if
applications are substitutes and it is neutral if they are independent.
Let us define w (δ) (π (δ)) as the difference in consumer surplus (profits from
developers’ side) generated by the two platforms, i.e.,
w (δ) = wA (δ)− wB (δ) =
1
4 (1− σ2) b
¡
W 21 −W 22
¢ ¡
1− δ2
¢µ
1− 1
b
¶
, (26)
π (δ) = πA (δ)− πB (δ) =
1
4 (1− σ2) b
¡
W 21 −W 22
¢ ¡
1− δ2
¢
. (27)
Two facts that trivially follow from (26) and (27) are next stated:
Fact 1. ∂w(δ)∂δ < 0 and
∂π(δ)
∂δ < 0.
Fact 2. w (δ) > 0 and π (δ) > 0 if δ < 1 and w (δ) = π (δ) = 0 if δ = 1.
The rationale behind the above facts has an intuitive reasoning. The difference
between the two platforms in the indirect utility that consumers derive from the
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applications decreases with the degree of compatibility. In the limit, when δ = 1,
this difference is zero since both platforms will provide both applications with values
W1 and W2. Similarly, the platform with the most valuable application receives
higher profits from the developers side, a difference that disappears if there is full
compatibility (δ = 1) .
To avoid platform A tipping the market, an additional assumption is intro-
duced:
Assumption 1. t > w(δ)+π(δ)3 .
This implies that the transportation cost parameter is greater than the term
that reflects the asymmetries between the platforms. Note that if there is no asym-
metry in the applications or if there is full compatibility, i.e., w (δ) = π (δ) = 0,
Assumption 1 is trivially satisfied.
Platform competition. At the first stage, platforms compete by setting prices to
consumers. We assume that consumers have beliefs about network sizes which
lead them to make purchase decisions that in equilibrium confirm their beliefs.
Moreover, they anticipate that monopoly prices for applications will be set at the
last stage. Since platform profits are given by
Πl = (sl + πl (δ)) θl (δ) ,
the degree of compatibility affects price competition as it has an impact on plat-
forms’ market shares. Moreover, compatibility makes platforms softer or tougher
competitors depending on whether applications are complementary or substitutes.
The problem faced by platforms at this stage is similar to that of a multimarket
oligopoly.71 An increase in the level of compatibility acts as a positive (negative)
shock in the markets of applications when σ < σ¯2 (σ > σ¯1), as Lemma 1 shows.
Consequently, a change in δ has a direct effect on the profits made from the appli-
cations side and an indirect effect on the platforms market share.
Consider first the case of independent or complementary applications. An in-
crease in δ moves platforms’ reaction curves, i.e., sA (sB) and sB (sA) , inwards.
Furthermore, this move is larger for the platform A which is stronger in the ap-
plications market as compatibility "reduces differentiation" which affects this plat-
form negatively. Recall that as compatibility increases the platforms tend to offer
the same surplus in terms of applications. Consequently, both firms will be more
aggressive in the platform market. This is explained by two facts: first, the comple-
mentarity between the applications and the platform, and second, by the fact that
the reaction curves sA (sB) and sB (sA) are upward sloping as prices are strategic
complements. Assume now that applications are close substitutes. In this case both
firms will be less aggressive in the platform’s market since an increase in δ moves
platforms’ reaction curves outwards.
These results are the content of the next lemma.
Lemma 2
i) If applications are complementary or independent, platform price competition
is more aggressive the higher the degree of compatibility between the firms.
ii) If applications are close substitutes, platform price competition is less ag-
gressive the higher is the degree of compatibility.
71See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
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iii) There is a degree of substitution for which the platform with the dominant
application becomes less aggressive whereas the platform with the weak application
becomes more aggressive as the degree of compatibility increases.
Proof. see the Appendix.
In our framework, incompatibility generates a similar situation to the one in
which developers single-home. In contrast, when compatibility takes place, it leads
to partial (or full) multihoming.72 Lemma 2 shows that if applications are com-
plementary or independent, platform price competition (referred to the price set
to users) is more aggressive the higher the degree of compatibility, a result that is
consistent with a competitive bottleneck equilibrium. In contrast, platform price
competition is less aggressive, as compatibility increases, when applications are close
substitutes. It follows that the typical outcome related to a competitive bottleneck
equilibrium (that the platforms strongly attend the interests of the single-homing
group) may not be robust to introducing some substitution on the sellers side.
3.1 Welfare analysis. We have seen that the degree of compatibility affects
the prices that platforms charge to users. We next analyze its impact on platforms’
profits. We will say that firm l has incentives to promote compatibility if its profits
increase when the degree of compatibility increases, otherwise we will say that firm
l does not have incentives to promote compatibility.
A priory, one may think that both platforms would earn more as the degree of
compatibility increases since the market for applications expands and at the same
time both platforms will offer a better product. However this is only true for the
platform that is weaker for which an increase in compatibility positively affects
its total profits. Regarding the other platform, compatibility has a positive and a
negative impact on its profits. Consider complement or independent applications.
Thus, on the one hand, platform A increases its profits in the applications market.
But, on the other hand, the strong competition for the users in the first stage
in a covered and fixed market, leads to a price reduction. Platform A uses the
gains obtained on the applications side to offer lower prices to consumers in the
first stage. The reduction in sA (δ) overtakes the gains in πA (δ) due to the fight
to maintain the market share. In contrast, for platform B the reduction in price
sB (δ) is indeed compensated by the gains in profits from the applications, πB (δ) .73
In this case, platforms are less aggressive as compatibility increases but since the
"reducing differentiation" effect remains, the profits of the strong platform in the
market of applications still decrease whereas the profits of the weaker one increase.
Finally, note that if we consider platforms with symmetric applications, their profits
would not depend on the degree of compatibility. The following lemma summarizes
the above discussion.
Lemma 3
72Incompatibility can also be interpreted as exclusive developers and compatibility as non-
exclusive ones. Although we focus on compatibility, decisions on standards and/or on exclusivity
arrangements can be considered forms of compatibility.
73Note that if applications are close substitutes, profits in the applications market are de-
creasing in δ. Under these conditions platforms charge more to the users side and less to the
applications side when compatibility increases. More precisely, there is a range of σ for which the
weak platform charges more to the applications side whereas the dominant charges more to users
for the platform as a response to a higher compatibility (see lemmas 1 and 2).
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i) If W1 =W2 both firms are indifferent about compatibility
ii) If W1 6= W2 the dominant firm in the applications market does not benefit
from an increase in the degree of compatibility whereas the weaker one does
Proof. see the Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that whenever applications are symmetric, the higher profits
that the platforms can make on one side due to a greater compatibility get dis-
counted in the price of the other side in such a way that in equilibrium total profits
are not affected by δ. The lemma also shows that, with asymmetric applications, the
dominant firm has lower profits under compatibility but the weak firm has larger
ones. Consequently, the strong platform has no incentive to promote compatibility
whereas the weak one would like compatibility to be enforced. This implies that
if compatibility were an outcome of a coordinated decision between firms, it would
never arise.
Compatibility, consumer surplus and welfare
From (23) it follows that total consumer surplus denoted by TS (δ) is given byZ θA(δ)
0
(wA (δ) + V − tx− sA (δ)) dx+
Z 1
θA(δ)
(wB (δ) + V − t (1− x)− sB (δ)) dx,
which equals
V +θA (δ) (wA (δ)− sA (δ))+(1− θA (δ)) (wB (δ)− sB (δ))−
1
2
t
³
θ2A + (1− θA)
2
´
.
Total welfare denoted by TW (δ) can also be written using a similar decompo-
sition as above as
V +θA (δ) (wA (δ) + πA (δ))+(1− θA (δ)) (wB (δ) + πB (δ))−
1
2
t
³
θ2A + (1− θA)
2
´
.
Next proposition shows that the overall effect on consumer surplus and on
welfare of an increase in compatibility may turn negative. In particular, it shows
that there is a critical degree of substitutability among applications above (below)
which compatibility is bad (good) for consumers.
Proposition 1
There exist σ∗ and σ∗∗, 0 < σ∗∗ < σ∗, which are decreasing in W1 −W2 and
increasing in δ, such that
if σ > σ∗ then ∂TS(δ)∂δ < 0 and
∂TW (δ)
∂δ < 0,
if σ∗∗ < σ < σ∗ then ∂TS(δ)∂δ > 0 and
∂TW (δ)
∂δ < 0,
if σ < σ∗∗ then ∂TS(δ)∂δ > 0 and
∂TW (δ)
∂δ > 0.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Note that the impact of an increase in δ depends on both the level of substitu-
tion between the applications and on their asymmetry. In particular, an increase
in the degree of compatibility is more likely to yield a reduction in the consumers
surplus and in the total welfare if there is a high level of substitution and a low
value of δ. The fact that welfare is more likely to decrease than consumers surplus
is explained by the fact that the total profits of the industry are decreasing in the
degree of compatibility, i.e., ∂(ΠA(δ)+ΠB(δ))∂δ =
2
9t ((w (δ) + π (δ)))
∂(w(δ)+π(δ))
∂δ < 0.
Moreover, based on Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 we can conclude that a move
towards a larger degree of compatibility in the applications may be harmful for
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users and social welfare, particularly when asymmetries are strong. Consequently,
it may be undesirable to force a larger degree of compatibility not only because
it is against the dominant firm interests but also because it may lower consumers’
surplus. Based on these arguments, next corollary follows.
Corollary 1
There is a range of parameter values for which the dominant firm, the users and
the social planner share the same interests regarding compatibility that are against
those of the weak firm. Furthermore, this range is higher the larger the dominance
of the strong firm.
Note finally that firms can differ in another dimension, namely in the stand
alone values of their platforms. Denoting by ∆ to VA−VB, it is easy to see that ∆
has the same impact on equilibrium market outcomes than w (δ) has. Consequently,
all the potential negative effects on consumers’ surplus and on welfare of increasing
compatibility get reinforced when this second source of asymmetry is present, i.e.,
the critical values σ∗ and σ∗∗ in Proposition 1 are decreasing in ∆.
3.2 Direct network effects and Inter-network compatibility. We have
assumed so far that there are no direct network effects which may be considered
as a limiting assumption. We next introduce direct network effects among users
with a twofold objective: on one hand, we want to study if they make compat-
ibility in applications more or less desirable, on the other hand, by introducing
direct network effects we can analyze inter-network compatibility. Note that since
consumers derive value from the existence of consumers using the other platform,
inter-network compatibility might turn desirable. Furthermore, it may be in the
interest of firms to enforce it even though they might be against compatibility in
applications.
When there are direct network effects users’ utility is given by (24) , i.e., by
Ul = wl (δ) + V + ηθl − tx− sl,
where η measures the extent of the network effects. Since compatibility makes
the platforms more symmetric, it reduces the positive direct network externalities.
Thus, in markets where direct network effects are important, the potential harming
effect that an increase in compatibility has on consumers surplus and on welfare
is more likely to occur. In other words, strong direct network effects make more
likely the negative consequence of forcing compatibility in applications. It hence
follows that the presence of network effects make compatibility in applications less
desirable.74
Regarding inter-network compatibility, it allows consumers who buy platform
l to get an extra net-utility of ηβ (1− θl) from the existence of users of the other
platform, so that consumers overall utility becomes
Ul = wl + V + η [θl + β (1− θl)]− tx− sl
where β  [0, 1] measures the level of inter-network compatibility.
74More precisely, the critical values σ∗ and σ∗∗ in Proposition 1 are decreasing in η, as the
market share of the dominant firm is now given by
θA (δ) =
1
2
+
1
6 (t− η)
(w (δ) + π (δ)) ,
that is increasing in η.
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We find that inter-network compatibility would indeed be promoted by the
strong firm. Although an increase in β reduces the platform differentiation, it also
allows platforms to set higher prices to consumers. This last positive effect com-
pensates the negative impact on the dominant firm’s market share of the reduced
differentiation. Furthermore, inter-network compatibility reduces consumers sur-
plus and its effect on total welfare might turn negative if the level of asymmetries
are large. Firms’ incentives to become inter-network compatible are opposite to
those of consumers. Furthermore, as the market dominance of the strong platform
(either in platforms or applications values) grows larger it is more likely that an
increase in inter-network compatibility will decrease welfare. These results are the
content of next Proposition.
Proposition 2
i) Both firms benefit from an increase in inter-network compatibility.
(ii) Inter-network compatibility has a negative impact on consumers’ surplus,
which is larger the stronger the asymmetries are.
(iii) If asymmetries are strong, inter-network compatibility has a negative im-
pact on welfare.
Proof. see the Appendix.
4. Incentives to innovate
A platform can invest in the stand-alone value of the platform itself and/or
in the value of the fully compatible application. Think of the video-game indus-
try, a sector characterized by huge levels of investment. We observe that firms
invest in developing new applications for the platform (console),75 but also invest
in producing more advanced technology.76
We will consider here that the result of an innovation is an increase in a firm’s
value, so that the steeper the slope of the firm’s profit function with respect to
its own value level, the larger the firm’s incentive to increase this value.77 We
will determine the effect of compatibility on a firm’s incentives to undertake an
innovation by the sign of
∂| ∂Πl(δ)∂Vl |
∂δ and
∂| ∂Πl(δ)∂Wi |
∂δ . Based on the nature (positive or
negative) of the incentives to undertake these innovations we will propose a four
type taxonomy of firms:
∂| ∂Πl(δ)∂Wi |
∂δ > 0
∂| ∂Πl(δ)∂Wi |
∂δ ≤ 0
∂| ∂Πl(δ)∂Vl |
∂δ > 0 Type I Type II
∂| ∂Πl(δ)∂Vl |
∂δ ≤ 0 Type III Type IV
Table 1: Firm taxonomy
75Satoru Iwata, the president of Nintendo declared "By designing products for existing
gamers and neglecting non-gamers, it undermines the prospects to future growth"...."by providing
non-gaming functions such as news and weather too, the aim is to overcome non-gamers’ aver-
sion to consoles, so that eventually they might flick to the "games" channel and give something
a try" (see The Economist, 26/10/2006).
76Sony is pushing the PS3 as the most advanced console, with a powerful new processor chip
and a high definition "Blu-ray" optical drive ( see The Economist 26/10/2006 and 10/11/2006).
77We introduce investment incentives as in Valletti and Cambini (2005).
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We will say that a firm is of type I if compatibility increases the marginal
incentive to invest in both values. In contrast, a firm is of type IV if compatibility
decreases both marginal incentives. Finally, a firm is of type II or III if the marginal
incentive to invest is increasing in compatibility for one value but decreasing for the
other one. By analyzing firm types we will state the relationship between increasing
firms’ compatibility and getting more valuable products in the market.
We next study the effect of compatibility in applications on the incentives to
invest. The next proposition presents the results regarding the typology introduced
in Table 1 and the effect on total marginal incentives.
Proposition 3
When we consider an increase in δ,
i) The weak firm is type I if the asymmetries (any of them) are very strong,
otherwise it is type II.
ii) The dominant firm in the market of applications is type IV.
iii) The total marginal incentive to invest in the stand-alone value does not
change, however the corresponding to the value of the fully compatible applications
decreases.
Proof. see the Appendix.
As the degree of compatibility increases, the strong platform in the market of
applications has lower marginal incentives to invest in either type of investment. In
contrast, compatibility positively affects the marginal incentive of the weak platform
to invest in its stand-alone value. The effect is also positive regarding its incentive
to invest in the fully compatible application when existing asymmetries are high.
The rationale is as follows. Consider first the incentives to invest in the ap-
plications. When a firm invests in the value of its fully compatible application,
this investment is shared with the other firm, through δ, which free-rides from this
increase in its value. Consequently, the marginal benefit of this investment is de-
creasing in δ. In the case of the dominant platform, this effect is reinforced by the
fact that an increase in δ also leads to a loss in its relative advantage, so that ii)
follows. Consider now the incentives of the weak platform. When asymmetries
are very strong, the benefit due to its gain in the relative advantage compensates
the loss due to the free-rider effect, which explains i). The opposite occurs when
asymmetries are weak.
In the case of investment in the stand-alone value, the free-rider effect does
not exist but the effect of δ on the relative advantages between firms remains. It
reduces the incentives of the strong firm, while increasing those of the weak firm.
These effects balance each other out and this explains first part in point (iii). The
free-rider effect explains the second part of the last point.
Consider now the effect on the incentives to invest that inter-network compat-
ibility yields.
Proposition 4
When internetwork compatibility increases, i.e., when β increases,
i) The dominant firm is type IV
ii) The weak firm is type I
iii) The total marginal incentive to invest in the stand-alone value does not
change, however the corresponding to the value of the fully compatible applications
decreases.
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Proof. see the Appendix.
When considering the effect of β on the incentives to invest the problem of
the free-rider problem disappears, and only the effect on the relative advantage
is present. It explains that the weak firm is always type I, whereas the rest of
the results are similar to those under compatibility in the applications, stated in
proposition 4.
5. Robustness
We have shown that whenever the applications to be made compatible are close
substitutes, users’ surplus and welfare are decreasing in the degree of compatibility.
Moreover, the dominant firm will never promote compatibility in applications as
both its profits and its incentives to invest will decrease.
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that for a given compatibility level
the two platforms compete à la Hotelling in attracting customers. Note that two
assumptions are hidden behind this mode of competition. First, that the mar-
ket size is fixed, and second, that although the model allows for applications to
be substitutes, complements or independent, the systems as a whole are assumed
substitutes.78 Either of these assumptions is not innocuous for the aforementioned
results. On the one hand, the incentives of the strong platform may change if we
allow for a non-covered market. An increase in the value of its product due to
compatibility would expand the market and the profits generated by this expan-
sion may compensate the reduction in the advantage of the dominant firm. If this
were the case, the dominant firm might also be interested in making applications
compatible. On the other hand, complementarities among systems do exist (there
are complementarities among computer operating systems and mobile phones, as
well as between video consoles and mobile phones),79 and they may alter firms’
attitudes towards compatibility. Our purpose here is to study the robustness of the
results by examining the extent to which they hold true for a potential expandable
market and for systems that are not necessarily substitutes.
To do so we analyze a market in which two systems provide a service to con-
sumers.80 System i, i = 1, 2, is composed of platform i, application i which is fully
compatible for this system and application j which is fully compatible for system
j but compatible in a degree δ for system i. Consumers’ valuations are given by
α1 = VH +W1 + δW2,
α2 = VL +W2 + δW1.
where VH , VL are the stand alone values of the platforms,W1 is the value of the ap-
plication that is fully compatible for system 1, W2 the value of the application that
is fully compatible for system 2 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 measures the degree of compatibility.
We assume W1 > W2 and VH ≥ VL.
78A system is the good composed by the platform plus the applications.
79For instance, the Wii of Nintendo has a game that is played with photographs, so that it
can be played with a camera or a mobile phone.
80We here present the main results and their intuition. All the details are relegated to
Appendix B.
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The price that consumers pay for the system can be decomposed in the following
way:
pi = si + xii if δ = 0
pi = si + xii + xij if 0 < δ ≤ 1,
where si is the price that the platform of the system i sets to users, and xij is the
price that users pay for an application j to be used in system i. Firms compete in
prices and the representative consumer maximizes a net utility based on Bowley’s
(1924) model and given by
(28) U = α1q1 + α2q2 −
1
2
b
¡
q21 + 2σq1q2 + q
2
2
¢
− p1q1 − p2q2,
where qi is the quantity of system i consumed, b > 0 and −1 ≤ σ ≤ 1. Negative
values of σ make the model one of demand for complementary systems. If σ = 0 the
two systems are independent in demand. As σ approaches 1, the systems become
closer substitutes.
Since the market is two-sided, the profits of platform i depend on the price set
to consumers, si, as well as on the prices that it sets to the developers so that
Πi = (si + dii + dij) qi
where dii (dij) is the price that platform i sets to the developer of its fully compatible
application (of application j).
The timing of decisions is as follows. First, platforms set prices dii, dij , and si.
Then developers of the complementary product set their prices competitively, i.e.,
xij = dij . Because of this and since the platform and the applications are perfect
complements, the model becomes equivalent to that of a one-sided market in which
firms compete by setting the prices for their systems p1, p2.
The best response of firm i to a price pj by its rival is given by
(29) pi (pj) =
1
2
(αi − σαj + σpj) .
Note that price systems are strategic complements, with ∂pi∂pj =
σ
2 > 0, if systems
are substitutes. If they are complementary (σ < 0), prices are strategic substitutes.
From (29) equilibrium prices are derived, with
p∗1 =
1
4− σ2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α1 − σα2
¢
, (30)
p∗2 =
1
4− σ2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α2 − σα1
¢
.
The impact of an increase in the degree of compatibility on the equilibrium
prices depends, on one hand, on the nature of the strategic interaction between
firms’ choices, and on the other hand on the interplay between two effects which
are brought about by compatibility: a market expansion effect and a reducing
differentiation effect.
When prices are strategic substitutes, so that σ < 0, both firms respond to an
increase in the degree of compatibility by increasing their price. Demanded quanti-
ties also increase, thus when systems are complementary or independent, both firms
benefit from compatibility. When they are strategic complements, so that σ > 0,
the price of system 2 also increases and the effect is always positive for the weak
firm’s profits. Regarding system 1 two outcomes can occur: i). The equilibrium
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price and quantity of system 1 increase as compatibility increases. This outcome
emerges in either of the following two circumstances. First, if the market expansion
effect dominates the reducing differentiation effect, i.e., if ∂α1∂δ > σ
∂α2
∂δ , which hap-
pens when W1 < 1σW2, then, in equilibrium, the positive effect from W1 <
1
σW2 is
reinforced by the price strategic complementarity (since ∂p
∗
2
∂δ > 0). Compatibility
shifts system 1’s reaction function outwards and in equilibrium its price and quan-
tity sold are higher (see Figure 1 (a)). Second, if the reducing differentiation effect
dominates the market expansion effect, but this negative effect is compensated by
the price increase of the weak platform, the strategic complementarity still leads
to ∂p
∗
1
∂δ > 0 in equilibrium. This is the case when
1
σW2 < W1 <
2−σ2
σ W2 and
the final effect looks as depicted in Figure 1 (b). ii). The equilibrium price and
quantity of system 1 decrease as compatibility increases. This outcome emerges
whenever W1 >
(2−σ2)
σ W2 so that the negative impact brought by the reducing
differentiation effect dominates overall and in equilibrium ∂p
∗
1
∂δ < 0 (see Figure 1
(c)).
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Based on the above discussion it follows that compatibility will hurt the domi-
nant platform as long as W1 >
(2−σ2)
σ W2. The reducing differentiation effect tends
to dominate as long as σ and the difference between the values of the complements
are high. In contrast to the Hotelling case, the dominant platform might now be
interested in inducing compatibility with the weak platform. However, a strong
market expansion is crucial for this result.
Regarding users’s surplus and welfare, Proposition B1 in Appendix B shows
that whenever systems are complements or independent, they are both increasing in
the degree of compatibility in applications. However, if the systems are substitutes
the opposite result can hold.
Finally, when considering the marginal incentives to invest, the net effect will
depend on whether or not the gains coming from offering a higher product value
compensate the losses coming from the free-rider effect and from the reduction in
the relative advantage the dominant system enjoys (the formal result is presented
in Proposition B2). If this happens, the dominant firm can be of type I (i.e., com-
patibility encourages investment incentive in the platform and the fully compatible
application), something that never occurs under the Hotelling price competition.
Again this will only occur if a very important market expansion takes place.
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The incentives to invest in the stand-alone value only depend on the difference
(W1 −W2) . The change, due to δ, in the dominant platform’s marginal incentive
to invest is positive as long as W1 < 2−σ
2
σ W2. Note that this is the condition under
which p1 and q1 are increasing in δ. Thus, the marginal benefit of investing in VH
when δ increases is negative if the effect of δ on profits is also negative. Since this
effect is always positive for the weak platform, its marginal incentive to invest in
VL is always positive.
The incentives to invest in the value of the applications depend on both sources
of asymmetriesW1−W2 and VH−VL.When asymmetries are strong, compatibility
increases the weak platform’s incentives to invest. For the dominant firm, the
effect of δ on incentives goes in the opposite direction, and when asymmetries
are important it is negative (the losses coming from the free-rider effect and from
decreasing its relative advantage are larger than the gains from offering a higher
product value).
In sum, even though some of our basic findings could change if a larger degree of
compatibilityo brings about the possibility of a market expansion, we have shown
that a large expansion is needed to compensate the prevailing (negative) forces
identified in the basic model.
6. Final remarks
We have developed a model where firms are horizontally differentiated á la
Hotelling and are asymmetric in the value of their fully compatible application. We
have analyzed firms’ compatibility decisions and investment incentives to assess the
benefits to users and to welfare of imposing a larger degree of compatibility among
firms. We have stressed that compatibility is not always beneficial for consumers.
Furthermore, in many instances the dominant firm’s interests regarding compati-
bility decisions are in line with those of users, and are opposite to those of the weak
firm, which will always demand more compatibility to be enforced. When this is
the case, imposing a higher degree of compatibility will damage total welfare and
consumer surplus.
Let us first recap the driving forces that underlie our main results. We have
shown that the gap or the level of asymmetry given by (W1 −W2) determines firms
attitudes towards compatibility in applications. In particular, if W1 =W2 they are
indifferent about the degree of compatibility that is enforced. When applications
have different values so that W1 6= W2 then the weak firm is always interested in
promoting compatibility in applications. In contrast, the dominant one is never
interested in doing so. The reason behind this result is that compatibility mainly
decreases the market power of the dominant firm by reducing its advantage in
product differentiation. However, regarding inter-network compatibility we have
shown that both firms find profitable to promote it.
We have also shown that the welfare results strongly depend on the level of
complementarity/substitutability of the applications, with compatibility decreas-
ing both consumer surplus and welfare if applications are close substitutes. The
level of the asymmetries in applications and/or in platform value, may also shape
the effect of compatibility on welfare and consumer surplus. In particular, it tends
to be negative when the asymmetries are important. We have also found that strong
direct network effects strengthen the potential negative incidence of increasing the
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degree of compatibility in the applications. Moreover, our results show that a mar-
ginal increase in inter-network compatibility is always consumers’ surplus reducing
and it may have a negative impact in total welfare if asymmetries are strong. Fi-
nally, when systems are independent or complements, compatibility should indeed
be promoted by any sector of the society.
Regarding the effects on the incentives to innovate, we have found that the
marginal incentives to invest in the stand-alone value for the weak platform is
increasing in δ, and so are the marginal incentives to invest in the application
provided that asymmetries are important. For the dominant one, the marginal
incentives to invest in either the stand-alone value or in the value of the fully
compatible application are decreasing in the degree of compatibility. Changes in the
level of inter-network compatibility positively affect the weak platform’s marginal
incentives to invest and negatively affect those of the dominant one.81
In sum, two salient aspects of the compatibility-welfare puzzle follow. First,
substitutes goods are "bad" for compatibility. If products are substitutes, even if
the market is not covered, compatibility tends to be welfare decreasing. Second,
the negative potential consequences of compatibility are more likely when asym-
metries are strong. To the best of our knowledge these are two novel results in
the literature, as we offer a study of compatibility issues from the perspective of
complementarities/substitutabilities among the goods to be made compatible.
Our analysis has several implications for evaluating "real world" policy deci-
sions. In particular, we believe that these results shed light on some issues related
to the EC vs. Microsoft case that we mentioned in the introduction. We find
that when deciding about forcing compatibility/interoperability, the existence of a
dominant firm does not provide enough arguments for more compatibility to be de-
sirable. Moreover, network effects, almost always present in this kind of industries,
may act as a countervailing reason to not force more compatibility in applications.
Related to the incentives to innovate, when the Commission took the decision of
imposing interoperability, it stated that the remedy would be good for innovation.
We have shown that interoperability generates a free-rider effect, so that more in-
teroperability may not encourage innovation either for the dominant firm or for the
weak firm.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Solving the maximization problem in (25) gives equilibrium prices
pA1 =
1
2
W1, pA2 =
1
2
δW2,
pB1 =
1
2
δW1, pB2 =
1
2
W2,
81We have considered how compatibility affects the marginal incentives to invest of both
platforms. We acknowledge that the study of the effect of compatibility on innovation demands
analysing its impact on equilibrium investment levels. We consider this as a future extension.
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so that the corresponding indirect utilities and the profits from applications are
given by
wA (δ) =
1
4 (1− σ2) b
³
W 21 + (δW2)
2 − 2σδW1W2
´µ
1− 1
b
¶
, (31)
wB (δ) =
1
4 (1− σ2) b
³
W 22 + (δW1)
2 − 2σδW2W1
´µ
1− 1
b
¶
, (32)
πA (δ) =
1
4 (1− σ2) b
³
W 21 + (δW2)
2 − 2σδW1W2
´
, and (33)
πB (δ) =
1
4 (1− σ2) b
³
W 22 + (δW1)
2 − 2σδW2W1
´
. (34)
By inspecting expressions above it trivially follows that
∂wA (δ)
∂δ
> 0,
∂πA (δ)
∂δ
> 0⇔ δW2 − σW1 > 0,
∂wB (δ)
∂δ
> 0,
∂πB (δ)
∂δ
> 0⇔ δW1 − σW2 > 0,
inequalities that always hold if applications are complementary or independent, so
that i) trivially follows. In contrast, if applications are substitutes (0 < σ < 1) the
sign of ∂wA(δ)∂δ equals the sign of
∂πA(δ)
∂δ and it depends on the relationship between
σ and the ratio δW2W1 so that ii) follows. Similar arguments apply to the other
platform.
Proof of Lemma 2
By looking for the indifferent consumer as is usual in the Hotelling model, the
market share of platform A is given by the following expression,
θA =
1
2
+
w (δ)− (sA − sB)
2t
,
and the market share of B by θB = 1− θA. Note that Assumption 1 is sufficient to
ensure that the market share equation above is well behaved.
Each platform will set a price sl to maximize
Πl = (sl + πl (δ)) θl.
By solving maximization problem above we derive the platform’s reaction functions
which are given by
sA (sB) =
1
2
(t+ w (δ) + sB − πA (δ))
sB (sA) =
1
2
(t− w (δ) + sA − πB (δ)) .
Since they are increasing in the choice of the rival, prices are strategic complements.
From reaction functions above it is straightforward to derive the equilibrium plat-
form prices, which are given by
sA (δ) = t+
1
3
w (δ)− 2
3
πA (δ)−
1
3
πB (δ) (35)
sB (δ) = t−
1
3
w (δ)− 2
3
πB (δ)−
1
3
πA (δ) .
If applications are either complements, independent or substitutes with σ < σ¯2,
we observe that ∂sA(δ)∂δ < 0. Note that for platform B, an increase in compatibility
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has a positive effect on sB (δ) via a reduction in w (δ) . However, this is compensated
by the increase in πA (δ) and πB (δ) , so that it also holds for platform B that
∂sB(δ)
∂δ < 0.
If applications are substitutes and σ > σ¯1, then
∂si(δ)
∂δ > 0 holds for both
platforms. Finally, if σ¯2 < σ < σ¯1 then
∂sA(δ)
∂δ > 0 and
∂sB(δ)
∂δ < 0 and the
statements in the lemma follow.
Proof of Lemma 3
Platform profits are given by
Πl (δ) = (sl (δ) + πl (δ)) θl (δ) ,
where, using (35) , (33) and (34) , platform’s revenues per consumer are given by
sA (δ) + πA (δ) = t+
1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ)) (36)
sB (δ) + πB (δ) = t−
1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ)) ,
and equilibrium market shares by
θA (δ) =
1
2
+
1
6t
(w (δ) + π (δ))
θB (δ) =
1
2
− 1
6t
(w (δ) + π (δ)) .
If W1 = W2 occurs, then it happens that w (δ) = π (δ) = 0 and point i)
in the lemma follows. To prove ii) note that because of lemma 1 we have that
sA (δ) + πA (δ) and θA (δ) are decreasing in δ, so that ΠA (δ) is strictly decreasing
in δ. In contrast, sB (δ)+πB (δ) and θB (δ) are all increasing in δ functions so that
ΠB (δ) is strictly increasing in δ.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider first the analysis for the consumers’ surplus. For expositional simplic-
ity, let us define A and B as
A = wA (δ) + V − sA (δ) =
2
3
(wA (δ) + πA (δ)) +
1
3
(wB (δ) + πB (δ)) + V,
B = wB (δ) + V − sB (δ) =
2
3
(wB (δ) + πB (δ)) +
1
3
(wA (δ) + πA (δ)) + V.
To study the effect of compatibility on total consumers surplus we need to compute
∂
³
θA (δ)A+ (1− θA (δ))B − 12 t
³
θA (δ)
2
+ (1− θA (δ))2
´´
∂δ
that is
θA
∂A
∂δ
+ (1− θA)
∂B
∂δ
+ (A− tθA)
∂θA
∂δ
+ (B − t (1− θA))
∂ (1− θA)
∂δ
.
By definition of the indifferent consumer in equilibrium we have that
(A− tθA)
∂θA
∂δ
+ (B − t (1− θA))
∂ (1− θA)
∂δ
= 0,
Consequently, the effect of compatibility on total consumers surplus does only de-
pend on the sign of
(37) F (δ, σ) = θA
∂A
∂δ
+ (1− θA)
∂B
∂δ
.
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We next show F (δ, σ) that is decreasing in σ. First, note that from the expressions
for wA, wB, πA, and πB given respectively in (31) , (32) , (33) and (34) it follows that
their cross partial derivatives ∂
2
∂δ∂σ are negative. Consequently,
∂2A
∂δ∂σ is negative iff
2σ
(1− σ2) (σ¯2 − σ) < 1⇔ σ¯2 <
1 + σ2
2σ
,
and ∂
2B
∂δ∂σ is negative iff
2σ
(1− σ2) (σ¯1 − σ) < 1⇔ σ¯1 <
1 + σ2
2σ
,
where σ¯1 and σ¯2 are defined in lemma 1 and they both belong to the interval (0, 1).
Since 1+σ
2
2σ > 1 we can conclude that both
∂2A
∂δ∂σ and
∂2B
∂δ∂σ are negative. Since
∂θA
∂σ > 0,
∂(A−B)
∂δ < 0 and
∂(A−B)
∂δ∂σ < 0 it follows straightforwardly that F (δ, σ)
stated in (37) is decreasing in σ.
By Lemma 1 we have that for all σ > σ¯1 it holds that
∂TS(δ)
∂δ < 0 and for all
σ < σ¯2 it holds that
∂TS(δ)
∂δ > 0. Appealing to the mean value theorem there is a
critical degree of substitutability among applications σ∗ ∈ (σ¯2, σ¯1) that makes (37)
zero. Furthermore since F (δ, σ) is decreasing in σ, this value is unique which shows
our claim.
Consider now total welfare. We first show ∂
2TW
∂δ∂σ < 0. To do so we only need
to show that the cross derivative of the total profits of the industry with respect
to δ and σ is also negative, given that we already shown that this is the case for
consumers’ surplus. Total industry profits are given by
ΠA +ΠB =
µ
t+
1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ))
¶
θA +
µ
t− 1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ))
¶
(1− θA) .
Since θA =
¡
1
2 +
1
6t (w (δ) + π (δ))
¢
profits can be rewritten as
ΠA +ΠB = t+
1
9t
(w (δ) + π (δ))2
so that
∂ (ΠA +ΠB)
∂δ
=
2
9t
(w (δ) + π (δ))
∂ (w (δ) + π (δ))
∂δ
< 0,
and
∂2 (ΠA +ΠB)
∂δ∂σ
=
2
9t
∂ (w (δ) + π (δ))
∂σ
∂ (w (δ) + π (δ))
∂δ
+
2
9t
(w (δ) + π (δ))
∂2 (w (δ) + π (δ))
∂δ∂σ
Since ∂(w(δ)+π(δ))∂σ > 0,
∂(w(δ)+π(δ))
∂δ < 0 and
∂2(w(δ)+π(δ))
∂δ∂σ < 0 it follows that
∂(ΠA(δ)+ΠB(δ))
∂δ∂σ < 0 holds.
Now, to set the effect of a change in δ on welfare we need to sign
(38) θA
∂A0
∂δ
+ (1− θA)
∂B0
∂δ
+
∙
(A0 − tθA)
∂θA
∂δ
+ (B0 − t (1− θA))
∂ (1− θA)
∂δ
¸
,
where A0 = wA (δ) + πA (δ) + V and B0 = wB (δ) + πB (δ) + V. Since A0 > A
and B0 < B we have that (A0 − tθA) > (B0 − t (1− θA)) . Moreover, since ∂θA∂δ =
−∂(1−θA)∂δ , we can conclude that the term in brackets in (38) is always negative and
it is decreasing in the level of asymmetry measured by W1 −W2.
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Appealing again to Lemma 1 it follows that and if σ > σ¯1 then
∂TW (δ)
∂δ < 0. If
σ < σ¯2 the expression
∂TW (δ)
∂δ can be positive or negative. However, at σ = 0 we
have that ∂TW (δ)∂δ > 0. Consequently, there is σ
∗∗ ∈ (0, σ¯1) that makes (38) zero.
Given that,
θA
µ
∂A
∂δ
− ∂A
0
∂δ
¶
+ (1− θA)
µ
∂B
∂δ
− ∂B
0
∂δ
¶
< 0
it follows that σ∗∗ < σ∗. Moreover, by Lemma 1, we also have that ∂A∂δ (σ
∗) <
∂B
∂δ (σ
∗) and ∂A
0
∂δ (σ
∗∗) < ∂B
0
∂δ (σ
∗∗). Thus, the critical values are decreasing in
θA =
1
2
+
1
6t
(w (δ) + π (δ)) ,
and consequently they are decreasing in W1 −W2 and increasing in the level of δ
as the proposition states.
Proof of Proposition 2
With inter-network compatibility, equilibrium prices, market share and profits
are given by
sA (δ, β) = t+
1
3
w (δ)− 2
3
πA (δ)−
1
3
πB (δ)− η (1− β) ,
sB (δ, β) = t−
1
3
w (δ)− 2
3
πB (δ)−
1
3
πA (δ)− η (1− β) ,
θA (δ, β) =
1
2
+
1
6 (t− η (1− β)) (w (δ) + π (δ))
θB (δ, β) =
1
2
− 1
6 (t− η (1− β)) (w (δ) + π (δ))
ΠA (δ, β) =
1
2 (t− η (1− β))
µ
t+
1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ))− η (1− β)
¶2
,
ΠB (δ, β) =
1
2 (t− η (1− β))
µ
t− 1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ))− η (1− β)
¶2
.
To prove statement i) note that ∂ΠA∂β and
∂ΠB
∂β are positive if
t > η (1− β) + 1
3
(w (δ) + π (δ)) ,
a condition which is implied by the analogous condition to Assumption 1, namely
Assumption 1’: t > η + w(δ)+π(δ)3 .
We next study its impact on consumers’ surplus and on welfare. To do so, note
that total surplus TS (δ, β) is given by
V +
Z θA(δ,β)
0
(wA (δ) + V − tx+ η [θA (δ, β) + β (1− θA (δ, β))]− sA (δ, β)) dx+Z 1
θA(δ,β)
(wB (δ) + V − t (1− x) + η [(1− θA (δ, β)) + βθA (δ, β)]− sB (δ, β)) dx.
To study how changes in β affect TS (δ, β) note that
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∂TS (δ, β)
∂β
= θA
∂A (β)
∂β
+ (1− θA)
∂B (β)
∂β
+
(A (β)− tθA)
∂θA
∂δ
+ (B (β)− t (1− θA))
∂ (1− θA)
∂δ
,
where
A (β) = (wA (δ) + V + η [θA + β (1− θA)]− sA (δ, β)) , and
B (β) = (wB (δ) + V + η [(1− θA) + βθA]− sB (δ, β))
By definition of indifferent user we know that
(A (β)− tθA)
∂θA
∂δ
+ (B (β)− t (1− θA))
∂ (1− θA)
∂δ
= 0.
Therefore to study how β affects TS (δ, β) we only need to analyze the sign of
(39) θA
∂ (η [θA + β (1− θA)]− sA)
∂β
+ (1− θA)
∂ (η [(1− θA) + βθA]− sB)
∂β
.
Given that ∂sA∂β =
∂sB
∂β = η, it follows
η
µ
θA
∂ [θA + β (1− θA)]
∂β
+ (1− θA)
∂ [(1− θA) + βθA]
∂β
¶
− η.
Taking into account that ∂(1−θA)∂β = −
∂θA
∂β , computing the derivatives and rearrang-
ing terms lead to
∂TS (δ, β)
∂β
= η
µ
2θA (1− θA) + (2θA − 1)
∂θA
∂β
(1− β)
¶
− η.
Since ∂θA∂β < 0 and 2θA (1− θA) < 1 it follows that the impact of β on TS (δ, β)
is negative as claimed. Furthermore, he first term is decreasing in θA so that the
negative impact of β is higher, the higher the asymmetries as stated in ii).
We can obtain the effect on total welfare TW (δ, β) by signing
∂TW (δ, β)
∂β
=
∂TS (δ, β)
∂β
+
∂ΠA (δ, β)
∂β
+
∂ΠB (δ, β)
∂β
.
Straightforward computations yield that
∂ΠA (δ, β)
∂β
+
∂ΠB (δ, β)
∂β
= η
Ã
1− (w (δ) + π (δ))
2
(3 (t− η (1− β)))2
!
< η,
Note that ∂ΠA(δ,β)∂β +
∂ΠB(δ,β)
∂β is decreasing in the size of the asymmetries. With
no asymmetries the total gain of the industry would be η. However, given the
existence of asymmetries, this gain is lower. Moreover, the higher the asymmetries
in applications, the lower the gain of the industry due to β. Thus, given that both
components of total welfare are decreasing in the asymmetries, point iii) follows.
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the first statement note that
∂
³
∂ΠA(δ)
∂VA
´
∂δ
=
1
9 (t− η)
∂ (π (δ) + υ (δ))
∂δ
< 0.
APPENDIX A 79
If we consider investment in the fully compatible application, straightforward
computation shows that
∂ΠA (δ)
∂W1
=
Ã¡
t+ 13 (∆+ w (δ) + π (δ))− η
¢
(t− η)
!Ã¡
2− 1b
¢ ¡
1− δ2
¢
W1
6 (1− σ2) b
!
.
Since ∂ΠA(δ)∂W1 is the product of two decreasing and positive functions, it trivially
follows that
∂
³
∂(ΠA(δ))
∂W1
´
∂δ
< 0,
and the first statement follows.
To prove the second statement we note that
∂
³
∂ΠB(δ)
∂VB
´
∂δ
= − 1
9 (t− η)
∂ (π (δ) + υ (δ))
∂δ
> 0.
To analyze the marginal incentive of the weak firm to invest in the fully com-
patible application we observe that
∂ΠB (δ)
∂W2
=
¡
t− 13 (∆+ w (δ) + π (δ))− η
¢
(t− η)
Ã¡
2− 1b
¢ ¡
1− δ2
¢
W2
6 (1− σ2) b
!
,
so that, differentiating expression above and rearranging gives
∂
³
∂ΠB(δ)
∂W2
´
∂δ
=
2
¡
1− σ2
¢
(2b− 1) δW2
9 (t− η) (σ + 1)2 (1− σ)2 b2
µ
w (δ) + π (δ)− 1
2
(3 (t− η)−∆)
¶
.
Note that
∂
³
∂ΠB(δ)
∂W2
´
∂δ
≶ 0
as long as
w (δ) + π (δ)− 1
2
(3 (t− η)−∆) ≶ 0,
or equivalently if
1
3
(2 (w (δ) + π (δ)) +∆) + η ≶ t.
Then,
∂
?
∂ΠB(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ > 0 and the weak firm is type I, if the asymmetries are very
strong, i.e., if either ∆ or w (δ)+π (δ) are large enough. Otherwise this firm is type
II.
Finally, note that
∂
?
∂ΠA(δ)
∂VA
?
∂δ = −
∂
?
∂ΠB(δ)
∂VB
?
∂δ and that
∂
?
∂(ΠA(δ))
∂W1
?
∂δ +
∂
?
∂ΠB(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ =
G
3 (t− η)
∂ (w (δ) + π (δ))
∂δ
¡
1− δ2
¢
(W1 −W2)
− 2δG
(t− η)
µ
t (W1 +W2) +
µ
1
3
(∆+ w (δ) + π (δ))− η
¶
(W1 −W2)
¶
whereG = (
2− 1b )
6(1−σ2)b . Since
∂(w(δ)+π(δ))
∂δ < 0, and
1
3 (∆+ w (δ) + π (δ))−η < t−η < t
by Assumption 1, the last statement of the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
80 CHAPTER 3. COMPATIBILITY AND INNOVATION WITH FIRM DOMINANCE
The changes in the marginal incentives to invest in the stand-alone value of the
dominant platform are given by
∂
³
∂(ΠA(δ,β))
∂VA
´
∂β
= − η
9 (t− η (1− β))2
(π (δ) + w (δ) +∆) < 0,
and the changes in the marginal incentives to invest in its fully-compatible appli-
cation are given by
∂
³
∂(ΠA(δ,β))
∂W1
´
∂β
= − 2ηW1
9 (t− η (1− β))2
H
¡
H
¡
W 21 −W 22
¢
+∆+ π (δ)
¢
< 0,
where H = 14(1−σ2)b
¡
1− 1b
¢ ¡
1− δ2
¢
> 0, so that i) follows. Regarding the weak
firm, the corresponding expressions are given by
∂
³
∂(ΠB(δ,β))
∂VB
´
∂β
=
η
9 (t− η (1− β))2
(π (δ) + w (δ) +∆) > 0,
and
∂
³
∂(ΠB(δ,β))
∂W2
´
∂β
=
2ηW2
9 (t− η (1− β))2
H
¡
H
¡
W 21 −W 22
¢
+∆+ π (δ)
¢
> 0,
consequently ii) follows.
Finally, since
∂
?
∂(ΠA(δ,β))
∂VA
?
∂β = −
∂
?
∂(ΠB(δ,β))
∂VB
?
∂β and the total incentive
∂
?
∂(ΠA(δ,β))
∂W1
?
∂β +
∂
?
∂(ΠB(δ,β))
∂W2
?
∂β becomes
− (W1 −W2)
2ηH
¡
H
¡
W 21 −W 22
¢
+∆+ π (δ)
¢
9 (t− η (1− β))2
< 0,
part iii) follows.
Appendix B
We first introduce an assumption to ensure that system 2 is active, namely,
Assumption 2:
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α2 − σα1
¢
> 0 for all δ.82
From the utility (28) in the text, the demand function for system i becomes
qi =
(αi − σαj)− pi + σpj
b (1− σ2) .
Assuming marginal costs are null firm i obtains profits of
Πi = pi
µ
(αi − σαj)− pi + σpj
b (1− σ2)
¶
.
Next lemma formalizes the discussion in the main text.
Lemma B1
If the systems are complementary or independent the dominant platform in the
market of applications benefits from an increase in the degree of compatibility. If the
82The assumption is trivially satisfied if systems are independent or complementary, i.e.,
σ ≤ 0.
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systems are substitutes, it benefits if the reducing differentiation effect induced by
compatibility is not too strong. The weak platform always benefits from compatibility
an increase in the degree of compatibility.
Proof: From the expressions for the equilibrium prices given in (30), equilib-
rium quantities and profits are respectively given by
q1 =
¡
2− σ2
¢
α1 − σα2
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)
q2 =
¡
2− σ2
¢
α2 − σα1
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)
Π1 =
1
b (1− σ2)
Ã¡
2− σ2
¢
α1 − σα2
4− σ2
!2
Π2 =
1
b (1− σ2)
Ã¡
2− σ2
¢
α2 − σα1
4− σ2
!2
.
We now show that if σ ≤ 0 then ∂Πi∂δ > 0 for all i, whereas if σ > 0 then
∂Π2
∂δ > 0,
but ∂Π1∂δ > 0 if and only if
¡
2− σ2
¢
W2 − σW1 > 0. To see this note that
∂Π1
∂δ
=
2
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α1 − σα2
¢µ¡
2− σ2
¢ ∂α1
∂δ
− σ∂α2
∂δ
¶
=
2
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α1 − σα2
¢ ¡¡
2− σ2
¢
W2 − σW1
¢
, and
∂Π2
∂δ
=
2
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α2 − σα1
¢ ¡¡
2− σ2
¢
W1 − σW2
¢
.
Since
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
α2 − σα1
¢
> 0 because of Assumption 2 and
¡
2− σ2
¢
α1 − σα2 >
0 (recall that α1 > α2 and 2 − σ2 > σ) then ∂Π2∂δ > 0, and sign
³
∂Π1
∂(δ)
´
=
sign
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
W2 − σW1
¢
. Consequently, the dominant platform in the market
of applications benefits with compatibility iff
¡
2− σ2
¢
W2−σW1 > 0, an inequality
that always holds if σ ≤ 0.
We next study how changes in the degree of compatibility as measured by δ
affect consumers surplus and total welfare.
Proposition B1
If σ ≤ 0 both consumer surplus and total welfare are increasing in δ, otherwise
they may be increasing or decreasing.
Proof:Consumer surplus and total welfare are is given by
CS = (α1 − p1) q1 + (α2 − p2) q2 −
1
2
b
¡
q21 + 2σq1q2 + q
2
2
¢
, and
W : α1q1 + α2q2 −
1
2
b
¡
q21 + 2σq1q2 + q
2
2
¢
.
Substituting prices and quantities for their equilibrium prices expressions above can
be rewritten as
CS : B
¡¡
4− 3σ2
¢ ¡
α21 + α
2
2
¢
− 2σ3α1α2
¢
, and
W = B
¡¡
12 + 2σ4 − 9σ2
¢ ¡
α21 + α
2
2
¢
− 2σ
¡
8− 3σ2
¢
α1α2
¢
,
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where B = 1
2b(1−σ2)(4−σ2)2 > 0. Thus,
∂CS
∂δ
= B
Ã¡
4− 3σ2
¢ ∂ ¡α21 + α22¢
∂δ
− 2σ3 ∂ (α1α2)
∂δ
!
,
∂W
∂δ
= B
Ã¡
12 + 2σ4 − 9σ2
¢ ∂ ¡α21 + α22¢
∂δ
− 2σ
¡
8− 3σ2
¢ ∂ (α1α2)
∂δ
!
where
∂
¡
α21 + α
2
2
¢
∂δ
= 2δ
¡
W 21 +W
2
2
¢
+ 2 (2W1W2 + VLW1 + VHW2) > 0
and
∂ (α1α2)
∂δ
=
¡
W 21 +W
2
2
¢
+ 2δW1W2 + VHW1 + VLW2 > 0.
If σ ≤ 0 it follows that ∂CS∂δ > 0 and
∂W
∂δ > 0. If 0 < σ < 1, consumer surplus
and welfare can decrease or increase as the following example shows. Let W1 = 24,
W2 = 4, VH = 8, VL = 2 and δ = 0.25. Figure A1 depicts ∂CS∂δ (solid line) and
∂W
∂δ
(dotted line) as a function of σ.
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Figure A1
Note that there are values of σ for which both ∂CS∂δ and
∂W
∂δ can be either negative
or positive, which shows our claim. The picture suggests that high values of σ make
∂CS
∂δ and
∂W
∂δ negative.
We next analyze the incentives to invest
Proposition B2
(i) There exist σ¯, eσ ∈ (0, 1), σ¯ < eσ, such that
if σ < σ¯ the dominant firm is type I
if σ ∈ (σ¯, eσ) the dominant firm is type II
if σ > eσ the dominant firm is type IV
(ii) The weak firm is either type I or type II. It is more likely type I if asym-
metries in either stand-alone values or in application values are large.
Proof.
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Consider first the dominant system. The effect of δ on the marginal profit from
a higher stand-alone value is given by
∂
³
∂Π1(δ)
∂VH
´
∂δ
=
2
¡
2− σ2
¢
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
W2 − σW1
¢
,
which is increasing if the inequality¡
2− σ2
¢
W2 − σW1 > 0
holds. Let w = W1/W2. Then
∂
?
∂Π1(δ)
∂VH
?
∂δ > 0 if σ < eσ = 12 ¡√w2 + 8− w¢ . Note
that eσ < 1 as it is strictly decreasing in w.
Regarding its marginal incentive to invest in the application, we have
∂Π1 (δ)
∂W1
= 4B (2− σ (δ + σ))
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
(VH +W1 + δW2)− σ (VL +W2 + δW1)
¢
and
∂
³
∂Π1(δ)
∂W1
´
∂δ
= 4B
µ ¡
4 (1− σδ)− σ2 (3− σ (σ + 2δ))
¢
W2 − 2σ (2− σ (δ + σ))W1
−σ
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
VH − σVL
¢ ¶
Depending on the parameters, this expression can be negative or positive. The
first term evaluated at eσ is −12 ¡w2 − 1¢ ³W 21W2 + 4W2 −W1√w2 + 8´ . Since we only
care about its sign we divide it by W2 and we find that it is negative as it equalsµ
− (w
2−1)
2
¶¡
w2 + 4− w
√
w2 + 8
¢
≤ 0 for all w ≥ 1. It is positive at σ = 0, while
negative and increasing at σ = 1. Consequently, there is σ∗ < eσ such that the
first term equals zero at σ = σ∗. Since the second term is always negative we can
conclude that
∂
?
∂Π1(δ)
∂W1
?
∂δ < 0 for all σ > σ
∗. Furthermore since at σ = 0 the second
term equals zero, there is 0 < σ¯ < σ∗ such that
∂
?
∂Π1(δ)
∂W1
?
∂δ ≥ 0 for any σ < σ¯. The
dominant firm type does hence depend on σ. If σ < σ¯ it is type I. If σ ∈ (σ¯, eσ) it is
type II. And if σ > eσ it is type IV, then (i) follows.
Consider now the weak system. The effect of δ on the marginal profit from a
higher stand-alone value is given by
∂
³
∂Π2(δ)
∂VL
´
∂δ
=
2
¡
2− σ2
¢
b (1− σ2) (4− σ2)2
¡¡
2− σ2
¢
W1 − σW2
¢
which is always positive. When analyzing the incentives to invest in the application
value we have that
∂Π2 (δ)
∂W2
= 4B (2− σ (δ + σ))
µ
2 (VL +W2 + δW1)−
σ (W1 + VH + δW2)− σ2 (W2 + VL + δW1)
¶
and
∂
³
∂Π2(δ)
∂W2
´
∂δ
= 4B
µ ¡
4 (1− σδ)− σ2 (3− σ (σ + 2δ))
¢
W1 − 2σ
¡
2− σδ − σ2
¢
W2
+σ
¡
σVH −
¡
2− σ2
¢
VL
¢ ¶ .
Depending on the parameters expression above can be negative or positive. It is
strictly positive at both σ = 0 and σ = 1. Furthermore, it is strictly increasing in
both W1 and VH and strictly decreasing in W2 and VL. Similarly, it is increasing
in both w and v (v = VH/VL) and decreasing in δ. To analyze the impact of
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asymmetries on the sign of
∂
?
∂Π2(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ , consider first a full symmetric scenario with
VH = VL =W1 =W2. In this case
∂
?
∂Π2(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ evaluated at δ = 1 is positive if σ 6= 1,
and σ ≤ 0.44. If we introduce an asymmetry in the stand alone value, for instance
by setting VH = 1.5 > VL = 1, while keeping W1 = W2 = W, then
∂
?
∂Π2(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ is
positive iff σ /∈ (σ1(W ), σ2(W )) where both σ1(W ) and σ2(W ) increase with W
with σ1(1) > 0.44 and σ2(W ) < 1. Finally, if we introduce an asymmetry in the
applications value by setting W1 = 1.5 > W2 = 1, while keeping VH = VL = V,
then
∂
?
∂Π2(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ is positive iff σ /∈ (σ1(V ), 1) where σ1(1) > 0.44. Thus, asymmetries
and/or lower values of δ increase the probability of
∂
?
∂Π2(δ)
∂W2
?
∂δ being positive. The
weak system is hence either type I or type II. It is more likely type I if asymmetries
either in stand-alone values or in application values are large, and statement in (ii)
follows.
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Chapter 4. Two Sided Platforms with Quality
Differentiation
1. Introduction
Nowadays two-sided platforms are present in many aspects of our life. When we
pay with a debit or credit card in the gas station, when we search for a flight ticket
or a hotel in the web, when we buy a newspaper or simply go to the shopping mall,
we are having access or using a platform that allows us to connect in a particular
way with agents on the other side of the market. In general, the more numerous
these agents are the larger is our interest on the platform.83 However, in many
cases the choice of the platform is also conditioned by other circumstances like
the identity of the agents that we are going to meet, the brands that are offered
inside the platform or our level of income. Think of malls in a big city and sellers
and buyers visiting them. On the sellers’ side, we observe that some brands are
present in all of them, whereas others are not. On the buyers’ side, buyers choose
the mall they visit according to the sellers they are intending to buy from. At the
same time, expensive brands have preferences about the type of buyers and locate
in malls visited by high income people. Finally, sellers belonging to the group of
expensive brands choose to group together in the same malls, although it makes
competition between them stronger. A clear example of this phenomena are the
Village Outlets (Fidenza Village in Milan, Bicester Village in London, Las Rozas
Village in Madrid, etc.) that group only expensive brands as Loewe, Versace or
Dior, and present themselves as the "Chic Outlet Shopping".84 Another example is
observed in online travel platforms. In some of them low-cost airlines as "EasyJet",
"GermanWings" or "Ryanair" participate (see for instance, Edreams, Rumbo),
whereas there is a different group of platforms where only big or high-cost airlines
participate (CheapTickets).
Consequently, we may think that heterogeneity of the customers on each side
of the market may play an important role in the formation of the platforms, the
type of platform that may arise and/or the prices that platforms can set.
The recent and growing literature on two-sided platforms have largely consid-
ered models in which members of each customer group benefit if more members of
the other customer group are on the same platform.85 In particular, this literature
has focused on the network effects assuming that agents’ choice of platform is inde-
pendent of their type. However, in many markets, agents’ decisions also affect the
83Note what the advertisement of Mastercard says: "There are some things money can not
buy, for everything else there is Mastercard".
84The webpage of the chain store is www.chicoutletshopping.com, where the expresion "lux-
ury" is present everywhere.
85See the classical papers of Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006).
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level of quality offered by the platform and then other customers’ utilities, so that,
a quality externality takes place. The existence of this externality may help us to
explain why, in spite of the presence of strong network effects, it is not common to
observe concentration in industries based on two-sided platforms. As Evans et al.
(2005) remark, product differentiation may be an important countervailing force
working against concentration.
This paper proposes a tractable framework that allows for both network and
quality effects. There are two sides of the market, buyers and sellers. Sellers are
of two types, the sellers that offer a product of high quality and the sellers that
offer a low quality product. For the low type sellers we maintain the traditional
assumption that they only care about the mass of buyers that participate in their
platform. In contrast, we assume that high type sellers care about the mass of
buyers of a particular type. Buyers are heterogeneous and care about the mass and
type of sellers.
Working with a model where ex-ante platforms are equal, the goal is to de-
termine the conditions under which concentration prevails (i.e., there is a single
active platform in equilibrium) and, in particular, the conditions by which market
equilibria can be characterized by two platforms having different qualities, prices
and profits.86
The platforms’ quality is endogenously determined by the type of sellers that
they house, so that the level of quality is increasing in the proportion of sellers of
high quality.
We find that quality concerns about agents on the other side of the market
are not enough to obtain more than one active platform with sellers playing pure
strategies. However, once we consider that high type sellers care about their part-
ners in the platform,87 any equilibrium market configuration is characterized by
the coexistence of two active platforms. In particular, it occurs when we assume
that high type sellers value in a positive way sharing the platform with sellers of
their type but not with low type ones.88 We find that depending on parameter
values there are equilibria where sellers separate by type, equilibria where every
seller multihomes, and equilibria where low types singlehome whereas high types
multihome.
In any equilibrium where sellers singlehome and separate by type, the profits of
the platform that houses the low quality sellers are no lower than the profits of the
platform housing high quality sellers. In equilibria where low type sellers singlehome
while high type ones multihome, profits of both platforms must be equal, although
their qualities are different. Finally, we also find that there are equilibria with two
86A common feature in the literature is the presence of symmetric equilibria with identical
competing platforms setting the same prices, see Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Armstrong and
Wright, (2007), Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004). An exception is Ambrus and Argenziano (2007).
They find equilibria where one network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other network
is cheaper and larger on the other side. In their model, agents differ in the willingness to pay for
participating in a larger network.
87Pashigian and Gould (1998) analyze empirically the demand externalities existing among
stores in a shopping mall. They argue that there exist "anchor stores" (well known stores) that
create external economies to other stores.
88Any own side effect has been largely ignored in the literature. An exception is Nocke, Peitz
and Stahl (2007) who assume competition between sellers.
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identical platforms where the prices that they set and the profits they get could be
different.
Buyers prefer the equilibria where high type sellers multihome and low type
ones singlehome, so that in the market there is a platform with high quality and the
other one with medium quality. Under some conditions, this kind of equilibrium
also generates the highest level of welfare.
A paper close to this one is Damiano and Li (2007). Their model considers
duopoly price competition in a matching environment. Participants care about the
identities of other participants and the quality of the matching is endogenously
determined. However, there are no network effects between customers, and agents
are assumed to not care about members on their own side. The main consequence of
the differences between theirs and our model is that, whenever platforms compete
in prices simultaneously, only equilibria in mixed strategies will exist, whereas we
find conditions under which pure strategies equilibria indeed exist. In addition,
in the Damiano and Li’s model an equilibrium with a single active platform never
arises. In contrast, this is our unique equilibrium with sellers playing pure strategies
whenever they do not care about who are their partners in the platform.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model
where agents are concerned with quality of members on the other side. In section 3,
we solve the game. In section 4, we search for the equilibria when sellers also care
about the quality of the other sellers in the platform. Finally, Section 5 discusses
the main results we obtained and the adopted modelling assumptions.
2. The model
We study platform price competition in an environment with endogenous ver-
tical differentiation. There are two ex-ante identical platforms operating in a two-
sided market. One side has a measure one of sellers and the other side has a measure
one of buyers. Platforms offer an access service that provides each side with the
possibility of connecting with agents on the other side. This service conveys two
characteristics for each side of the market: the quality of the platform and the
number (mass) of agents on the other market’s side participating in the platform.
The platforms set a charge to permit the access and then, endogenously, determine
the characteristics of the service offered.
Buyers and sellers’ must decide whether to access to the platforms or not. In
particular, buyers are allowed to access only one platform (singlehome) while sellers
can access both of them simultaneously (multihome). We think of platforms in such
a way that at a given point in time a seller or a brand can be present in more than
one platform while a buyer has to choose one of them to visit (malls are a good
example).
Buyers
The surplus that a buyer derives from access to a platform depends on the
number of sellers who join the platform and on its quality. Buyers are heteroge-
neous in the value they assign to the platform’s quality and homogeneous in their
valuations of the network. A consumer of type θ derives a utility
uθi = θq
i + γNSi
of a platform with quality qi and a mass of sellers NSi , where γ is the network
parameter, which can be interpreted as the benefit buyers enjoy from interacting
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with each seller.89 Note that our representation of buyers’ population encompasses
as a particular case Armstrong’s model with membership fees. A buyer of type θ
chooses the platform for which θqi+ γNSi is the largest. If this is negative for both
platforms, then a type θ buyer stays out of the market.
We assume that θ is distributed according to a Burr type XII distribution90
with parameter λ:
θ ∼ F (θ) = 1−
∙
1− θ − θ
θ − θ
¸ 1
λ
;λ ≥ 0, θ  Θ =
£
θ, θ
¤
, θ − θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0.
The value of λ identifies the level of concentration around high or low values of θ. In
particular, if λ = 1, θ is uniformly distributed. If λ > 1, high valuation consumers
are more numerous than low valuation consumers and the opposite occurs if λ < 1.
If λ = 0, distribution becomes degenerate at θ = θ.
Note that quality of the platform and mass of sellers are substitutes in the
surplus of the buyer. Heterogenity determines differences in the weights to each
surplus component.91 Beyond their heterogeneity, all the buyers are more attracted
by both, the platform that houses the largest number of sellers and the platform
with the highest quality. Buyers act to maximize their surplus and they do not pay
to accesing the platform, i.e., platforms charge zero to the buyers side.92
Sellers
There are two type of sellers, the high (H) type, with measure x, and the low
(L) type with measure 1 − x (assume that x < 12). The quality of a platform
depends on the number of high type sellers relative to the total of sellers in the
platform, so that its value belongs to the interval qi [0, 1]. In particular, it takes
value qL = 0 when the platform houses only low type sellers and value qH = 1
when the platform accounts only for high type sellers. If the platform houses all
sellers its quality is qM = x.
We define the mass of sellers (sellers’ demand) on each platform according to
NSi = N
H
i +N
L
i
where NHi and N
L
i are the mass of H type and L type sellers in platform i,
respectively.We denote the mass of buyers (buyers’ demand) that visit the platform
i by NBi .
The net utility of each type of seller when singlehoming in platform i is equal
to
(40) UHi = N
B
i
³
βH
´
− PSi
89Alternatively, the buyers have probability NSi to find the product they need.
90Burr type XII distribution has been used by Basaluzzo et al. (2005).
91It may be better understood if it is interpreted as a heterogeneity in income instead of
preferences. A priori every buyer values the high quality products but before visiting the platform
they anticipate the purchases they can make, so that θ is the result of a problem previously solved
by the buyer (as an indirect utility function).
92Nocke. et. al. (2007) also assume a zero access price for consumers. They note that
this applies whenever it is not feasible to charge buyers or whenever the platform would like to
subsidize them but is not allowed to set negative access prices. Furthermore, they argue that the
latter situation is likely to occur in models with two platforms provided that sellers multi-home
and buyers single-home. Both of these features are present in our model.
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and
(41) ULi = N
B
i − PSi ,
and the utility of sellers that multihome is equal to Usi + U
s
j , s = H,L. The pa-
rameter βH determines the type of buyers that high type sellers are interested in,
where NBi
³
βH
´
is a function defined by
NBi
³
βH
´
= P
³
θ ≥ βH
´
for all θ s.t. UBθi ≥ max{UBθj , 0}.
It follows that NBi
³
βH
´
≤ NBi , so that high type sellers only perceive utility from
the buyers in the platform whose types are in the interval
h
βH , θ
i
. In other words,
NBi (θ) = N
B
i is the complete mass of buyers visiting platform i and N
B
i (β
H) is the
mass of buyers visiting platform i of the type that high type sellers are interested
in. The intuition is that sellers only derive utility from high type buyers (i.e., high
income buyers) to which they expect to sell. Implicitly it is assumed that βL = θ,
i.e., low type sellers derive utility from any kind of buyer. Finally, note that inside
each group sellers are homogeneous.93
Platforms
Platforms face no cost, they can not discriminate in prices within sellers and
they can not set positive prices for the buyers.94 The profits of platform i are given
by
Πi = PSi N
S
i .
The reasoning behind our modelling strategy is similar to that in Gabszewicz
and Wauthy (2004). From the viewpoint of a seller, the willigness to pay to access
a platform depends on her own type and the number of additional sales this seller
expects to realize in the platform. All of them are conditioned by the number and
type of buyers and sellers participating in the platform. From the viewpoint of
the buyers, the willigness to visit the platform depends on the buyers’ type and on
the number of purchases that they expect to make in the platform, which in turn
depends on the number and types of sellers housed by it.
The timing of the game is the following: in the first stage platforms set prices,
in the second stage sellers observe prices and decide their locations. Finally, buyers
observe sellers’ locations, infer platforms’ quality and choose the one they visit. We
search for subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
3. The game
We solve the game by backward induction. First we solve the buyers’ problem,
then we solve the sellers’ subgame and finally the platforms’ problem. In the third
stage, each buyer takes the decision that maximizes her utility given her type. In
the second stage, we search for equilibrium locations of the sellers. In the first
stage, platforms choose the prices they will charge to sellers.
As there is a continuum of sellers, there are multiple locations by the sellers
that can constitute a Nash equilibrium. Given this plethora of equilibria, in order
93The utility function of the sellers follows Armstrong’s model.
94Pashigian and Gould (1988) note that shopping malls charge nothing for access to buyers
whereas they collect rent from retailers. Hagiu (2006) finds that the sellers side pays relatively
more when the "intensity" of buyers’ preferences for variety is higher.
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to obtain sharp predictions, in what follows we will concentrate on Nash equilibria
that are robust to coalitional deviations so that they satisfy the Strong Nash re-
finement. We will search for choices by platforms for which no subgroup of sellers
can deviate by changing strategies jointly in a manner that increases payoffs to all
of its members, given that non-members stick to their original choice.
3.1 The buyers’ problem. At the third stage of the game, each buyer de-
cides on visiting platform 1 or platform 2. We assume that the strategy of not
participating in any platform yields a zero payoff to any buyer. Sellers have already
been located in stage 2 and qualities of the platforms are known in the last stage.
Buyers may hence face one of the three following possible situations: 1) Two active
platforms with different qualities, 2) Two active platforms with the same quality,
and 3) A single active platform.
Two active platforms with qi > qj . For each
¡
NSi , N
S
j
¢
we define θ∗ as the
buyer who is indifferent between visiting platform i and platform j, i.e.,
(42) θ∗ = min{θ, γ
¡
NSj −NSi
¢
(qi − qj) }.
Consequently, the mass of buyers in platform i is given by NBi = 1 − F (θ∗) and
the mass in platform j is given by NBj = 1−NBi = F (θ∗) .
We will here further assume that γ < θ. If this assumption is not satisfied all
the buyers will visit the same platform and they will never separate as the network
effect is too strong. Two particular cases will be of importance in the analysis that
follows. If there is one platform with quality qH = 1 and the other one with quality
qL = 0 then θ∗ = γ (1− 2x). However, if the last platform has quality qM then
θ∗ = γ.
Two active platforms with qi = qj . Two cases may arise. If NSi > N
S
j , then
NBi = 1 and N
B
j = 0, whereas if N
S
i = N
S
j , then N
B
i = N
B
j =
1
2 .
A single active platform j with qj . Every buyer will visit this platform, so that
NBj = 1.
Among all the configurations that may arise in the market when all sellers
participate, the particular cases that will be relevant in the analysis that follows
are:
Configuration 1: a single platform with quality qM
Configuration 2: two platforms with the same quality qM
Configuration 3: two platforms, one with quality qM and
the other with quality qH
Configuration 4: two platforms, one with quality qL and
the other with quality qH
Configuration 5: two platforms, one with quality qL and
the other with quality qM
Before continuing to solve the rest of the game, let us see which of the five
cases is the one that buyers would prefer. We find that any buyer is indifferent
between Configuration 1 and Configuration 2 (recall that buyers are not charged by
accessing to the platform). In either of them, they enjoy a medium quality platform
and they will face the total mass of sellers. Buyers types in the interval [θ, γ] are also
indifferent between any of the two former configurations and Configuration 3, while
3. THE GAME 93
they prefer any of those to Configuration 4 where both, platform quality and mass
of sellers, would be lower than in any of the three aforementioned configurations. In
contrast, buyers types in the interval
£
γ, θ
¤
are indifferent between configurations
3 and 4. In either of them they enjoy a high quality platform and face a mass
of sellers of size x. Note that they are better off under this situation than in the
one where they get a medium quality platform and have access to all the sellers.
Finally, Configuration 5 is dominated by any other one. Thus, the next proposition
follows.
Proposition 1 A market with two platforms, one with quality qM and the
other with quality qH (Configuration 3) is the preferred configuration by any buyer
type.
The most elitist buyers can visit a platform where only the high type sellers are
present. Since they are interested in this type of sellers, the network effect of the
rest of the sellers is not important for them. Other buyers, who may be looking for
a greater variety of sellers, will be more satisfied when visiting the medium quality
platform.
3.2 The sellers’ problem. At the second stage sellers decide where to lo-
cate: at one of the two platforms, at both platforms or at none of them, once the
prices have been already set in the first stage. We assume that the strategy of not
participating in any platform yields a zero payoff to both types of sellers.
A seller of type s will go to platform i (singlehome in i) if and only if
Usi ≥ max{Usj , Usi + Usj , 0}, s = H, L
and she will multihome if and only if
Usi + U
s
j ≥ max{Usi , Usj , 0}, s = H, L.
Recall that the presence of a continuum of sellers yields multiplicity of Nash
equilibria. In order to avoid this situation, our equilibrium concept is the Strong
Nash Equilibrium. It is defined as a strategic profile for which no subset of players
has a joint deviation that strictly benefits all of them.
Definition (Aumann 1959): Let N be the number of players. A strategic profile
σ∗ is a Strong Nash Equilibrium if for all M ⊂ N there is not any (σk)k∈M such
that for all k ∈M
Uk
³
(σk)k∈M , (σ
∗
l )l∈N\M
´
> Uk (σ∗) .
The definition immediately implies that any Strong Equilibrium is a Nash equi-
librium. Throughout the paper, whenever we write that a strategy profile is a
subgame perfect equilibrium we refer to a strategy that represents a Strong Nash
equilibrium in the subgame where sellers play.
3.3 The subgame perfect equilibrium. In a symmetric equilibrium in
which all sellers of a given type follow the same strategy, sellers’ location decisions
can give rise to three possible type of equilibria: 1) a single active platform in which
both types of sellers singlehome (Configuration 1); 2) singlehoming with separation
by type (Configuration 4); 3) some form of multihoming, in particular, the equilib-
rium at which both types multihome (Configuration 2), the one at which only low
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types multihome and high types singlehome (Configuration 5), and the equilibrium
at which only high types multihome and low types singlehome (Configuration 3).
Note that the preferred configuration by the buyers requires of multihoming to
be allowed and, in particular, requires that high type sellers multihome.95
We will restrict the attention to situations where βH > γ (1− 2x). We do
this to emphasize the importance that quality relative to network size has for high
sellers. Recall that 1− F (βH) is the value that the high type sellers attach to the
network, that is, the utility that the mass of buyers with θ‘s higher than βH yield to
the high type sellers. Similarly, 1−F (γ (1− 2x)) is the mass of buyers that go to the
platform with the highest quality when sellers separate by type. Thus, whenever
βH > γ (1− 2x) holds, the mass of buyers that high sellers value is smaller than
the mass of buyers that visit the high quality platform when sellers separate. The
intuition of a sufficiently large βH is that high type sellers are sufficiently exigent
about the buyers type, so that, the network size is small for them.
We next show that when platforms set prices a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium arises when only pure strategies are allowed. In this equilibrium, network
effects dominate quality differentiation so that only one platform can survive in
the market. There is also an equilibrium where sellers play mixed strategies. In
particular, they randomize with probability 12 between the strategies of visiting one
platform or the other.
Proposition 2 A single active platform with quality qM (Configuration 1) is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium configuration in pure strategies. At this
equilibrium, prices are PS1 = P
S
2 = 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.
4. Sellers reputation effect
In the previous section we have seen that quality considerations about agents
on the other side of the market are not enough to obtain an equilibrium with
more than one active platform. In this section we will introduce a second source
of heterogeneity between the two types of sellers. We will assume that high type
sellers care about their partners in the platform, an effect that we interpret as a
reputation effect. In particular, high type sellers value sharing the platform with
sellers of their type but not with low type ones.96 The intuition is that for H type
sellers is more profitable to participate alone conforming an elitist platform since
they can charge higher prices for their products.97 Furthermore, in a platform
where low sellers participate, H type sellers may be forced to set lower prices due
to competition of the other type of sellers that offer cheaper products.
Consider now the following net utility of joining platform i for the high type
sellers
(43) UHi = V (q
i, NBi ) +N
B
i (β
H)− PSi ,
95Exclusive dealings between a platform and high sellers (not low types) would avoid this
configuration to be an equilibrium outcome.
96Although the effect of sharing the platform with sellers of the same type might result in
a fiercer competition among them, we assume that the positive reputation effect overcomes any
potential negative effect that clustering may generate.
97For instance, a shirt in Christian Dior’s shop in Piazza Spagna in Rome is much more
expensive than in others Christian Dior’s shops located in more ordinary places.
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where V (qi, NBi ) measures the value that these sellers assign to platform’s quality.
This is defined in the following way
V (qi, NBi ) =
½
V (qi) if NBi > 0
0 if NBi = 0
and we further assume V (qH) > V (qM ) ≥ V (qL) = 0.
Equation (43) embeds the assumption that in the high sellers utility function
the concern for quality and the concern for network size are additively separable, so
that quality and network are substitutes. This assumption allows us to characterize
sellers’ equilibrium strategies in a convenient way. We will comment on the role
played by this assumption in the last section.98
Since the buyers’ problem remains like in section 3.1, we solve now the sellers’
stage considering their new utility. The following lemma shows that, if sellers
are very exigent about their partners in the platform, the buyers’ most preferred
configuration is still absent as an equilibrium outcome,
Lemma 1 If V (qM ) = 0 there is no equilibria involving multihoming by any
type of seller.
Consider the strategies of low type sellers. If H type sellers are in platform i,
going to this platform generates a benefit 1 − P si for L types while multihoming
yields 1 − P si − P sj . So, given that H type sellers are located in one platform, the
strategy of multihoming by the low sellers will never be a best response. Also, if L
type sellers decide to multihome, platform i will have a level of quality qM , while
platform j with only L types will have quality qL. No buyer will visit platform j
given that it will have a lower quality and a lower number of sellers.
Consider now the high type sellers. If low types are in platform i, going to
platform j generates a benefit
V (qH) +
h
1− F (βH)
i
− P sj
for H type, while multihoming yields
V (qH) +
h
1− F (βH)
i
− P si − P sj .
So, given that L type sellers are located in one platform, the strategy of multihoming
by the high type will never be a best response.
Let us stress that, as we did in subsection 3.3, we are here also restricting the
analysis to the case where βH > γ (1− 2x) , a condition that implies
h
1− F (βH)
i
<
[1− F (γ (1− 2x))]. This condition is indeed relevant for the result in Lemma 1. If
it does not hold, platform j would generate a benefit
(44) V (qH) + [1− F (γ (1− 2x))]− P sj
for the high sellers. And, in particular, they may be interested in multihoming
given that this strategy yields
V (qH) +
h
1− F (βH)
i
− P si − P sj ,
what implies a higher network than in (44).
98However, we conjecture that a utility function for the sellers that would allow for some
complementarity between quality of the platform and network size would not change our results
dramatically.
96CHAPTER 4. TWO SIDED PLATFORMS WITH QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION
Thus, as long as V (qM ) = 0 and βH > γ (1− 2x) hold, there is to say, when-
ever the quality concern of the high type sellers, regarding buyers and sellers, is
sufficiently strong they will never multihome. In the analysis that follows we will
see that multihoming may arise if V (qM ) > 0.
Let us introduce some new pieces of notation that will simplify the presentation
that follows. Let T1 = [1− F (γ (1− 2x))] , T2 = 1 − F (γ) and T3 = 1 − F (βH).
In particular, T2 is the mass of buyers that go to the platform with the highest
quality when low type sellers go to one platform while high type sellers multihome.
Let us also detone by Dq to V (qH) − V (qM ), i.e., to the extra benefit that high
sellers enjoy in terms of reputation from sharing the platform only with sellers of
their type, instead of also sharing the platform with the low type sellers.
To simplify the exposition we write the locations of sellers as “LiHj” to refer to
a location where the L type sellers follow the strategy i and H type sellers follow the
strategy j, where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, M}, i.e., sellers either do not go to any platform,
or go to platform 1, or to platform 2 or multihome. So, for instance, L1H1, means
that both type of sellers only go to platform 1; L1HM means that L type sellers
go to platform 1 and H type multihome. Note that, most of the configurations
can be achieved by more than one location of sellers. In particular, L1H1 and
L2H2 locations lead to Configuration 1, L1HM and L2HM lead to Configuration 3,
finally L1H2 and L2H1 lead to Configuration 4. Finally, we will call platform 2 the
platform that sets the higher price, i.e., PS2 ≥ PS1 .
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium configurations that may arise. In particular,
it provides the map of equilibria at the sellers’ stage that will be formally presented
in proposition 3 below.99
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 V(qH)
Figure 1: The Nash Equilibria at the sellers ’stage
99To construct figure 1 we have further assumed V
?
qM
?
> T1.
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From the figure it follows that Configuration 5, where high type sellers sin-
glehome and low type multihome (locations LMH1 or LMH2) never arises. The
explanation relies on the same arguments used to show Lemma 1.
Let us explain now the rationale behind conditions in Figure 1 which will be
formally stated in next proposition. Consider location L1H2. At this location
sellers’ profits are given by UH2 = V (q
H) + T3 − PS2 and UL1 = (1− T1) − PS1 .
High type sellers will not deviate to location L1H1 whenever
V (qH) + T3 − PS2 ≥ V (qM ) + T3 − PS1 ,
which requires PS2 −PS1 ≤ Dq to hold, and they will not deviate to location L1HM
as long as
V (qH) + T3 − PS2 ≥ V (qH) + V (qM ) + T3 − PS1 − PS2
is satisfied. This is the case whenever PS1 ≥ V (qM ) holds. Similarly, low type
sellers will not deviate to L1H1 if
(1− T1)− PS1 ≥ 1− PS2 ,
which requires PS2 − PS1 ≥ T1. Participation constraints impose PS1 ≤ 1 − T1 and
PS2 ≤ V (qH) + T3. In sum, an equilibrium as (L1H2) requires prices such that
T1 ≤ PS2 − PS1 < Dq, V (qM ) ≤ PS1 ≤ 1− T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH) + T3 (see Figure 1).
Symmetric prices determine location L2H1.
The general conditions for the existence of other type of equilibria at the sellers’
stage is the content of next Proposition.100
Proposition 3
i) There is an equilibrium where sellers separate by type (L1H2) if and only if
T1 ≤ PS2 − PS1 < Dq, V (qM ) ≤ PS1 ≤ 1− T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH) + T3
ii) There is an equilibrium where all the sellers multihome (LMHM) if and only
if PS1 + PS2 ≤ 1 and PS2 ≤ min{T2, V (qM )}
iii) There is an equilibrium where high type sellers multihome and low type
singlehome (L1HM) if and only if PS1 ≤ min{1−T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤ V (qH)
iv) There is an equilibrium where all the sellers singlehome in the same platform
(L1H1) if and only if PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM )+T3} and PS2 ≥ V (qH).
Proof. See Appendix A.
We find that a necessary condition for separation to exist is that the extra ben-
efit that high type sellers obtain when they separate, as compared with a situation
where both types of sellers are together, measured by Dq, is larger than the cost
that separation has on low type sellers in terms of network size, measured by T1.
The latter is the difference in potential clientele between this kind of equilibrium
and a situation where all sellers are together. Thus, the reputation effect has to
be sufficiently higher when they do not share the platform with the low type sell-
ers than when they do. As Dq and T1 tend to get close to each other, separation
becomes unlikely. The same occurs when 1− T1 and V
¡
qM
¢
get close (see Figure
1).
Whenever λ > 1, the distribution function of θ stochastically dominates the
uniform distribution so that T1 is larger than in the case of λ = 1. The contrary
100Proposition 3 focus on pure strategies equilibria. The mixed strategies equilibria are
discussed in appendix B. Note also that it ignores the potential strategies where any type of
sellers do not participate, i.e., locations L0Hi and the LiH0, for any i {0, 1, 2,M}.
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occurs if λ < 1. Then, the more concentrated the buyers’ distribution is around the
higher types, the less likely it is that separation emerges.
Note that the mass of high type sellers, x, affects T1 directly, so that a smaller
mass of high type sellers facilitates separation. On the contrary, changes in γ
affect T1 negatively and make separation more likely. It may appear counterintu-
itive that a higher buyers’ valuation for the network facilitates buyers separation.
This is due to the fact that the low quality platform has a higher mass of buyers
(1− x > x by assumption) . Thus, if γ increases, the utility that this platform gen-
erates for every buyer is higher, and more buyers will decide to visit this platform.
Consequently T1 decreases, and the cost for the low type sellers of being separated
gets smaller. Buyers’ heterogeneity is also crucial for this equilibrium to exist, as
otherwise buyers would never have an incentive to separate.
As long as T2 is large, the equilibrium where all the sellers multihome becomes
more likely. Recall that T2 is the cost for the low type sellers of staying in only one
platform, compared with the benefit of the multihoming strategy, when high type
multihome. The impact of λ and γ on T2 are analogous to those explained for T1.
In a L1HM equilibrium the quality of platform 1 is qM while the quality of
platform 2 is qH . To attract the low type buyers, the price in platform 1 must be
lower than the one in platform 2, and PS2 must be larger than the extra benefit
(T2) that would accrue to the low type sellers by multihoming.
Finally, consider the equilibrium with a single platform. For high type sellers
to stay in the active platform, the difference in prices must compensate for the
difference in terms of reputation between strategies H1 and H2.
4.1 The subgame perfect equilibrium with sellers reputation effect.
We next focus on the first stage of the game when platforms set prices. We first
show that when reputation is a concern an equilibrium with a single platform (as
the one described in Proposition 2) will never arise.
Proposition 4 If V (qH) > V (qM ) ≥ 0 there is no subgame perfect equilibrium
in which only one platform is active in the market (Configuration 1 never arises).
Proof. See Appendix C
Corollary 1 If sellers reputation effect is small there is no a subgame perfect
equilibrium with sellers playing pure strategies.
Under conditions V (qM ) = 0 and V (qH) < T1, Configuration 1 is the only
candidate to be an equilibrium where sellers play pure strategies. Since proposition
4 indicates that this configuration will never exist, the result of the corollary follows.
We next show that depending on parameter values, equilibrium configurations with
the two active platforms and sellers playing pure strategies may arise.
Proposition 5 There exist parameter values under which Configurations 2, 3
and 4 may arise as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
Proof. See Appendix C
To illustrate the likelihood of the different configurations in Proposition 5, let
us analyze the case of Configuration 3, the preferred one by the buyers. Let us
fix platform prices at PS∗1 = V (q
M ) and PS∗2 = V (q
H). At these prices, provided
that V (qM ) < 1 − T2 (see Proposition 3), there is a candidate equilibrium with
Configuration 3, location of sellers L1HM and platforms’ profits Π∗1 = V (qM ) and
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Π∗2 = V (qH)x. To ease the exposition, we here restrict the attention to the parame-
ter values under which Figure 1 follows. In particular, we here assume V (qM ) > T2
and V (qH) > 1.
To analyze under what conditions location L1HM is in fact an equilibrium
outcome we must study deviations of each platform given the other’s price.
Deviations to prices that guarantee a location of sellers L1HM are not profitable
as PS∗1 and P
S∗
2 are the best prices that platforms can set among those that yield
this location. Because of this, deviations by platform 1 to a lower price PS1 < V (qM )
and deviations by platform 2 to prices in the interval (V (qM ), V (qH)] are never
profitable.
Deviations by platform 2 to prices PS2 > V (q
H) are never profitable given that
these prices would lead to a location of sellers L1H1 that would imply Π2 = 0.
Deviations by platform 2 to prices lower than V (qM ) would make this platform to
attract the low type sellers while the high types will multihome (location L2HM
will emerge). This deviation will not be profitable whenever
(45) V (qM ) ≤ V (qH)x.
Consider now deviations by platform 1. As mentioned above we only need to
consider deviations to higher prices. The first possibility is to set PS1 ≤ 1− T1. It
would induce a location of sellers L1H2, so that platform 1 will not deviate if and
only if
(46) V
¡
qM
¢
> (1− T1) (1− x) .
There are two other intervals to be considered. Interval of prices 1− T1 < PS1 < 1
and 1 ≤ PS1 ≤ V
¡
qH
¢
. Prices in the second interval would lead to a location L0H1
and platform 1 would not deviate if
(47) V (qM ) ≥ V (qH)x.
At prices in the interval 1−T1 < PS1 < 1 sellers play mixed strategies in equilibrium
and we present the analysis of this deviation in lemma C3, in the appendix. How-
ever, the condition for such deviations to be unprofitable is guaranteed to hold when
(47) holds. Consequently, if (45), (46) and (47) are satisfied then Configuration 3
can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Regarding platforms profits, note that conditions (45) and (47) imply V (qM ) =
V (qH)x, so that equilibrium profits under Configuration 3 are the same for both
platforms. The rationale is that each platform has the possibility of replicating the
profits of its rival by setting its price. The result holds true for any set of parameters
that allow for configuration 3 to be an equilibrium outcome. Under Configuration
3, although platforms are not symmetric, the profits that they get are the same.
It follows that the price set by the high quality platform is higher than the price
set by the medium quality one. High quality sellers pay more to participate in a
platform where they are alone than in a platform shared with low type ones.
Under Configuration 4, the low quality platform (say platform 1) has always the
possibility of getting the profits of the high type one. Setting a price PS1 = PS2 −ε ,
platform 1 attracts H type sellers, loses the L types and gets the profits of the high
quality platform. In contrast, the high quality platform (say platform 2) can not
replicate the situation of platform 1. Note that in an equilibrium in which Con-
figuration 4 is attained, there is the largest differentiation. Platforms enjoy more
market power and they can extract all the surplus of at least one type of sellers. The
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explanation is the following: from Proposition 3 we know that the best response
prices are: PS1 = min
¡
1− T1, PS2 − T1
¢
and PS2 = min
¡
V
¡
qH
¢
+ T3, PS1 +Dq
¢
.
Since Dq > T1 at least one of the sellers type is at its participation level in equilib-
rium, PS1 = 1− T1 or PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
+ T3.
Finally, under Configuration 2 platforms can enjoy different profits. These
results are summarized in next Proposition.
Proposition 6
i) Symmetric platforms in a equilibrium with Configuration 2 may have different
profits.
ii) In any equilibrium with Configuration 3, although platforms are asymmetric,
profits are equal.
iii) In any equilibrium with Configuration 4, profits of the low quality platform
are higher than or equal to profits of the high quality platform.101
Proof. See Appendix C.
5. Discussion
We have studied competition between two-sided platforms with heterogeneous
buyers and sellers when each side of the market cares not only about the size of
the other side, but also about the type of its members. When buyers and sellers
interact through the platforms there are network and quality effects operating from
one side of the market to the other. In this set-up we have shown that due to the
presence of network effects, the market tends to be concentrated in spite of the
quality effect being present.
The purpose of this section is to discuss the market outcomes that we have
identified, their robustness with respect to changes in the modelling assumptions
and their welfare.
Market outcomes. The unique equilibrium that may emerge, with sellers play-
ing pure strategies, involves a single active platform and all the sellers visiting it,
conforming a medium quality platform. At this equilibrium sellers pay prices equal
to the platforms’ marginal cost.
Given that sellers are allowed to multihome, this result contradicts, in some
sense, the well known "competitive bottleneck equilibrium" of Armstrong (2006) at
which the multihoming side is charged with nearly monopoly prices. The timing of
the game explains the different outcomes. Here buyers decide their location after
observing sellers’ choices so that sellers anticipate that if they group together, they
will meet all the buyers. Because of this, the strategy of multihoming will always
be a dominated one. When this occurs, platforms have incentives for "undercut"
prices to "steal" sellers. It follows that the competitive bottleneck equilibrium may
not be robust to introducing sequential moves so that the two sides of the market
do not play simultaneously.
Once we introduce an own side effect on the sellers’ side, in particular, a kind
of reputation effect for the high type sellers, we find that a unique platform config-
uration will never arise as an equilibrium outcome. Despite the network effects and
the ex-ante symmetric platforms, in any equilibria we find more than a single active
platform. The sufficient condition for this result is that V (qH) > 0. The platforms
101Damiano and Li (2007) show that in a sequential-move game where platforms compete
in prices, the platform that moves first chooses prices such that this platform becomes the low
quality one.
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have the possibility of offering the extra reputation effect to the high sellers in or-
der to attract them and so making impossible the existence of an equilibrium with
Configuration 1.
In particular, whenever the reputation effect is present, platforms have two
types of pricing strategies. First, they can "lowering the own price" to attract
sellers. Second, they can "increase the own price" to provide a higher level of qual-
ity.102 For instance, given a location LMHM, platform 2 would achieve a location
L1HM by setting a price higher than min{T2, V
¡
qM
¢} and lower than V ¡qH¢ (see
Proposition 3). By doing so, platform 2 would offer a service of quality qH , higher
than the initial quality qM , and would attract the buyers that care more about
quality. Something similar occurs in locations L1HM and L1H2. In both cases,
the low quality platform could increase its price to expel the low type sellers while
keeping the high types. By this way, this platform becomes of the same quality as
its rival. Once this is the case, location L0H1 might emerge.
Modelling assumptions. From lemma 1 it follows that in order to have mul-
tihoming a necessary condition is that V (qM ) > 0. In our model it means that
sharing the platform with low sellers still yields a positive extra utility. However,
in some equilibria the condition implies that, for exogenous reasons not related to
the network, participating in both platforms yields an extra profit to the sellers,
compared with the singlehoming strategy. This is a situation that we accept may
be hard to justify.
Thus, the additive separability in quality and NBi (β
H) in the sellers utility
function can be called into question. A multiplicative form would be, for instance,
a more attractive assumption, but instead, a more difficult to work with. Moreover,
results would not change qualitatively, given that the restrictions on platform prices
for each type of equilibrium to arise would go in the same direction.
Throughout the paper we have assumed βH > γ (1− 2x). Note that if we
consider a lower value of βH , so that high sellers care more for the network, we
also may find equilibria where they multihome, with no necessity of V (qM ) > 0.
However, it would imply less heterogeneous sellers and less emphasis on quality by
the high quality sellers.
We consider that a merit of our model is that it provides a tractable framework
to combine both networks and quality effects, where the former effect is the most
important for low sellers and the latter is for high sellers.
Welfare. We have found that Configuration 3 is the preferred one by the buyers:
those buyers that are only interested in high sellers can have access to them, while
those buyers more interested in the number of sellers may visit the rival medium
quality platform.
Note that taking total welfare as the sum of the buyers’ surplus, plus sellers’
surplus and platforms’ profits, this configuration also yields, in general, the highest
level of welfare.
Denote with Λ the aggregate of the sellers’ surplus and the platforms’ profits.
Since buyers access the platform for free, we have that
Λ =
h
V
¡
qi
¢
+NBi
³
βH
´i
NHi +N
B
i N
L
i +
h
V
¡
qj
¢
+NBj
³
βH
´i
NHj +N
B
j N
L
j .
102Note that this strategy is similar to the "overtaking strategy" in Damiano and Li (2007).
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The value that Λ takes under the different equilibrium configurations is as follows
ΛLiHi =
£
V
¡
qM
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) , i 6=M, for Configuration 1,
ΛLMHM =
£
2V
¡
qM
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) for 2,
ΛLiHM =
£
V
¡
qH
¢
+ V
¡
qM
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) (1− T2) , i 6=M, for 3, and
ΛLiHj =
£
V
¡
qH
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) (1− T1) , i 6= j 6=M for 4.
Since ΛLiHM (i 6= M) > ΛLiHj (i 6= j 6=M) , Configuration 4 is always dominated
by Configuration 3. Similarly, platforms and sellers aggregate profits in an equilib-
rium with location LMHM (Configuration 2) are always higher than in a Configura-
tion 1 equilibrium, that is, ΛLMHM > ΛLiHi (i 6=M) . Finally, note that whenever
Dq
T2
> 1−xx it follows that Λ
LiHM (i 6= M) > ΛLMHM . Thus, if Dq is sufficiently
high, Configuration 3 generates the highest level of Λ.
Appendix A
Proof of proposition 2
The statement follows from Bertrand’s arguments. Both plaforms yield a benefit
(gross of prices) to the high type sellers of T3 =
h
1− F
³
βH
´i
. The best reply of
low type sellers is participating in the same platform than H type sellers (i.e., in
platform 1) as
1− PS1 > 1− T1 − PS2 .
Since platforms compete to attract the sellers and equilibrium prices are equal to
the marginal cost of the platforms, there is no profitable deviation to higher prices.
Due to the network effects, even though prices are zero, sellers locate all together
in one platform as claimed.¥
Proof of Proposition 3
i) In any equilibrium configuration in which sellers separate by type as L1H2,
prices satisfy T1 ≤ PS2 − PS1 < Dq, V (qM ) ≤ PS1 ≤ 1− T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH) + T3.
We next show that prices that satisfy these restrictions imply an equilibrium
with location L1H2, by using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Under
prices PS1 ≤ 1 − T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH) + T3, strategies L0 and H0 are eliminated.
Given that PS2 − PS1 ≥ T1, L1 dominates L2 and LM. Finally, the best response
to L1 by high type sellers is H2. Thus, the conditions T1 ≤ PS2 − PS1 < Dq,
V (qM ) ≤ PS1 ≤ 1−T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH)+T3, are necessary and sufficient to ensure
the existence of an equilibrium with location L1H2.
ii) We first prove that in any LMHM equilibrium location, prices satisfymin{T2, V (qM )} ≥
max{PS1 , PS2 } and PS1 + PS2 ≤ 1. The profits of the sellers are UH1 + UH2 =
2V (qM ) + T3 − PS1 − PS2 and UL1 + UL2 = 1 − PS1 − PS2 , where PS1 + PS2 ≤ 1
and PS1 +PS2 ≤ 2V (qM ) + T3 must hold to ensure sellers’ participation. High type
sellers will not deviate whenever
2V (qM ) + T3 − PS1 − PS2 ≥ max{V (qM ) + T3 − PS1 , V (qM ) + T3 − PS2 }
which requires PS1 ≤ V (qM ) and PS2 ≤ V (qM ) to hold. Similarly, low type sellers
will not deviate whenever
1− PS1 − PS2 ≥ max{(1− T2)− PS1 , (1− T2)− PS2 }
which requires PS1 ≤ T2 and PS2 ≤ T2. Thus, the first implication follows.
APPENDIX B 103
Now, by iterated elimination of dominated strategies, we show that prices
such that min{T2, V (qM )} ≥ max{PS1 , PS2 } and PS1 + PS2 ≤ 1 ensure the exis-
tence of a equilibrium location LMHM as claimed. Trivially, strategies L0 and
H0 are eliminated given that participation conditions are fullfilled. Given that
max{PS1 , PS2 } ≤ V (qM )}, HM dominates H1 and H2. Finally, the best reply of L
type sellers to the HM strategy is LM under prices max{PS1 , PS2 } ≤ T2.
iii) We first show that in any L1HM location prices satisfy PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0,
PS1 ≤ min{1− T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤ V (qH).
In a location as L1HM, sellers’ profits are given by UHM = V (q
H)+V (qM )+T3−
PS1 − PS2 and UL1 = (1− T2) − PS1 . Participation constraints require PS1 ≤ 1 − T2
and PS1 + P
S
2 ≤ V (qH) + V (qM ) + T3 to hold. High type sellers will not deviate
whenever PS1 ≤ V (qM ) and PS2 ≤ V (qH) hold. Similarly, low type sellers will not
deviate whenever PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0 and PS2 ≥ T2 are satisfied.
We next show that under prices that satisfy PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0, PS1 ≤ min{1 −
T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤ V (qH), only a L1HM equilibrium can arise. As in
previous parts of this proof we obtain the result by iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. The strategies L0 and H0 are trivially eliminated. Given that PS1 ≤
V (qM ), HM dominates H2. And then, L1 dominates L2 and LM. Finally, the best
response of high type sellers to L1 is HM.
Thus, the conditions PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0, PS1 ≤ min{1− T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤
V (qH) are necessary and sufficient to ensure the existence of an equilibrium location
L1HM, as claimed.
iv) First, we prove that in any L1H1 equilibrium prices satisfy PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq,
PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM ) + T3} and PS2 ≥ V (qH).
In a location as L1H1, sellers’ profits are given by UH1 = V (q
M ) + T3 − PS1
and UL1 = 1− PS1 , where PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM ) + T3} ensure that profits above are
positive. High type sellers will not deviate to platform 2 whenever PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq
and will not deviate to a multihome strategy whenever PS2 ≥ V (qH) is satisfied.
Similarly, low type sellers will not deviate whenever PS2 − PS1 ≥ −T1. Note that
this condition is implied by PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq.
We next show that under prices that satisfy PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM )+
T3} and PS2 ≥ V (qH) only a L1H1 equilibrium will arise. The implication is proved
by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Strategies L0 and H0 are trivially
eliminated. Under prices PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq, strategy H1 dominates H2 and under con-
dition PS2 ≥ V (qH), HM is dominated by H1. Finally, given strategy H1, the best
reply of low type sellers is L1. Consequently, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a L1H1 equilibrium location are PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM )+T3} and
PS2 ≥ V (qH) as claimed.¥
Appendix B
NE in mixed strategies of the sellers’ subgame. B1)We present the set of Nash
Equilibria in mixed strategy of the sellers’ subgame when PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
and the
price of platform 1 belongs to the interval (1− T1, 1) .
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Under these prices and assuming V
¡
qH
¢
> 1, iterative elimination of domi-
nated strategies103 shows that low type sellers can only randomize between strate-
gies L1 and L0 and high type sellers can only randomize between strategies H1 and
H2.
Denoting by a the probability of playing L1 and by y the probability of playing
H1, high sellers’ expected utility is given by
UH(a; y) = y
¡
V (qH)− aDq − PS1
¢
.
The best reply by H type sellers involves
BRH(a; y) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
y = 1 if V (qH)− aDq − PS1 > 0
y = 0 if V (qH)− aDq − PS1 < 0
y  [0, 1] if V (qH)− aDq − PS1 = 0.
And the low type sellers’ utility is given by
UL(a; y) = a
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
,
so that their best reply is
BRL(a; y) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
a = 1 if
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
> 0
a = 0 if
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
< 0
a ∈ [0, 1] if
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
= 0.
Note that, given PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
, whenever PS1 belongs to the interval
£
1, V
¡
qH
¢¤
,
the equilibrium location is L0H1. Similarly, if PS1 belongs to the interval
£
V
¡
qM
¢
, 1− T1
¤
,
the equilibrium is L1H2. Consequently, we only need to derive the set of NE in
mixed strategies for the interval of prices 1− T1 < PS1 < 1.
Lemma B1 If 1−T1 < PS1 < 1, high type sellers randomize between strategies
H1 and H2 with probabilities y = 1T1
¡
PS1 − (1− T1)
¢
and 1−y respectively, whereas
low type sellers randomize between strategies L1 and L0 with probabilities a =
V (qH)−PS1
Dq
and 1− a. The size of the market of platform 1 is given by
(48)
Ã
V
¡
qH
¢
− PS1
Dq
!
(1− x) +
µ
1
T1
¡
PS1 − (1− T1)
¢¶
x
Proof. The value a =
V (qH)−PS1
Dq
leaves the high type sellers indifferent between
strategies H1 and H2. Analogously, the value y = 1T1
¡
PS1 − (1− T1)
¢
leaves the
low type sellers indifferent between strategies L1 and L0.¥
B2) We present the set of Nash Equilibria in mixed strategy of the sellers’
subgame when PS1 = 1 − T1 and the price of platform 2 belongs to the interval
V
¡
qM
¢
≤ PS2 ≤ 1.
The set of equilibria is computed assuming that LM is a dominated strategy
(it occurs if 1− T1 > T1 or if V (qM ) > T1).
In addition, this set of equilibria exists when parameters satisfy also the fol-
lowing conditions: 2 (1− T1) < V (qH) + V (qM ) < 2− T1.
103We find that L1 dominates LM, then H1 weakly dominates HM, L0 dominates L2 and
finally, H2 dominates H0.
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We denote by a the probability of the low type sellers playing strategy L1 and
consequently (1− a) the probability of L2. We denote by y, b and c = 1− y− b the
probabilities of the high type sellers playing strategies H1, H2 and HM, respectively.
Given PS1 = 1− T1, the high type sellers’ expected utility is given by
UH(a; (y, b)) = T3 + y
¡
T1 + V (qH)(1− a) + aV
¡
qM
¢
− 1
¢
+
b
¡
V
¡
qM
¢
(1− a) + aV (qH)− p2
¢
+ c
¡
V
¡
qM
¢
+ V (qH) + T1 − 1− p2
¢
= T3 + yz1 + bz2 + cz3.
The best reply by H involves
BRH(a; (y, b, c)) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
y = 1 if z1 > max(0, z2, z3)
b = 1 if z2 > max(0, z1, z3)
c = 1 if z3 > max(0, z1, z2).
Given PS1 = 1− T1, the high type sellers’ expected utility is given by
UL(a; (y, b, c)) = a (yT1 + T1 − bT1 − 1 + p2)− yT1 + 1− T2 + T2y + T2b− p2,
and the corresponding best reply by low type sellers is
BRL(a; (y, b, c)) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
a = 1 if (1 + y − b)T1 − 1 + p2 > 0
a = 0 if (1 + y − b)T1 − 1 + p2 < 0
a ∈ [0, 1] if (1 + y − b)T1 − 1 + p2 = 0.
Using the best reply functions above, we next show the set of Nash equilibria in
mixed strategies.
Lemma B2 Along the interval V (qH)+V (qM )−(1− T1) < PS2 ≤ 1 there exists
a set of mixed strategy Nash Equilibria where low type sellers randomize between
strategies L1 and L2 and high type sellers randomize between strategies H1 and
H2 with probabilities a =
³
1
2
Dq+PS2 −(1−T1)
Dq
´
, y =
³
1
2
1−PS2
T1
´
and b = 1 − y. The
platform 2’s market in this interval is equal to
(49)
µ
1
2
Dq − PS2 + (1− T1)
Dq
¶
(1− x) +
µ
1
2
T1 − (1− T1) + PS2
T1
¶
x
Proof. If V (qH) + V (qM )− (1− T1) < PS2 , then z3 < 0 so that strategy HM
is dominated. At a =
³
1
2
Dq+PS2 −(1−T1)
Dq
´
type H sellers are indifferent between H1
and H2. Similarly, y =
³
1
2
1−PS2
T1
´
is the probability that makes low type sellers
indifferent between L1 and L2. The size of the market follows trivially from the
probabilities above.¥
Lemma B3 Along the interval (1− T1) < PS2 < V (qH) + V (qM ) − (1− T1),
L type sellers randomize between strategies L1 and L2 whereas H type sellers ran-
domize between strategies H2 and HM with probabilities a = (
V (qH)−(1−T1))
Dq
, b =³
1
T1
¡
PS2 − (1− T1)
¢´
and c = 1−b.104 Platform 2’s market in this interval is equal
to
(50)
Ã
(1− T1)− V
¡
qM
¢
Dq
!
(1− x) + x
104If the price is PS2 = V (q
H)+V (qM )− (1− T1) , L type sellers randomize between L1 and
L2 whereas H type sellers randomize by putting positive weights in their three strategies.
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Proof. At a = (
V (qH)−(1−T1))
Dq
, H type sellers are indifferent between their
three possible strategies as z1 = z2 = z3. The values that leave L type sellers
indifferent between L1 and L2 are b =
³
1
T1
¡
PS2 − (1− T1)
¢´
and c = 1− b, which
trivially follows from BRL(a; (y, b)).¥
Lemma B4 If VM < PS2 < (1− T1) low type sellers randomize between strate-
gies L1 and L2 with a = (
PS2 −V (qM))
Dq
, and high type sellers randomize between
strategies H1 and HM with probabilities y = (
1−T1−PS2 )
T1
and c = 1− y.105 The size
of the market of platform 2 in this interval of prices is
(51)
Ã¡
V
¡
qH
¢
− PS2
¢
Dq
!
(1− x) +
µ
T1 − (1− T1) + PS2
T1
¶
x
Proof. Whenever the value of a is smaller than
V (qH)−(1−T1)
Dq
, the best response
of the high type sellers is b = 0. The value y = (
1−T1−PS2 )
T1
leaves low sellers
indifferent between strategies L1 and L2. Platform 2’s market trivially follows.¥
Note that, whenever DqT1 ≥
1−x
x , markets defined by equation (48) , (49), (50)
and (51) are non-decreasing in prices.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume first V (qM ) > 0. From proposition 3 we know that there is an equi-
librium where all the sellers locate in platform 1 if the following conditions are
satisfied: PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM )+T3} and PS2 ≥ V (qH). (Symmetric
prices lead to an equilibrium with all the sellers in platform 2).
Assume by way of contradiction that there are equilibrium prices
¡
PS1 , PS2
¢
such that sellers locate all together in platform 1 so that Π2 = 0. As PS1 ∈£
0, V (qM ) + T3
¤
, consider the following deviation by platform 2 P 02 = P
S
1 +V (q
H)−
ε > 0. Since V (qH) > 0, this deviation never leads to a configuration in which all
the sellers go to platform 2 as that would require PS1 − P 02 ≥ Dq > 0 to hold while
PS1 − P 02 < 0.
At the new prices, and depending on the parameter values, the following con-
tinuation equilibria at the sellers’ stage game may arise:
1) If V (qH) > T1 and V (qM ) ≤ PS1 ≤ 1− T1 hold, then sellers will separate by
type, low type sellers will remain in platform 1 whereas high type sellers will go to
platform 2. The deviation will hence result in Π2 > 0.
2) If PS1 < min{V (qM ), 1 − T2} and P 02 > T2, the new location is L1HM and
the deviation will yield Π2 > 0.
105If PS2 = (1− T1) there is a set of NE in mixed strategies where L type sellers randomize
between L1 and L2 with probabilities a ∈
?
(1−T1)−V (qM)
Dq
,
V (qH)−(1−T1)
Dq
?
whereas H type sellers
play the strategy HM.
If PS2 = V
?
qM
?
L type sellers play strategy L2 and H type sellers randomize between
strategies H1 and HM with probabilities y ∈ [0, (1−T2−P
S
2 )
T1
).
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3) If PS1 < min{V (qM ), T2} and PS1 + P 02 ≤ 1, the new location is LMHM and
the deviation will also yield Π2 > 0.
4) In any other case, sellers will play mixed strategies. The strategy of not
participating in any platform is a dominated strategy for high sellers, thus, they
will randomize between going to platform 1 and going to platform 2. Consequently,
Π2 > 0.
Since the deviation will be profitable, all the sellers singlehoming in one plat-
form can not be an equilibrium, as claimed.
Consider now the case V (qM ) = 0. Assume again by contradiction that there
are equilibrium prices
¡
PS1 , P
S
2
¢
such that sellers locate all together in platform 1 so
that Π2 = 0. For this to be the case prices must satisfy the following two conditions
(analogous to the ones in proposition 3) i) PS2 − PS1 ≥ V (qH); ii) PS1 ≤ T3. Since
PS1 ∈ [0, T3], consider the following deviation by platform 2: P 02 = PS1 +V (qH)−ε >
0. Since V (qH) > 0, this deviation never leads to a configuration in which all the
sellers go to platform 2 as that would require PS1 − P 02 ≥ V (qH) > 0 to hold and
PS1 − P 02 < 0.
At the new prices, and depending on parameters, the following continuation
equilibria at the sellers’ stage game may arise:
1) If V (qH) > T1 and PS1 ≤ 1− T1 hold then sellers will separate by type, low
type sellerswill remain in platform 1 whereas high type sellers will go to platform
2. The deviation will hence result in Π2 > 0.
2) If at least one of the two conditions in 1) is not satisfied, sellers will play
mixed strategies. The strategy of not participating in any platform is a dominated
strategy for high sellers, thus, they will randomize between going to platform 1 and
going to platform 2. Consequently, Π2 > 0.
Since the deviation will be profitable, all the sellers singlehoming in one plat-
form can not be an equilibrium, as claimed.¥
Proof. of Proposition 5
The proof of this proposition is organized around three lemmas: lemma C1
shows that Configuration 2 may arise as a subgame perfect equilibrium, lemma
C2 shows it for Configuration 4, and lemma C3 complements the proof that is
presented in the paper for conditions that imply a subgame perfect equilibrium
with Configuration 3.
Lemma C1 If V (qH)x < min{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 Configuration 2 arises as
a subgame perfect equilibrium with prices PS∗1 = P
S∗
2 = min{T2, V (qM )}. If
min{T2, V (qM )} > 12 , there is a set of subgame perfect equilibria with Configuration
2 if PS1 + P
S
2 = 1 and xV (q
H) < min{1− PS2 , 1− PS1 } are satisfied.
Proof. We first show that there is no profitable deviation by platform 2 given
PS∗1 = min{T2, V (qM )}.
At the candidate equilibrium platform 2’s profits are Π∗2 = min{T2, V (qM )}
provided that min{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 , which ensures low type sellers participation.
As shown in proposition 3 no other price by platform 2 will yield a higher profit
among the prices that induce Configuration 2. Consequently, we only need to check
for deviations to a higher price that would induce sellers’ location L1HM provided
that PS2 < V (q
H). Such a deviation is not profitable if and only if
PS2 x < min{T2, V (qM )}.
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As PS2 < V (qH), a sufficient condition to deter this deviation is given by V (qH)x <
min{T2, V (qM )}. If min{T2, V (qM )} > 12 holds, participation of low type sellers
is ensured by condition PS1 + PS2 = 1. The last condition deter any deviation by
platform 2. Similar arguments apply to platform 1 deviations, which show our
claim.¥
Lemma C2 If x is sufficiently lower than (1− T1) , a Configuration 4 with
location of sellers L1H2 and prices PS∗1 = (1− T1) and PS∗2 = V (qH) + T3 may
exist as an equilibrium.
Proof. At the candidate equilibrium platform’s profits areΠ∗1 = (1− T1) (1− x)
and Π∗2 =
¡
V (qH) + T3
¢
x.
We first analyze deviations by platform 2 given PS∗1 = 1−T1.These deviations
can be divided into three groups:
1) Deviations to prices that guarantee sellers’ separation, i.e., to prices in the
interval [1,Dq + 1− T1] . These deviations are not profitable as PS∗2 is the monopoly
price.
2) Platform 2 can deviate to a lower price PS2 ≤ 1 to attract more sellers and
obtain higher benefits. There are three price intervals to be considered. In all of
them sellers play mixed strategies in equilibrium (see B2 in Appendix B):
Interval 1: V (qH) + V (qM )− (1− T1) < PS2 ≤ 1
As shown in lemma B1 of appendix B, at these prices low type sellers go to
platform 2 with probability (1− a) and high type sellers with probability b, hence
the market of platform 2 in this interval is (49) .
Interval 2: (1− T1) < PS2 ≤ V (qH) + V (qM )− (1− T1)
At these prices lemma B2 shows that platform 2 gets all the high type sellers
and gets the low type with probability (1− a) , so that the market of platform 2 is
(50) . Note that (50) is higher than (49) .
A sufficient condition for no deviation to any price in the two previous intervals
by platform 2 is to evaluate profits at PS2 = 1. The condition that arises is
(52)
¡
V (qH) + T3
¢
x ≥
Ã
(1− T1)− V
¡
qM
¢
Dq
!
(1− x) + x
Interval 3: V (qM ) < PS2 ≤ (1− T1)
At these prices from lemma B3 we know that platform 2 gets the low type sellers
with probability (1− a) and the high type sellers with probability (1− y) .The
relevant market of platform 2 for this interval is given by (51). If the market in
this interval is non-decreasing in PS2 , i.e., condition
Dq
T1
≥ 1−xx holds, a sufficient
condition for no deviation arises. If Π∗2 ≥
£
Market
¡
PS2 = 1− T1
¢¤
(1− T1) , i.e.,
(53)
¡
V (qH) + T3
¢
x ≥
"Ã
V
¡
qH
¢
− (1− T1)
Dq
!
(1− x) + x
#
(1− T1)
If PS2 ≤ V (qM ) the condition that avoids any deviation to a location L2HM is
(54)
¡
V (qH) + T3
¢
x ≥ V (qM )
3) Deviations to a higher price PS2 ≥ Dq + 1 − T1. These deviations are not
profitable deviations given that they would lead to a location of sellers L1H1 that
implies Π2 = 0.
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Now, consider deviations by platform 1 given PS∗2 = V (qH) + T3. These devi-
ations can be divided into three groups:
1) Deviations to prices that guarantee sellers’ separation, i.e., to prices in the
interval
£
V (qH) + T3 −Dq, V (qH) + T3 − T1
¤
. These deviations are not profitable
as PS∗2 is the monopoly price.
2) Platform 1 can deviate to a lower price PS1 ≤ V (qH)+T3−Dq = V (qM )+T3.
These prices would lead to a location of sellers L1H1 that implies Π1 = V (qM )+T3.
This deviation is not profitable whenever
(55) V (qM ) + T3 < (1− T1) (1− x)
3) Deviations to a higher price PS1 ≥ V (qH)+T3−T1. The best deviation would
imply attrating H type sellers while L type are lost (location L0H1). The maximum
price that ensures to attain L0H1 is PS1 = V (qH) + T3 − ε, so that platform 1 will
not deviate if and only if
(56)
¡
V (qH) + T3
¢
x ≤ (1− T1) (1− x)
Note that (53) and(56)are compatible if and only if (1−T1)−V (q
M )
Dq
> x1−x
Note that (52) and(56)are compatible if and only if (1−T1)(Dq−1)+V (q
M )
Dq
> x1−x .
Condition (56) is compatible with V (qH) > 1 if and only if (1−T1)(1+T3) >
x
1−x .
The common feature of the conditions are that x must be sufficiently low and
(1− T1) sufficiently high to hold.¥
Lemma C3 Consider V (qH) > 1 and V (qM ) > T2. If xV (qH) = V (qM ) >
(1− T1) (1− x), Configuration 3 arises as a subgame perfect equilibrium with prices
PS∗1 = V (qM ) and PS∗2 = V (qH) and location of sellers L1HM.
Proof. Since for PS1 = V (qM ) to be an equilibrium it is needed that (1− T2) >
V (qM ) (see proposition 3), we further assume that this condition holds. The result
is obtained for the case where DqT1 ≥
1−x
x satisfies.
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The proof of this lemma is presented in the paper after the statement in propo-
sition 5. There is only one deviation that rest to be analyzed, the one in the interval
1 − T1 < PS1 < 1 at which sellers play mixed strategies in equilibrium (see B2 in
appendix B).
In particular, platform 1 gets the low type sellers with probability a and gets
the high type sellers with probability y. Platform 1’s market is given by (48) that
under the condition DqT1 ≥
1−x
x is non-decreasing in P
S
1 . Consequently profits at
these prices are bounded above by the profits at PS1 = 1. No deviation will take
place if
(57) V
¡
qM
¢
>
Ã
V
¡
qH
¢
− 1
Dq
!
(1− x) + x.
Note that (57) is implied by (47) as V
¡
qH
¢
> 1.¥
Proof. of Proposition 6
i) From lemma C1 it follows that if min{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 , platforms’ profits are
Π∗1 = Π∗2 = min{T2, V (qM )}. If the contrary occurs, the profits are Π1 = 1 − PS2
106We have shown in the Appendix B that under this condition the market of platform 1
when sellers play mixed strategies is non-decreasing in its own price.
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and Π2 = 1 − PS1 , in which case there is a set of possible equilibria and profits of
both platforms will be equal if and only if PS1 = P
S
2 =
1
2 .
ii) From proposition 3 we know that prices are going to be such that PS1 ≤
min{1− T2, V (qM ), PS2 } and PS2 ≤ V (qH). Note that in equilibrium platforms will
optimally charge prices PS1 = min{1− T2, V (qM )} and PS2 = V (qH). At any other
price there exists a profitable deviation for at least one of the platforms. Moreover,
both platforms have the possibility of getting the other platform’s profits by setting
its price. Setting a price PS2 = min{1 − T2, V (qM )} − ε platform 2 attracts low
type sellers and gets the profits that platform 1 obtains in the equilibrium. With a
price PS1 = V (qH)− ε platform 1 attracts high type sellers, loses low type sellers
and gets the profits of platform 2 in equilibrium. These two deviations will not be
profitable whenever profits in equilibrium are equal, which shows the statement.
iii) Let platform 1 be the low quality platform and platform 2 be the high
quality one. The statement follows from two facts. On the one hand, the low
quality platform always has the possibility of getting the profits of the high type
one (whenever PS2 > 1− T1). Setting a price PS1 = PS2 − ε , platform 1 attracts H
type sellers, loses L type sellers and gets the profits of the high quality platform.
It would be a profitable deviation if the high quality platform had higher profits
than the low quality one. On the other hand, given PS1 , platform 2 can not always
replicate the situation of platform 1. This fact explains the asymmetry between
profits.¥
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